Dreams Into Lightning 2

Winograd Report

Ha'Aretz: Main findings of the Winograd report.

1. On September 17th 2006, the Government of Israel decided, under section 8A of The Government Act 2001, to appoint a governmental commission of examination "To look into the preparation and conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12th 2006". Today we have submitted to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense the classified interim report, and we are now presenting the declassified report to the public.

2. The Commission was appointed due to a strong sense of a crisis and deep disappointment with the consequences of the campaign and the way it was conducted. We regarded this difficult task both as a duty and a privilege. It is our belief that the larger the event and the deeper the feeling of crisis - the greater the opportunity to change and improve matters which are essential for the security and the flourishing of state and society in Israel. We believe Israeli society has great strength and resilience, with a robust sense of the justice of its being and of its achievements. These, too, were expressed during the war in Lebanon and after it. At the same time, we must not underrate deep failures.

3. This conception of our role affected the way we operated. No-one underestimates the need to study what happened in the past, including the imposition of personal responsibility. The past is the key for learning lessons for the future. Nonetheless, learning these lessons and actually implementing them are the most implications of the conclusions of the Commission.

4. This emphasis on learning lessons not only follows from our conception of the role of a public commission. It also follows from our belief that one of Israeli society's greatest sources of strength is its being free, open and creative. Together with great achievements, the challenges facing it are existential. To cope with them, Israel must be a learning society - a society which examines its achievements and, in particular, its failures, in order to improve its ability to face the future.

5. Initially we hoped that the appointment of the Commission would serve as an incentive to accelerate learning processes in the relevant systems, so that we could devote our time to study all of the materials in depth, and present the public with a comprehensive picture. However, learning processes have been limited. In some ways an opposite, and worrying, process emerged - a process of 'waiting' for the Commission's Report before energetic and determined action was taken to redress the failures that have been revealed.

6. Therefore we decided to publish initially an Interim Report, focusing on the decisions related to the start of the war. We did this in the hope that the relevant bodies would take urgent action to change and correct all the implications. We would like to reiterate and emphasize that we hope that this Partial Report, which concentrates on the functioning of the highest political and military echelons in their decision to move to war will not divert attention from the troubling overall picture revealed by the war as a whole.

7. The interim report includes a number of chapters dealing with the following subjects:

a. The Commission's perception of its role, and its attitude to recommendations in general and to recommendations dealing with specific persons in particular (chapter 2). We see the main task of a public commission of inquiry (or investigation) as determining findings and conclusions, and presenting them - with its recommendations - before the public and decision makers so that they can take action. A public commission should not, in most cases, replace the usual political decision-making processes and determine who should serve as a minister or senior military commander. Accordingly, we include personal conclusions in the interim report, without personal recommendations. However, we will reconsider this matter with regards to our Final Report, in view of the depiction of the war as a whole.

b. The way we balanced our desire to engage in a speedy and efficient investigation with the rights of those who may be negatively affected to 'natural justice' (chapter 3). The special stipulations of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in this regard do not apply to a governmental commission of Examination, but we regard ourselves, naturally, as working under the general principles of natural justice. The commission notified those who may be affected by its investigation, in detailed letters of invitation, of the ways in which they may be negatively affected, and enabled them to respond to allegations against them, without sending "notices of warning" and holding a quasi-judicial hearing before reaching out conclusions. We believe that in this way we provided all who may be negatively affected by our report with a full opportunity to answer all allegations against them.

c. The processes and developments in the period between the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon until July 11, 2006 which contributed to the background of the Lebanon War (chapter 4). These processes created much of the factual background against which the decision-makers had to operate on July 12th, and they are thus essential to both the understanding and the evaluation of the events of the war. Understanding them is also essential for drawing lessons from the events, whose significance is often broader than that of the war itself.

8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.

9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We place the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made. However, there are many others who share responsibility for the mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.

10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making processes can be summed up as follows:

a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not another effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.

b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations without immediate military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.

c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized the commencement of a military campaign without considering how to exit it.

d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action.

e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.

f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting would continue until they were achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.

11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been significantly better.

12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.

a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.

b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front or of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.

c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationship between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.

d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and were not materializing.

e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.

13. The Minister of Defense is the minister responsible for overseeing the IDF, and he is a senior member of the group of leaders in charge of political-military affairs.

a. The Minister of Defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals.

b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he attended.

c. The Minister of Defense did not act within a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table - and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.

d. The Minister of Defense did not develop an independent assessment of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, of which he was in charge, and the Prime Minister.

e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defense failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.

14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's personal involvement with decision making within the army and in coordination with the political echelon was dominant.

a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.

b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of the arena was that there was a high probability that a military strike against Hezbollah would make such a move necessary.

c. The COS' responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational plans fitting the situation.

d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservations about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals and the authorized modes of actions.

e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and judgment.

15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the outcomes of the war, had many other partners. ...

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

On Monday, April 30, the Inquiry Commission into the military campaign held in Lebanon in summer 2006, headed by former Justice Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, submitted to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense an interim report relating to the time from the IDF's exit from Lebanon to the soldiers' abduction on July 12, 2006 and to the time between July 12 and July 17, when the decision to move into war was taken. ...

Israel Insider:

"The prime minister had formulated his opinion without being presented with a detailed plan, and without demanding that such a plan be presented, and therefore he could not have analyzed its details and approved it.

"Furthermore, he did not demand to be presented with genuine alternatives to his own opinions, or exhibit due skepticism regarding the military's positions. In this he failed.

"The prime minister also failed when he had his government approve such decisions ... and by declaring unattainable objectives to the war, and that the fighting should continue until they were achieved."

Members of the Winograd Commission arrived at Olmert's Jerusalem office at 4 p.m. on Monday -- one hour before the report's release to the public -- and gave the Prime Minister and Defense Minister Amir Peretz copies of the report, for their inspection before its publication.

Upon receiving a copy of the report, Olmert thanked the members for their hard work and assured them, "We will study the report and act immediately ... so that we can implement the lessons, fix the failures, and make sure that in any future scenario of the State of Israel, the failures you have indicted are corrected."

Debka:

... Then, too, the Olmert government's handling of the Lebanon War last summer came in for scathing criticism in the interim report submitted Monday, April 30 by the team led by Judge Eliahu Winograd. But no demands were made for heads to roll. The final report due out in August 2007 is expected to be less kind to individual decision-makers. So the prime minister and his government can only count their future in months – not years.

The Belmont Club:

... The debacle experienced by Israel last summer was consequent to two fundamental mistakes. The first is that ceding the initiative to the enemy and withdrawing from contact while he is still advancing increases rather than decreases vulnerability. It does not "take troops out of harms' way". It sets them up for the slaughter. The second error is more fundamental. Disengagement is an act in which the enemy gets a vote. The Israeli public's desire for peace, which manifested itself in unilateral withdrawal, the abandonment of its allies and in the reluctance to give the give the slightest offense to its enemies could only have succeeded in ending the fighting if it had been matched by a similar desire on the part of its enemies.

... As it was, Israeli passivity only encouraged enemy boldness while it withered the sinews of the IDF. The crisis, when it came, consisted of a rain of unstoppable missiles deep within the territory of Israel itself. Not only was Israel sucked back into Lebanon, from which it had hoped never to return; but it was drawn back under conditions of the enemy's own choosing. Far from removing its soldiers the battlefield, the retreat had brought the battlefield back to its soldier's homes: to Israel itself. Most ironical of all, the appeasement, the concession, the attempts to win "world opinion" to Israel's side brought it no sympathy in the end. All it purchased was contempt for Israel and admiration for its enemies.

What lessons does the Winograd report have for America? None, I suspect. In Israel as in America, there are none so blind as those will not see.

Lisa Goldman - On the Face:

Also, most people seem to be ignoring the rather plentiful evidence pointing to the fact that the ground was laid for the failure of that war long before Olmert took office. For example, Aharon Ze'evi Farkash, who headed military intelligence until January 2006, told Yedioth on Monday that he warned former PM Ariel Sharon of a high risk of kidnappings on the northern border six months before the war, and that Sharon - who certainly had plenty of military experience - brushed his concerns aside. When I tagged along with Michael Totten on his April 2006 trip to the northern border, a young IDF captain told us very soberly that we really shouldn't be there, because "everything could explode at any moment." It's worth going back to read Michael's report to see that there's no way the army could have been unaware that Hezbollah was preparing to attack. And it's simply not credible to contend that the army didn't report what it saw in front of its eyes - a massive buildup of Hezbollah military force on the border - to the prime minister.

Don't get me wrong, I'm no Olmert fan. I just don't see any point in his resigning, because he's no more of a liar and a pathological narcissist than pretty much every other prominent Israeli politician (there are few less prominent politicians that I like and respect, but they're too principled and uncharismatic to go far in the shark-infested waters of high-profile politics). And besides, who would replace Olmert? The leader of the opposition, Bibi Netanyahu? Surely not!

A lot of people called Thursday's demonstration a great example of democracy in action. I saw it as a populist event without much purpose beyond the immediate goal of getting rid of the government. Finally, an issue that Left and Right could agree on! Everyone wanted Olmert out, everyone loved their country, let's forget that we usually disagree vehemently on the most fundamental issues affecting the state and go for a big group hug. I would be much more impressed if 200,000 people showed up to protest the fact that one-third of Israeli children live in poverty, or to support the striking university students who are expected to pay higher tuition whilst working for a living, after serving three years in the army, even as academic institutions are starved of funds.

Michael Totten - April 28, 2006:

“How dangerous is it here, really?” I asked the lieutenant.

“I say this to my guys every morning: Everything could explode at any moment. Just after I said it this morning a bus load of pensioners showed up on a field trip. An old woman brought us some food. It’s crazy. They shouldn’t be here. You shouldn’t be here.”

“What’s happening here is very unusual," Zvika, the Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman, said. But he wouldn't tell me what, exactly, was so unusual. Shortly after I left the country, a story broke in the Daily Telegraph that explained it.

Iran has moved into South Lebanon. Intelligence agents are helping Hezbollah construct watch towers fitted with one-way bullet-proof windows right next to Israeli army positions.

Here's what one officer said:
This is now Iran's front line with Israel.

Imshin - Not a Fish:

My feelings of betrayal are not because I think going to war with Hizballah was wrong. If anything, it was far too long coming. The Winograd Commission points to faulty decision making leading up to the war and in its first stage, but that doesn’t prove to me that the war was wrong. But then I haven’t read the full interim report, only what’s been in some of the papers.

No, my feelings of betrayal, which are completely subjective, are because I’ve got the feeling it was run all wrong; because the army was ill prepared; because the wrong people were running the show and they seem to have made all the wrong decisions; and all sorts of aggravating little details, for instance, that army intelligence seemed to have become so secretive that the people doing the job didn’t have the correct, updated information to do the job properly, and I have an unsettling fear that the information they did have was known by the enemy, and that the military equipment in emergency storage was antiquated (in a haunting reminder of 1973); and very much because of a feeling that the weaker elements of the northern population, those who couldn’t fend for themselves, were abandoned.

There was this feeling, all the time, that ordinary people were giving it their all - the young soldiers, the reservists, the families in the north, the people in the center of the country and the south that took them in - but that our leaders and our elite just couldn’t give a shit. They were too busy calling their stock brokers.

Link to complete text of Winograd interim report (PDF, 171 pages, Hebrew).

Middle East: Exposing Hezbollah, helping Iraqis, confronting Iran's regime.

Hezbollah war crimes. Clifford D. May at FDD:

Last summer, Lebanese-based Hezbollah commandos invaded Israel where they both killed and kidnapped Israeli soldiers, setting off a 34-day-long war. During that conflict, photographs of what were said to be Lebanese civilian victims were distributed around the world. But photographs of Hezbollah fighters, living or dead, were virtually impossible to find.

That’s because Hezbollah fighters wore no uniforms and hid among Lebanon’s civilian population. These illegal practices were not extensively reported. For Western journalists in Lebanon, distinguishing between combatants and civilians would have been difficult. Many did not try, choosing instead to report what they were told by Hezbollah spokesmen.

The truth began to emerge after a ceasefire was reached in mid-August. Upon completing an investigative mission to Lebanon, U.K. Foreign Office Minister Kim Howell told a parliamentary committee that Hezbollah had extensively hidden caches of arms and rockets in schools, mosques, apartment blocks and homes.

“What I saw out there begs many questions about the way we try to define what constitutes a war crime,” Howell said. “Every time the Israelis responded [to a missile attack] and smashed a building down, every picture of a burnt child and every picture of a building that had housed people [where] there was now pancake on the ground was propaganda for Hezbollah.”

... Nevertheless, it has been Israel, rather than Hezbollah, that has been persistently accused of war crimes by such organizations as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the U.N. Human Rights Council. Now, however, a study produced by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, an Israeli think tank, is utilizing newly declassified military intelligence materials, including aerial photographs, videotapes, and the testimony of Hezbollah detainees, in an attempt to prove once and for all Hezbollah egregiously violated the laws of war by targeting both Israeli and Lebanese civilians.

“This study,” writes Dr. Reuven Erlich, the Center’s director, “analyzes two central concepts of Hezbollah's warfare. … The first is the broad use of the Lebanese civilian population as a living shield; the second, viewing the Israeli civilian population as the primary target for the enormous rocket arsenal Hezbollah built up over a period of years. Both acts are considered war crimes under international law.”

The report and its accompanying photos and videos show Hezbollah rocket launchers hidden in Lebanese villages, alongside schools, mosques and hospitals; also rockets being launched from near U.N. outposts.

One Hezbollah detainee acknowledges on videotape that he transported missiles while carrying a white flag – used when Lebanese non-combatants wanted to signal Israelis that they were attempting to flee the battlefield. Other Hezbollah prisoners talked openly of using private homes both to store weapons and launch missiles.

Asked by The New York Times whether the Israeli report implies that Hezbollah should be seen as responsible for the deaths of Lebanese civilians, Elias Hanna, a retired Lebanese Army general, replied: “Of course Hezbollah is responsible. But these people are ready to sacrifice their lives for Hezbollah.”

That raises two questions that apparently did not occur to the Times: 1) If a Lebanese civilian was not ready to sacrifice his life for Hezbollah, how would he safely communicate that to Hezbollah leaders? And 2) if a civilian voluntarily turns his home over to Hezbollah to be used for rocket launches, does his home not become a military target – even if he and his family remain in it?

Bill Roggio: Message from Fallujah. Bill Roggio at Spirit of America:

Bill Roggio is a journalist embedded with the Marines in Al Anbar, Iraq. He's been meeting with some of the Marines Spirit of America has helped. ... Following is a message from Bill after his meeting with Major Britt Rosenberry:

Since of Fallujah was wrested from the control of al-Qaeda and the insurgency in November of 2004, the Coalition and Iraq government have worked to restore security and basic services the warn-torn city. Major Britt Rosenberry, stationed in Camp Fallujah, has 3-man teams who patrol with the Army and Marine Infantry throughout the entire Al Anbar Province. They interact with the citizens and concerned with their plight.

This generation of kids are the key to Iraq's future success. Al-Qaeda and the insurgency has been conducting a "Taliban-like campaign" to close down schools, keep children uneducated. They harass and intimidate principals (called headmasters) and teachers. This year, a headmaster was kidnapped in front of the students and later assassinated.

One of Major Rosenberry's highest priorities is the children. They are highly susceptible to insurgent propaganda, and ripe for recruitment by the insurgents. "Schools are easy targets," said Major Rosenberry. "The Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army patrol the city, but are not always providing overwatch to fixed locations." To counter the intimidation of al-Qaeda closing schools, they are secretly opened in homes. But this comes at a cost. Some children may travel up to two hours a day for two hours of instruction. And the provincial schools, whether they are established or clandestine, need supplies. School books, notebooks, pens pencils and other school items are in short supplies.

To fill this need, Major Rosenberry asked for help from home. "Don't send the fat pill," the care package filled with candy, Major Rosenberry told friends and family back home. "Send us notebooks and pens."

Not only do the school supplies help the Iraq children, but they help to defeat al-Qaeda and insurgency. "When fighting an information war, it is important to back up words with actions," said Major Rosenberry. Providing the school supplies allows the Coalition and Iraqi security forces to live up to their commitment to keeps schools open. The mission also introduces the children to the Iraqi security forces and U.S. soldiers and Marines. "They get to see we are human. They laugh, we makes jokes. We take off the gear and by the time we leave we're exchanging hugs. When we return, they recognize us."

You can be part of the good news by making a donation online at the Spirit of America site. And go visit Bill Roggio's blog, The Fourth Rail.

Merkel takes stand against nuclear Iran, unhappy with results of FM's Syria visit. JTA: 'Germany’s chancellor said the world must prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons.
“It is time that the U.N. Security Council address sanctions,” Angela Merkel said after meeting Tuesday with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, according to a release issued by the German Embassy in Washington. Merkel reportedly also vowed to stand by Israel against Iran. “Israel will never face Iran alone. Germany will be beside it like a fortified wall,” Yediot Achronot quoted Merkel as telling Olmert. ... Merkel also expressed disappointment about the results of a recent visit to Syria by her foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, describing them as “not positive.”'

Remarks. There's always something you can do. Here's a list of Free Muslim organizations from Stop the Project. I mentioned some of these groups two years ago in my post on the real peace movement. Never heard of them? They've never heard of you, either ... maybe it's time to introduce yourself with a donation.

Lebanon: Prelude to Iran?

Democracy for the Middle East has returned to regular posting recently, for which we can be very grateful. Looking at the recent conflict in Lebanon, DFME has this to say:

According to the Seymour Hersh, our analysis wasn't too far off:

The US government was closely involved in planning the Israeli campaign in Lebanon, even before Hizbullah seized two Israeli soldiers in a cross border raids in July. American and Israeli officials met in the spring, discussing plans on how to tackle Hizbullah, according to a report published yesterday.
The veteran investigative journalist Seymour Hersh writes in the current issue of the New Yorker magazine that Israeli government officials travelled to the US in May to share plans for attacking Hizbullah.

Quoting a US government consultant, Hersh said: "Earlier this summer ... several Israeli officials visited Washington, separately, 'to get a green light for the bombing operation and to find out how much the United States would bear'."
The Israeli action, current and former government officials told Hersh, chimed with the Bush administration's desire to reduce the threat of possible Hizbullah retaliation against Israel should the US launch a military strike against Iran.

"A successful Israeli Air Force bombing campaign ... could ease Israel's security concerns and also serve as a prelude to a potential American pre-emptive attack to destroy Iran's nuclear installations," sources told Hersh.

Read the rest at the link. Here's YNet:

The New Yorker weekly claims that the Bush Administration was closely involved in the planning of Israel’s retaliatory attacks in Lebanon following the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers by Hizbullah terrorist just over a month ago.

“President (George W.) Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney were convinced, current and former intelligence and diplomatic officials told

me, that a successful Israeli Air Force bombing campaign against Hizbullah’s heavily fortified underground-missile and command-and-control complexes in Lebanon could ease Israel’s security concerns and also serve as a prelude to a potential American preemptive attack to destroy Iran’s nuclear installations, some of which are also buried deep underground,” investigative reporter Seymour Hersh said in his article. ...

We'll see.

Afternoon Roundup

Ligntningbaron: 'BREAKING on FOXNews in the last hour:

Israeli intelligence and the IDF are monitoring "unusual activity" on the Syrian border in the Golan Heights. Syria is removing anti-tank mines from their border with Israel along the Golan Heights, and moving large numbers of tanks to the border at this time. The first step in an armored assault is to remove your own anti-tank defenses, to clear the way for your advancing armor. Any other time I'd assume this is just a feint (posturing), or a re-taking of the Golan Heights (which is bad enough). But the Syrian army has been mobilizing in the last two weeks. Combine this news with Iran & Syria possibly thinking (perhaps rightfully so) that Israel & the U.S. just "blinked" with Resolution 1701 and the cease-fire...and...well....this does not bode well.'

Hezbollah loses two drones: 'The IDF shot down a Hizbullah UAV on Sunday night that had crossed into Israeli airspace. The unmanned aerial vehicle was loaded with explosives. Another Hizbullah UAV crashed near Tyre on Sunday night, due to a mechanical failure.'

Debka: Condi's stark warning to Siniora. 'Rice calls Lebanese PM to warn him that if the UN Lebanon resolution is not implemented, “We will not be responsible for the consequences”. Earlier, Israeli FM Tzipi Livni put in urgent calls to the US secretary and the French foreign minister in an effort to salvage the ceasefire from Iranian-backed Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s 12th-hour retraction of his consent.'

Bomb hits internet cafe in Baghdad. Stratfor (subscription) reports: '1921 GMT - A building In the Zafaraniyah district of Baghdad was demolished after two explosions Aug. 13. The first blast reportedly took place inside an Internet cafe on the first floor of the four-floor building; it was followed minutes later by a car bomb outside, which brought the building down. A third bomb targeted rescuers on their way to help. Some 20 deaths have been reported.'

Hezbollah in PowerPoint.

With the ceasfire set to go into effect in just a few hours, we understand that many people still do not fully comprehend who and what Hezbollah is. We hope this will help.

Hezbollah is an Islamic Shiite terror organization founded in 1982 that was formed to expel U.S., French and Israeli troops from Lebanon; it has since widened its sphere of activity though. Despite being designated as a terrorist organization by U.S. and Canada, being on a watchlist by the EU, and having it be a crime to support and/or identify with the 'militant wing' in Australia, Hezbollah argues that it is a national "resistance" organization. The fact is though, that it has evolved into a substantial global terrorist network. In 2002, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called Hezbollah the "A-team" of terrorists.

Their fundamental Shiite ideology is baed on both the writings of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the radical Shiite-Islamic doctrine conceived by Iran's spiritual leader, the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The ideology is consistent and relentless in its struggle against Israel until the "liberation of Jerusalem" and the annihilation of Israel are achieved ...

War Bulletin: The Fog of War

Michael Totten's new podcast (8:17) from Metulla on the Israeli/Lebanese border paints a picture of tight-lipped Israeli soldiers crossing into Lebanon on foot. Now - after a seemingly endless and apparently pointless delay - Israel's ground invasion has begun.

A report from Stratfor (subscription) notes the unusually high level of infighting within the Israeli government, but does not ascribe the delay exclusively to that - or to any other known factor. "Something is holding the Israelis back", the report observes; "there is an aspect to Israeli thinking that we do not understand".

As Lightningbaron says, "When Stratfor is confused, you know it's bad." Maybe the events of the coming week will make things clearer.

War Bulletin: Moving Forward

Israel kills 20 terrorists.

IDF forces killed at least 20 Hizbullah terrorists, Army Radio reported Friday night. The airforce bombed a gas station belonging to Hizbullah in Ba'albek and a bridge located on the Zaharani river, on the Syrian-Lebanese border.

Vital Perspective: Does UNSCR matter?

The Security Council will likely unanimously approve the resolution tonight. Israel will likely accept it on Sunday. Lebanon has expressed satisfaction, but none of this matters if Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the terrorist Hezbollah organization, does not accept it. If the rocket attacks continue, if Israeli civilians are forced to live their lives in bomb shelters, if the IDF is attacked from their positions within Israel, then Israel can and will exercise its legitimate right to self-defense, and this resolution will have achieved little if anything at all. So by all means, Israel must accept this resolution. As Secretary Rice has said in the past, following this resolution, "We will see who is for peace and who is not."

John Podhoretz at The Corner: Why the resolution is not a disaster.

It's not a disaster, for this reason: The language of Paragraph 10, point 1, reads "Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations." This is not parallel language. Hezbollah must cease all attacks. Israel must only cease "offensive military operations." Since Israel itself defines its own action in South Lebanon as by definition defensive, not offensive, there's a lot of give here. Besides which, will Hezbollah really cease "all attacks"?

War Bulletin: To the Litani - Finally

Counterterrorism Blog:

The government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has given the Israeli Defense Force the final approval to conduct the ground assault to the Litani River in southern Lebanon. "According to military sources, close to 70 percent of the Katyusha rockets raining down on Israel are fired just south of, and north of the Litani river. It is in these parts of Lebanon that the Hizbullah's Nasser Unit is waiting with thousands of fighters and functioning command and control centers," reports the Jerusalem Post. Over 40,000 Israeli troops are available for the full scale invasion of southern Lebanon.

Prior to the green light from the government, the IDF has been fighting pitched battles on the central and eastern sectors along the Lebanese border. ...

Vital Perspective:

Israeli tank forces were preparing on Friday for orders to sweep into Lebanon after PM Ehud Olmert approved widening a more than month-old offensive against Hezbollah, Israeli television said. No schedule has been announced for new Israeli incursions but they are expected to be imminent, Channel Two's military correspondent reported from an army base on the Lebanese border. The Security Cabinet approved an operation Wednesday calling for a push to the Litani River, but delayed it until diplomatic efforts were exhausted. We caution that there is not yet official confirmation that the offensive is underway. ...

UPDATE 08/11 @ 13:47: AP reports that Olmert's spokesman, Asaf Shariv, said the expanded incursion had already begun. A cease-fire deal being worked out by the UN Security Council failed to meet Israel's basic requirements, such as stationing robust international combat troops in southern Lebanon once Israel withdraws.

Debka:

US and France agree on a UN ceasefire proposal to be submitted later Friday. Rice calls Olmert after he and Peretz gave the Israeli army the go-ahead to launch an expanded offensive up the Litani River. The US secretary of state asked if there is any room left for diplomacy. The Israeli prime minister replied that he gave the go-ahead for the expanded military ground offensive because the diplomatic effort was not reaching its goals. Israel is now reviewing the agreed final text which has not been released. The expanded offensive was approved by Israel’s inner cabinet Wednesday, Aug. 9, and put on hold for 48 hours to give diplomacy a chance. In the interim, army elements advanced up to the Litani River’s southern bank while hundreds of Hizballah rockets continued to ravage northern Israel. Friday, Haifa and Galilee took more than 120 rockets. The go-ahead for the full Israeli offensive to advance was given Friday after Hizballah forced the Lebanese government to veto the deployment of an expanded UNIFIL force empowered by UN Charter Chapter 7 to use force to implement the Security Council resolution.

Ha'Aretz:

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz on Friday ordered the Israel Defense Forces to implement an expanded ground operation in Lebanon.

The cabinet approved an operation Wednesday calling for a push to the Litani River, but delayed it until diplomatic efforts were exhausted. Apparently reports throughout Friday on a delay on a deal on a United Nations Security Council resolution on a cease-fire led to the decision.

A government source in Jerusalem said the IDF received instructions to proceed with the operation after officials viewed an updated version of the draft of the cease-fire resolution Friday, which included several points which Lebanon backtracked from one day after agreeing to them as spelled out in Thursday's draft.

Michael Totten audioblogs for PJM from the Lebanese border.

War Bulletin: New Threats for Israel

The new issue of DebkaNet Weekly (subscription) carries describes the threat Israeli troops are facing from a well-supplied enemy, including three types of anti-tank missiles (the Sagger AT-3A missile, the Metis-M 9K115-2 and the Kornet ATGM) which have inflicted significant losses on the Israeli tank corps. DNW adds, though, that the first tanks engaged by the enemy may have been early production models not fitted with full countermeasures (in particular the Trophy system made by General Dynamics), built at a time when Israel did not envision a significant anti-tank threat on the horizon. DNW also mentions a sophisticated Hezbollah communications system (supplied by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps) which was able to overcome Israeli countermeasures.

Stratfor (subscription) reports that Hezbollah was able to deceive Israel about the number of rocket launchers it destroyed by using heat-emitting decoys, which absorbed Israeli airstrikes after the real launchers had been removed. They're also reporting heavy fighting in the Eastern District in southern Lebanon.

Israeli and Lebanese Bloggers at Iraqi Bloggers Central

Thanks to Jeffrey from New York in the Comments, for calling our attention to an excellent series of posts at Iraqi Bloggers Central. First of all, if you've been missing IBC, you've been missing out on an excellent web journal, so why not take a moment to bookmark that IBC homepage on your browser!

The new series is a collection of interviews with Lebanese and Israeli bloggers on the current conflict. Here's Yael K, interviewed by the inimitable Mister Ghost:

MG: For those Americans and others who question Israel's actions in Lebanon, what would you tell them?

Yael K: I would tell those who are questioning our actions that this is not a war that Israel wanted in any shape or form. It is not one we were looking for and it is not one that we started. It is a war that was forced upon us. It is certainly not a war that anyone on our side is taking any joy or comfort in. It is a situation that is taking a terrible toll on civilians on both sides of this conflict and our hearts go out to the innocent Lebanese civilians caught up in this chaos. We are not fighting a war against Lebanon. We have no anger or enmity toward the Lebanese people. Far from it. We are fighting against a terrorist organization that has as a stated goal the destruction of our country ...

Read the rest at the link, and don't forget to pay a visit to Yael's homepage.

Lebanese journaler Lebanos is interviewed here:

MG: Why do you think Hezb'allah acted now?

Lebanos: Alan M. Dershowitz, a Jewish I presume, the Professor of Law at Harvard and the author of "Preemption" wrote today at jpost.com that Israel was attacked from areas that it does not occupy. And that last sentence says a lot about the situation. Hizbullah indeed attacked inside the Israeli borders, but Israel is occupying a 40 km2 of silver land, sending it's warplanes and sea destroyers to Lebanese territories, prisoning 3 Lebanese captives from earlier operations inside Israel lead by the Palestinians, and refusing to hand out the mines maps to the UN. Those points I stated above are the reasons which Hizbullah is exploiting to keep on it's political agenda, if any. ...

The rest is at the links, and there's much more at the IBC homepage, including interviews with long-time readers of Iraq the Model and some beautiful artwork by IBC contributors and friends.

Afternoon Roundup

Debka: Moshe Kaplinsky to lead Lebanon front.

Chief of staff appoints his deputy Maj.-Gen Moshe Kaplinsky as personal representative in the IDF’s northern command. DEBKAfile’s military sources add: Notwithstanding the official denials, this step is a manifestation of dissatisfaction on the part of chief of staff, Lt-Gen Dan Halutz, with the conduct of the war and his lack of confidence in the IDF’s northern command’s ability to carry the campaign forward without on-location supervision. ... As former OC Central Command, Kaplinsky’s forte is the disposition of ground forces. He is a former commander of the Golani infantry brigade. Kaplinsky needs to pull off the feat the late Moshe Dayan managed in 1967 on the eve of the Six-Day War – to pick up in short order the Israeli army’s once-acclaimed capabilities as a limber, versatile, fast-moving, innovative force that is crowned with success. After a campaign which has dragged on for too long with too much loss of life and too few successes, Israel thirsts for a breakthrough to victory.

Arutz Sheva on Kaplinsky appointment. 'Deputy Chief of General Staff Major-General Moshe Kaplinsky was appointed on Tuesday to supervise and coordinate military activities in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. Kaplinsky will function as the representative for IDF Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Dan Halutz until the end of the war. Kaplinsky will work with OC Northern Command Major-General Udi Adam, who will continue as commander on the northern front. Adam said the move made sense. According to Channel 2 TV news, he said it was ‘perfectly legitimate’ to appoint a senior officer to assist the commander of a front during wartime.'

JPost: Rocket attack hits Kiryat Shmona. 'Some four or five rockets have been launched from Lebanon, landing in the area of Kiryat Shmona on Tuesday. Searches were underway to identify the precise locations where the projectiles fell. No one was reported wounded in the attack.' A7: 'A barrage of rockets were fired at Nahariya and Kiryat Shmona by Hizbullah terrorists Tuesday night. Rockets landed in open areas near Kiryat Shmona and Nahariya. No one was hurt and no injuries were reported.'

CTB: 11 Egyptian students at large in the US. 'Today we now know of 11 young men from Egypt who have gone missing among us. They are joining a large number of other illegal aliens who have gone missing in our midst, hiding in plain sight. I hope that when we next hear about them it will not be in conjunction with another terrorist attack. Perhaps these students from a country that has a very serious terrorism problem simply went sightseeing. Perhaps they are driving taxis and will go home to Egypt when they have had their fill of New York's rush hour. Or, perhaps, just maybe, they are hiding in plain sight while they await instructions to participate in a terrorist attack.' News story: 'Eleven exchange students from Egypt are now missing. Police say the students failed to make a connecting flight out of JFK to Montana where they were going to study English at a university. ... The U.S. Justice Department is conducting a massive, nationwide search. They are looking for:

11 exchange students
18-21 years-old
Arrived in New York on July 29th

Experts say what's troubling is that the FBI has been unable to track them either through e-mail messages or bank transactions.'

General McCoy sets the Washington Post straight. 'Major General Bill McCoy, Reconstruction project director in Iraq, has responded to Andy Mosher’s recent WaPo article critical of reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The General’s comments on the job journalists are doing are worth reading. With his permission, we present it here.

After spending almost three days traveling with and being interviewed by one of the co-writers of a very poorly written article (“Much Undone in Rebuilding Iraq, Audit says,” Washington Post, August 2, 2006), I'm astounded at how distorted a good story can become and what agenda drives a paper to see only the bad side to the reconstruction effort here in Iraq. Instead of distorting the facts, let's get to the truth.

There is no flailing reconstruction effort in Iraq. The United States has rightfully invested $20 billion in Iraq’s reconstruction – in the opinion of many here, we should do more. This massive undertaking is part of a wider strategy for success in Iraq that involves the establishment of a democratic government, the development of professional Iraqi Security Forces, and the restoration of basic essential services and facilities to promote the sustained economic development of this new country. ...

'
Original hatchet job is here.