Dreams Into Lightning

China and the Internet

Strategy Page:

But the Internet also spreads technical knowledge, and the growth of higher education, and the economy (which continues to expand at 10-11 percent a year) is being used to provide China with more military power. The government believes that, in the next few years, China will surpass South Korea in technical abilities, and Germany in GDP. While China is still a minor player in the world of military high tech, the government is putting lots of money and effort into changing this. Expensive, and long term, efforts are being made to produce high tech items like jet engines, missiles and military electronics. At the current rate of progress, Chinese military technology will match that of the United States in a decade or so.

Snowball Against a Rock

The Belmont Club considers a hypothetical Chinese attack.

But these would take out only a fraction of American combat power. Most US strength is deployed far back. Nor does it take into account the very considerable combat power of Japan and Korea, which if once deployed, would a force to reckon with. In fact, Chinese military planners have expressed the professional opinion that any such surprise attacks would be like “throwing an egg against a rock.” If so, why are the Chinese even contemplating such scenarios?

Because the American public is “abnormally sensitive” about military casualties, according to an article in China’s Liberation Army Daily, killing U.S. airmen or other personnel would spark a “domestic anti-war cry” on the home front and possibly force early withdrawal of U.S. forces.

He's quoting Roger Cliff in AIM Points Magazine.

Remarks. I recently mentioned the evolving Iran-Russia-China axis with a link from FrontPage Magazine:

Iran is rightly portrayed as one of the most pressing threats to the United States and her interests. But Iran remains in many respects a piece on the chessboard of a greater Russian and Chinese game.

Iran seeks greater power and regional dominance and enjoys the support of both Russia and China in its pursuits. Both afford Iran the protection of cover and interference at the UN Security Council and other diplomatic endeavors, allowing Iran to continue its nuclear efforts under a fairly comfortable security blanket.

For Russia, already sitting atop a major portion of the world's oil reserves, the gains are monetary and psychological, with Iran as a major arms client as well as its principle client in Russia's lucrative nuclear construction and supply market. The Bushehr plant construction alone was a $1 billion dollar deal, with the potential prospects of more in the relatively near future.

For China, the issue is one of energy. Just as the Russian supply of nuclear fuel began transit preparations within hours of the release of the December Iran NIE, China in turn immediately signed a massive long-term energy deal with Iran worth billions. Before the NIE, there was hesitance from China in signing an open deal. The United States in particular had made specific demands for more sanctions against a recalcitrant Iran as well as public calls for other nations to specifically stop making energy agreements until Iran complies. Signing the energy deal before hand would have meant strained relations with lucrative trading partners and potential economic damage. China was patient, as it always is. And the NIE afforded them the diplomatic cover necessary to ink the deal, affording the oil-starved dragon energy relief and enriching the Iranian regime during economic plight.

What remains to be seen is whether the American public of the 21st century will prove as pliant as our adversaries imagine. I'm betting they've got us figured wrong.

Iran, Russia, China

FrontPage Magazine: The Iran-Russia-China axis.

Frontpage Interview's guest today is Steve Schippert, co-founder of the Center for Threat Awareness and managing editor for ThreatsWatch.org.

FP: We've gathered here today to discuss the Iran-Russia-China alignment. I think a good place to start is with Russia sending nuclear fuel to Iran. What do you make of this development?

Schippert: The 11-shipment Russian supply underway of 80 tons of enriched uranium nuclear fuel for the Russian-built 1,000 megawatt light water reactor is a sweeping Iranian victory and troubling in several respects. From a strategic view flying by at 20,000 feet, it is indicative of Iran and Russia's deepening common alignment against the United States. It's an alignment – an allied partnership beyond nuclear cooperation - that also includes China.

Iran has notched yet another major victory over the West, which remains quick and eager to talk while slow and reluctant to act. Iran smartly feeds the Western obsession with talks and negotiations, while acting without pause or regret. The West, in this regard, is persistently, willingly and knowingly being played. ...

FP: What is the state of the Iranian support axis: Russia and China? What threats does it represent?

Schippert: The state of the axis is good, strong – and strengthening – and mutually beneficial, particularly for the Iranian regime in the short term. I have and will continue to refer to Russia and China as the Iranian Protectorate. No nation at the UN Security Council has been more steadfast or consistent in resistance to US and Western sanctions efforts there than either the bear or the dragon.

The reasons for this are quite simple: Synergistic strategic advancement against a common enemy, oil and money. ...

FP: What do you make of Iran's invitation to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

Schippert: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was originally the manifestation of the Russian and Chinese rapprochement, a new strategic pact between historic enemies. It was publicly introduced as an anti-terrorism regional cooperative, looking to combine regional efforts to combat the thereat that terrorism posed to each participating state. But, while each may indeed have its own challenges posed by regional terrorism, The SCO has always been largely leveraged by Russia and China as an anti-US strategic cooperative, including security and economic aspects. ...

FP: What policy do you recommend for the U.S. in facing this new axis?

Schippert: It truly is a three dimensional chessboard in both complexity and scope. Compounding this is the sometimes schizophrenic nature of American Foreign Policy brought about by the regular peaceful transition of power brought about with every American election, particularly presidential elections. When an election results in a majority transition from one general world view to a different world view, the foreign policy changes can be dramatic.

With regard to the 'new axis' among Iran, Russia and China, we must avoid bi-polar sea changes in direction and effort and adopt a policy that recognizes these strategic competitors with consistency. Some may be enamored with phrases claiming to end the days of “cowboy diplomacy” and the like, but if ending this perception means fundamentally altering the approach to one or all in a 'kinder, gentler' manner, this will only serve to empower the alliance to further exploit an America (and the West) already nearing a refusal to act. They clearly have few such equivalent inhibitions.

For instance, China and Russia had some reluctance to ink a new oil and gas deal with Iran or supply enriched uranium for its reactors while its won enrichment program proceed unabated. But the words of one NIE reversed that in an instant. So too can the words outlining an outwardly weak foreign policy shift, and the words employed during its execution.

To the contrary, our foreign policy must be bolder, particularly with Iran. As it is, our Iran policy is impossible to define and left largely to interpretation.

I will make one crucial policy recommendation, though there are many to consider. The United States must openly adopt a regime change policy with regard to Iran. ...