Via comments, Rabbi Chanan Morrison informs me that his excellent site on Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook can now be found at the following URL:
http://ravkooktorah.org
Please go pay a visit.
Arutz Sheva, Thursday, March 6, 2008.
An Arab terrorist infiltrated Jerusalem's Merkaz HaRav Yeshiva at around 8:30 Thursday night and murdered eight Jews. At least 10 students were wounded, including five in serious to critical condition.Five of the dead were high school students in Merkaz Harav's Yeshiva LeTze'irim [youth seminary - aa], and three studied in the upper-school Merkaz HaRav Yeshiva.
The attacker entered the yeshiva and opened fire on students before he was gunned down himself by a part-time yeshiva student, aided by an off-duty army officer from the neighborhood. The attack began in the seminary's library with the terrorist spraying bullets in every direction before anyone could react.
The part-time yeshiva student who first shot the terrorist, 40-year-old Yitzchak Dadon, said he was in the Yeshiva's study hall when he heard the shots. "Everyone left through a side door," he said, "and I left through a window, and lied down on a roof overlooking the library... When he came out, I shot him in the head twice. I saw him start to stagger, and then David Shapira [a yeshiva graduate and paratroopers officer] arrived on the scene, shot him with his M-16 rifle, and then we emptied our magazines into him."
Dadon later told Arutz-7, "It was terribly frustrating feeling, knowing he was in there shooting, but I could do nothing but wait for him to come out so that I could shoot him... While waiting, I could see some boys in a side room in the library turn off the lights and barricade their door - and though he tried, he was unable to come into the room and gun them all down."
Debka: Terrorists defeated Shin Bet defenses.
DEBKAfile’s counter-terror sources report that for almost two years the Shin Bet’s uniquely effective defense system succeeded in thwarting almost every Palestinian terrorist attacks inside Israel. But with the deadly shooting rampage at Jerusalem’s Yeshivat Harav which claimed eight lives Thursday night, March. 5. Israel’s eight-year terror ordeal at Palestinian hands has now taken a new direction. Under the guidance of Iran, Syria and Hizballah, terror planners have learned how to bypass the universally-acclaimed Shin Bet counter-terror system by dispensing with large operational teams which include accomplices who drive the suicide killer to target. The Israeli security service found this set-up highly susceptible to penetration for advance tip-offs of attacks in store.Thursday’s attack was carried out single-handed by a lone gunman, a local man and Israeli citizen who could move around Jerusalem unnoticed. As a delivery-man, he could conduct his own surveillance and choose his method of attack and its timing. The Kalashnikov assault rifle he used is available for cash in most Israeli towns.
The yeshiva attack revealed that senior terror planners have found they can leave operational details to a lone suicide killer after selecting him, identifying his target and setting the date. In this way, they reduce the chances of leaks to almost zero.
Telegraph: Hamas plotted bloodbath.
There is now a growing prospect of a major military retaliation against Gaza, which is controlled by the militant Palestinian group.Sources in Gaza said that the Izzedine Al-Qassam Brigades instigated the attack by Alaa Abu Idheim, the 26-year-old gunman who stormed the Jewish religious college on Thursday. ...
IMRA: Yitzhak Dadon recalls attack.
[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA: For some reason, Israel Radio is frequently not mentioning the role of Dadon in killing the terrorist and only mentions the IDF officer who lives near the yeshiva and joined Dadon.]Yeshiva student who shot attacker recounts moments of horror; 'I was studying when shots rang out'
Aviram Zino YNET Published: 03.06.08, 22:42 / Israel News
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3516039,00.htmlA yeshiva student who shot the Jerusalem terrorist says he was busy studying when suddenly shots rang out, prompting him to grab his gun and eventually kill the Palestinian attacker.
"We realized something happened so I cocked my handgun," Yitzhak Dadon told Ynet Thursday evening.
"I went up on the roof and waited for the terrorist. Meanwhile, I saw blood and shattered glass," Dadon said. "The terrorist continue firing in the air, so I waited to see him again, and then I shot him twice in the head."
The Contentious Centrist looks at media bias.
Meryl Yourish has a comprehensive roundup.
Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited the yeshiva; Prime Minister Ehud Olmert wasn't invited.
English-language site by Friends of Mercaz haRav.
Arutz Sheva provides some background on Mercaz haRav.
Merkaz HaRav was founded as the Central Universal Yeshiva by Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak [Abraham Isaac] HaCohen Kook in 1924. He saw it as the ultimate Torah center in which to raise Torah scholars and leaders who would help build a modern Torah society in the Land of Israel that would lead to universal and religious redemption.When Rabbi Kook, who also served as the Chief Rabbi of the Holy Land, passed away in 1935, he was succeeded by his colleague/student, Rabbi Yaakov Moshe Charlop. Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, son of the original founder, took over in 1952, and served until his death in 1982. He was then succeeded by Rabbi Sha'ul Yisraeli and Rabbi Avraham Shapira; the latter took over as sole Rosh Yeshiva when Rabbi Yisraeli died, and Rabbi Yaakov Shapira took over from his father, who died just five months ago.
Merkaz, as it is known, is famous for its very spiritual, Torah-centered, love-of-Israel atmosphere. The vast study hall is packed with books, benches, book-stands (shtenders), and, almost throughout the day and night, students. Many of the students have completed their army service and some are IDF officers.
Thousands of Merkaz graduates saturate Israeli public life as rabbis, rabbinical court judges, army officers, professors, teachers and educators in many dozens of schools and yeshivot around the country. Rabbi Avraham Kook is considered the father of the entire movement of re-awakened religious nationalism.
More about Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook. [See update, below.]
Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) – first Chief Rabbi of Eretz Yisrael – was a mystic and a philosopher, a preeminent Talmudic scholar and a Lurian Cabbalist, a profound and original thinker, and a saintly tzaddik.Due to his poetic style and abstract thought, his writings are often difficult to understand, even for those fluent in Hebrew and well-versed in traditional Jewish sources. For the English-speaking audience in particular, his books are hidden treasures whose light has not been fully revealed. ...
At the Rav Kook list, Rabbi Morrison has some thoughts.
The Mercaz haRav Kook homepage (Hebrew) lists the names of the dead. In Roman spelling, from Debka:
Yohai Livshitz, 18, and Neria Cohen, 15 from JerusalemYonatan Yitzhak Eldar, 16, from Shilo
Yonadav Haim Hirschfeld, 19, from Kohav Hashahar
Segev Peniel Avihail, 15, from Neve Daniel
Avraham David Moses, 16, from Efrat
Ro’i Roth, 18, from Elkana
Maharta Taruno, 26, from Ashdod
Last month, the Israeli TecSar satellite was successfully launched into polar orbit by an Indian space rocket from the Sriharikota space center in east India. Tecsar is an advanced satellite equipped with a camera that can take high-resolution photos of small targets through clouds and fog. The polar orbit complements Israel’s Ofek series by providing additional angles on Iran’s nuclear sites.New Delhi is willing for its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), which has carried 11 launches since 1994, to boost more Israeli satellite projects for the substantial revenue and kudos they net for India. The government is therefore carrying on regardless of strong condemnation from the Communist party.
With a hat tip to the Bald-Headed Geek, here's an article in The Jewish Press which shows John McCain eager to set the record straight:
In statements to The Jewish Press this week, Arizona Senator John McCain reacted sharply to an article earlier this month in the Israeli daily Haaretz that he said left "several serious misimpressions" regarding his views on Israel and the Middle East. ...A source in McCain’s office characterized the Haaretz interview as a brief, impromptu session and the resulting article as long on the reporter’s suppositions and short on concrete quotes from McCain.
"You’ll note," said the source, "that the article featured perhaps one complete sentence from the senator; otherwise the report is basically the reporter’s narrative interspersed with several fragmentary quotes" from McCain.
The senator himself was clearly miffed at his portrayal in Haaretz, saying that "after reading the Haaretz article and subsequent report in The Jewish Press," he felt the need to "clear up several serious misimpressions."
McCain said that "in contrast to the impression left by the Haaretz article, I’ve never held the position that Israel should return to 1967 lines, and that is not my position today." ...
McCain was unequivocal in his remarks to The Jewish Press.
"I’m proudly pro-Israel, and my positions have been consistent and clear," he said. "Israel, as one of America’s closest allies and the only democracy in a dangerous neighborhood, deserves our support and assistance. That’s why I view with such alarm the victory of Hamas and the Iranian president’s vile comments about wiping Israel off the map."
January 20, 2008: Israel conducted another test of its Jericho 3 ballistic missile on January 17th. This missile went into production last year, after three years, of reports that it was close to entering service. With a range of nearly 5,000 kilometers, the Jericho 3 can drop a nuke anywhere in the Middle East. The Jericho 3 is apparently a variant of the Shavit satellite launcher. The Jericho is a 30 ton, solid fuel, two stage missile, with a half ton payload. Israel is believed to have 50-100 of the shorter range Jericho 2. This is a 26 ton missile with a max range of about 1,500 kilometers. The Jericho 2 was the basis for the Shavit satellite launcher, which has put several satellites in orbit since 1995. The Jericho 1, developed with French assistance, entered service in 1973. This 500 kilometers range missile was replaced by the 1,400 kilometers range Jericho 2, which entered service in 1989.
EU official: Israeli Gaza action not a war crime.
(IsraelNN.com) A European Union official visiting Israel said Israeli retaliation actions in the Gaza Strip "did not constitute war crimes." European Commission Vice-President Franco Frattini also said that "Europeans should have understood Israel’s concern sooner," EJP reported.Speaking to Israeli reporters on Tuesday in the course of his visit in Israel, he declared: "We have to take into account that the Gaza Strip has become a base from where rockets are launched every day against innocent people in Israel… Ultimately, Hamas was responsible for the conditions under which Gazans lived."
In a speech at the Herzliya Conference, Frattini, who is a former Italian Foreign Minister, said: "There has been a large-scale misunderstanding in recent years between Europe and Israel. For too long, we ignored Israel’s fears and legitimate concerns about terror, fanaticism and the refusal of key groups in the Arab camp to come to terms with Israel’s existence, let alone its legitimacy."
Canada to skip Durban conference due to expected anti-Semitism.
Canada will not take part in a major United Nations conference on racism next year because the event is likely to descend into "regrettable anti-Semitism", a top official said on Wednesday.Officials said they believed Canada was the first nation to announce it will not attend the conference in Durban, South Africa.
A similar meeting at the same venue in 2001 was marred when Israel and the United States walked out in protest over draft conference texts branding Israel as a racist and apartheid state - language that was later dropped.
"(We) had hoped that the preparatory process for the 2009 ... conference would remedy the mistakes of the past. Despite our efforts, we have concluded that it will not. Canada will therefore not participate," Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier said in a statement.
Jason Kenney, the secretary of state for multiculturalism, said the Conservative government was sure the conference would "showcase the same regrettable anti-Semitism" as the 2001 meeting.
"Our government sees no value in allowing Canada's participation to continue to dignify or legitimate such hateful and un-Canadian propaganda," he told reporters. ...
Remarks. Very encouraging developments from our friends to the north and across the Atlantic. It's especially noteworthy that these officials spoke in clear and unequivocal language.
Senior Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat appeared to soften his position Thursday but still rejected Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's call for explicit Palestinian recognition of Israel as "the Jewish state," saying he was baffled as to why Olmert wanted to "poke us in the eye" over the issue.Asked by The Jerusalem Post whether he recognizes that the Jewish nation has historic rights here, Erekat said: "Israel has rights in the Middle East and the majority of Israelis are Jews. And when we recognized Israel, we recognized the composition of the state." Erekat had told an Arabic satellite TV interviewer earlier this week that the Palestinian Authority "will never acknowledge Israel's Jewish identity."
Erekat told the Post it was up to Israel to decide what to call itself, and that the Palestinians would recognize it accordingly. "Like the Islamic Republic of Iran," he said, "if you change your name to 'the Jewish state of Israel,' we'll call you that."
He was a Polish Jew, born Victor Spielman, which he changed to Victor Grayevsky after he found that “Spielman” was just too Jewish for an ambitious young Pole. He went to school in Kazakhstan, then returned to Poland at the end of the war, where he joined the Communist Party and made a bit of a name for himself as a journalist. In the mid-fifties he followed his parents and sister to Israel, where he ran a lot of the broadcasting to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
And so? And so, he was arguably one of the most important men of the twentieth century, for he was the person who obtained the advance text of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, the one delivered in February, 1956, the one that laid out the crimes of Stalin for the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party. That text was a turning point in the Cold War. Grayevsky gave it to the Israeli Embassy, where it was copied and sent to Israel. The Shin Bet intelligence service delivered it by courier to James Jesus Angleton, the head of CIA counterintelligence (and the CIA’s liaison with the Israelis), who gave it to CIA chief Allen Dulles, who gave it to President Eisenhower.
The speech made headlines around the world, and Khrushchev’s revelations were vigorously exploited by the United States, shocking the Communist faithful. ...
But right now I want to concentrate on the tie-in between these two events in Horowitz’s life. The first event was one that rocked the American leftist world in a way I hadn’t quite realized till I read Horowitz’s book, while the second was an event that hardly made a ripple, except for sparking change in Horowitz himself.The first event was the publication of what became known as the Khrushchev Report. Horowitz had been the quintessential “red diaper baby.” His parents were not just leftists, they were committed and devoted Communists, as were most, if not all, of their friends. They had pooh-poohed any criticism of the Soviets, and revered Stalin. For them, and for their generation of American Communists, this was a watershed event, the great dividing line which occurred in 1956, when Horowitz was in his freshman year at Columbia. He writes:
…the Times had published a report from the Kremlin describing a secret speech by the new Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev. It had been smuggled out of the Kremlin by the Mossad, the Israeli secret service [quite a fascinating detail, that]. The speech made headlines all over the world because it was about crimes that Stalin had committed. Until then, Communists and progressives everywhere had denied such crimes ever took place, and had denounced the reports as “anti-Soviet” propaganda. Over the next months the story was confirmed, even by Communist sources, and in June the full text was published in the Times, and then in the Daily Worker itself…..
When my parents and their friends opened the morning Times and read its text, their world collapsed–and along with it their will to struggle. If the document was true, almost everything they had said and believed was false. Their secret mission had led them into waters so deep that its tide had overwhelmed them, taking with it the very meaning of their lives.
According to Horowitz, this was how Peggy Dennis, a woman who was a Party leader, recounted the event in her autobiography:
The last page crumpled in my fist. I lay in the half darkness and I wept…For the years of silence in which we buried doubts and questions. For a thirty-year life’s commitment that lay shattered. I lay sobbing low, hiccoughing whimpers.
Horowitz describes the split that followed:
In the American community of the faithful, the Khrushchev Report was a divisive force. Forty-year friendships disintegrated overnight, and even marriages dissolved as one partner would decide to quit the Party, the other to keep its faith…In the two years that followed, more than two-thirds of the Party membership dropped from its lists….My parents were among those who struggled to find solace in the thought that while “mistakes” had been made, remedies were being taken. But…they were stunned by a blow from which they could never recover…although they remained faithful in their hearts to the radical cause, they were never really active in politics again.
Here is a portion of The Australian's account:
Grayevsky's girlfriend Lucia Baranowska was executive secretary to the most powerful man in communist-ruled Poland, party chief Edward Ochab. When Grayevsky arrived at Baranowska's office that morning, she said she couldn't get away: "Things are just too hectic."As he prepared to leave, he noticed a document on the desk with the Russian words "top secret" and "state secret" on its red cover. At the bottom it read "Comrade Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress".
He picked it up and riffled through it. "Would you mind if I take this for an hour or so?" he asked. ...
All of this happened a bit before my time, but I find it fascinating to read how one article shaped the mindset of a generation, and destroyed so many illusions. We have Victor Grayevsky to thank for the revelation that brought so many out of the spell of communism.
Rest in peace, Victor Grayevsky.
Philippe Karsenty is tall, handsome, charming--and very determined; un homme, tres serieux (a very serious gentleman).Karsenty, a 41 year-old former stockbroker, media analyst, and founder of Media-Ratings, came to America on a lecture and media tour shortly after his interim victory in a Paris courtroom in the matter of the Al Dura Hoax. The state owned TV channel, France 2, sued him for defamation when Karsenty insisted that their airing of a brief (55-59 second) portion of the (27 minutes of raw footage) constituted a Blood Libel. The staged event took place on September 30, 2000 at the Netzarim Junction and became the Face that launched far more than a thousand Islamist riots, anti-Israeli petitions, and successful and intercepted Palestinian suicide bombings.
This past September, almost seven years later, a Paris judge finally ordered that France 2 turn over the film to the court by November 14th. The trial itself is set for February 27th of 2008.
Karsenty recently visited me one afternoon and he returned two days later to speak at a gathering to honor him at my home. ...
Soldiers from an elite Israeli unit captured nuclear material originating in North Korea from a secret Syrian military installation before IAF jets bombed it, a report by Britain's Sunday Times wrote Saturday night, quoting "informed sources in Washington and Jerusalem."According to the sources quoted by the report, the alleged IAF attack was sanctioned by the US on September 6, after the Americans were given proof that the material was indeed nuclear related. ...
The report said that the commandos, from the legendary General Staff's Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal), may have been disguised in Syrian army uniforms. It also stated that Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who used to head the unit, personally oversaw the operation.
Related.
Israel to Syria: Let's talk peace.
Israel-Syria overflight.
Two weeks after an Israeli airstrike against something or other in Syria, Israeli President Shimon Peres suddenly feels all warm and fuzzy toward the Syrians. Here's Ha'Aretz
"I do believe the nervousness in the relationship between Syria and ourselves is over," Peres told foreign journalists. "Why go back to rumors and speculation when we say clearly we are ready to negotiate directly with the Syrians for peace."... Meanwhile, another indication that tensions with Syria have quieted somewhat is the fact that the Israel Defense Forces have announced that a round of officer appointments, suspended due to the rise in tensions, would resume. The appointments were halted about a month before the September 6 incident, due to fears of a possible war with Syria during the summer.
The debate within Israel has been between the camp that says "Iran or no Iran, Syria is our enemy - we'd be nuts to negotiate with them"; and the side that says "One thing at a time - Iran is Public Enemy Number One, and we need to keep them from establishing a beachhead on our borders."
So what has just happened is that Israel has taken Syria to the woodshed and whipped it like a naughty schoolboy. Then, to add insult to injury, they've publicly humiliated the Assad regime by saying, "... Oh, you were saying something about peace talks? Let's talk peace."
I think there's a message for everybody here:
For Syria: You are our bitches.
For Iran: Your so-called allies in Syria are useless to you. We can strike any point in Syria at any time. You are alone.
For the Israelis: This is what we mean when we talk about negotiating from a position of strength. We know you think your government are a bunch of wimps, but we do know what we're doing. When we say "let's negotiate with the Syrians", we're not talking about giving away the farm - so don't take us for fools. Our focus must be on prying Syria away from Iran, and that's what we're doing.
And it might be working. Here's Stratfor:
Most intriguing are the reports we have received from Lebanon claiming that a serious division has opened up in the leadership of Hezbollah over the prospect of Syria working out a peace agreement with Israel. To even hear of a division within Hezbollah over the subject is startling, let alone the fact that the group is taking the possibility of a peace treaty seriously.Israel periodically raises the possibility of a peace settlement with Syria, usually not all that sincerely, so Peres' comment is not completely strange. The report on Hezbollah taking this seriously is more interesting, but remember that rumors always flow in Lebanon, and this one may not be true -- or Hezbollah is simply getting itself bent out of shape.
The report goes on to speculate on the possible role of Turkey, raising the possibility that something was entering Syria from Turkey "that the Israelis didn't want arriving" and noting that the Turkish government is interested in seeing Syria and Israel negotiate.
Related.
Israel-Syria overflight roundup.
Stratfor - September 17, 2007:
This weekend, the mystery of the Israeli aircraft over northern Syria became more important and even less clear than it was before. The story began Sept. 6 with a report from Syria that an Israeli aircraft had dropped ordnance over northern Syria and had been forced by Syrian air defenses to retreat from Syrian airspace. ...Then, during a meeting of Syrian and Turkish leaders, the Turkish government reported that two auxiliary fuel tanks from Israeli planes had been found in Turkish territory, close to the Syrian frontier. That would indicate that the Israelis were operating very close to the Turkish border, had been detected by the Syrians, released their fuel tanks and took off. That story left two unsolved mysteries: First, what were the Israelis looking for that close to the Turkish border -- or more precisely, right on the Turkish border? And second, why were the Turks so touchy about some drop tanks that were, after all, left behind by Israel, a country with which Turkey has close military relations? And of course, that takes us back to why the Israelis would be monitoring events on the Turkish-Syrian border themselves instead of just asking the Turks.
Then, this weekend, Washington started leaking, with the media carrying a series of utterly contradictory explanations from unnamed American sources. The Washington Post ran a report by an American "expert on the Middle East" (pedigree unclear, but obviously impressive enough to be used by the Washington Post). The Post report said the target was a Syrian facility officially labeled by Syria as an "agricultural research center." The attack was linked with the arrival of a ship in a Syrian port carrying goods from North Korea labeled as "cement." According to the Post's expert, it wasn't clear what the ship was actually carrying, but the consensus in Israel was that it was delivering nuclear equipment. Meanwhile, an unnamed source in The New York Times said the mission was indeed a reconnaissance flight tracking North Korean nuclear equipment. So, two of the major U.S. newspapers have both had similar leaks. This is clearly the official unofficial position of the U.S. government.
The problem with this theory is not with the idea that a North Korean ship might be carrying nuclear equipment to Syria. The problem is the idea that Syria would have a nuclear research facility smack on its border with Turkey. ...
Another leak, provided by Israel to the London Times, hinted that there were chemical weapons at the site, and that the attack (note that this leak claimed there was an attack and not simply a reconnaissance flight) helped save Israel from an "unpleasant surprise." A sub-leak from the Israelis was that the target destroyed in the raid was a store of chemical weapons. So the Americans are talking about North Korean nuclear technology while the Israelis are talking about chemical weapons. Amos Yadlin, head of Israeli military intelligence, said that he would not discuss the matter, then went on to discuss it by saying that Israel now has the deterrent capability against Hezbollah that it didn't have in 2006. Perhaps the chemical weapons were to be shipped to Hezbollah?
The least credible story of the bunch, which came from the British paper the Observer, was that the raid might have been a dry run for an attack on Iran. That is of course possible, but we are having trouble understanding how flying to the Turkish-Syrian border would constitute a dry run for anything beyond flying to the Turkish-Syrian border.
We do not mean to be flip. We think that this raid or reconnaissance flight, or whatever it was, was important. It's importance was less about U.S.-Syrian relations than about Syrian-Turkish relations. ...
Since when do the Syrians trust the Turks enough to do anything important along the border? Since when do the Israelis have to do reconnaissance flights along the border? The Turks patrol that area pretty intensely. We had thought there was a strong intelligence-sharing program. Perhaps it's no longer a trusted channel? Of course, the Turks somehow might have been complicit in this.
The mystery is deep and we are baffled, but it does not strike us as trivial. Something important happened Sept. 6.
David Horovitz at the Jerusalem Post - September 16, 2007:
Amid reports in the American media that the alleged Israeli raid into Syria 10 days ago targeted a North Korean-Syrian nuclear facility, John Bolton, the former US ambassador to the UN, told The Jerusalem Post over the weekend that "simple logic" suggested North Korea and Iran could have outsourced nuclear development "to a country that is not under suspicion" - namely Syria. Tellingly, he added: "Why would North Korea protest an Israeli strike on Syria?"Bolton suggested that Syria, which he said has long sought a range of weapons of mass destruction, might have agreed to provide "facilities for uranium enrichment" on its territory for two allied countries which are being closely watched for nuclear development.
Bolton spoke as American newspapers reported that the alleged IAF raid, over which Israel has maintained official silence, was aimed at a facility in northern Syria close to the Turkish border, and that the strike may have been linked to the recent arrival of a shipment from North Korea, labeled as cement, but believed by Israel to contain nuclear equipment.
According to The Washington Post, Israel had been keeping a watchful eye on the facility, which is officially characterized by the Syrians as an agricultural research center. The offending shipment arrived at the Syrian port of Tartus on September 3, three days before the reported IAF raid.
The IAF strike took place "under such strict operational security that the pilots flying air cover for the attack aircraft did not know details of the mission," The Washington Post said Saturday, quoting a top US expert who it said had interviewed Israeli participants. "The pilots who conducted the attack were briefed only after they were in the air," the paper quoted him as saying.
The Times - September 16, 2007:
IT was just after midnight when the 69th Squadron of Israeli F15Is crossed the Syrian coast-line. On the ground, Syria’s formidable air defences went dead. An audacious raid on a Syrian target 50 miles from the Iraqi border was under way.At a rendezvous point on the ground, a Shaldag air force commando team was waiting to direct their laser beams at the target for the approaching jets. The team had arrived a day earlier, taking up position near a large underground depot. Soon the bunkers were in flames. ...
Andrew Semmel, a senior US State Department official, said Syria might have obtained nuclear equipment from “secret suppliers”, and added that there were a “number of foreign technicians” in the country.
Asked if they could be North Korean, he replied: “There are North Korean people there. There’s no question about that.” He said a network run by AQ Khan, the disgraced creator of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, could be involved.
But why would nuclear material be in Syria? Known to have chemical weapons, was it seeking to bolster its arsenal with something even more deadly?
Alternatively, could it be hiding equipment for North Korea, enabling Kim Jong-il to pretend to be giving up his nuclear programme in exchange for economic aid? Or was the material bound for Iran, as some authorities in America suggest?
According to Israeli sources, preparations for the attack had been going on since late spring, when Meir Dagan, the head of Mossad, presented Olmert with evidence that Syria was seeking to buy a nuclear device from North Korea.
The Israeli spy chief apparently feared such a device could eventually be installed on North-Korean-made Scud-C missiles.
“This was supposed to be a devastating Syrian surprise for Israel,” said an Israeli source. “We’ve known for a long time that Syria has deadly chemical warheads on its Scuds, but Israel can’t live with a nuclear warhead.”
Strategy Page - September 18, 2007:
September 18, 2007: Israel has still not admitted what it's F-15s were bombing in northern Syria on September 6th. Syria complained bitterly, the media speculated and the government said nothing. This caused a spike in popularity polls for Israeli officials, which may have been the main objective of the operation. There are plenty of targets in Syria, like shipments of weapons for Hizbollah, or new Russian anti-aircraft missile systems. Nuclear weapons were also mentioned. But it's all speculation, and all that Israeli officials will talk about is the Israeli ability to hit their enemies anywhere, at any time.
In from the Cold - September 17, 2007:
Not surprisingly, the raid was cloaked in secrecy and deception--hallmarks of past Israeli military operations. Only three members of the Israeli cabinet knew about the raid in advance --Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Tzipi Livni, the foreign minister. To deceive the Syrians, Mr. Olmert reduced Israel's troop presence along the Golan Heights in the days before the attacks, suggesting an easing of tensions between the two countries.Obviously, the Israeli strategy worked; the operation caught Damascus by surprise (there was apparently little reaction from Syria's air defense system); the Israelis inflicted serious damage on the target, and both the F-15I crews and the commandos escaped unscathed. Syria has threatened retaliation, but its options are limited. The odds of Syrian aircraft penetrating Israeli airspace are slim, and a missile strike would invite a devastating response, as would an attack across the Golan Heights.
Still, the Times article leaves a number of questions unanswered. We'll begin with the issue of Israel successfully penetrating Syria's air defense system. While it's happened before, the Syrian air defense network was supposedly re-organized after an embarrassing 2003 Israeli strike against a Palestinian terrorist camp near Damascus. During that raid, the Israelis reportedly exploited confusion over geographic responsibilities within the Syrian defense system. The most recent mission--which involved a much deeper penetration into Syrian territory--suggests that (a) Bashir Assad's air defense network hasn't improved, or (b) the Israelis are using more advanced measures to target the system, and render it impotent.
Then, there's the matter of that commando team. If the Times is correct, those personnel arrived in the target area a day ahead of the fighters, inserted (we'll assume) by Israeli Sea Stallion helicopters. As we've noted before, the successful infiltration of a commando team by helicopter, deep into Syrian territory, is an impressive operational feat, indeed. But getting the commandos (and their choppers) all the way across Syria (and back again), undetected, represents a monumental challenge, even for a state-of-the-art military like the IDF.
That raises another interesting question: where did the commandos and their choppers come from? The target also lies relatively close to Syria's northern border with Turkey, which just happens to have close military ties with Israel. It would be far easier for those Sea Stallions to infiltrate from an airfield or forward operating base in Turkey, rather than making the long trip across Syria. So far, little has been said about a possible Turkish "role" in the enterprise, despite the fact that the IDF has long trained in that country, and members of Turkey's armed forces routinely utilize Israeli military facilities.
There's also the possibility that the commando team staged from a location in Iraq, as suggested by the Times:
According to Israeli sources, American air force codes were given to the Israeli air force attaché in Washington to ensure Israel’s F15Is would not mistakenly attack their US counterparts.
But that's something of a red herring. The "codes" refer to signal transmitted by the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders carried by all combat aircraft. But in a combat environment, attacking aircraft shut off their IFF before entering hostile airspace. Israeli jets attacking that Syrian "agricultural" complex (presumably) weren't transmitting an IFF "squawk." Moreover, the target is apparently far enough from the border that an accidental "intrusion" into Iraqi airspace--and targeting by U.S. jets--was a remote possibility, at best. And, the Israelis knew that our fighters wouldn't respond to an incident that was clearly within Syrian territory, and posed no threat to our own forces.
So why did the Israelis have our IFF codes? There are several possibilities. First, there's the slimmest of chances that the commando force staged from one of Saddam's old airfields in western Iraq. However, the chances of that happening are virtually non-existent; in today's Middle East environment, the U.S. can't afford to provide direct support to an Israeli strike on a Muslim nation.
On the other hand, there a better chance that the U.S. would allow a crippled Israeli aircraft to land at an airfield in western Iraq that is under our control. Al Asad Airfield, located 180 miles west of Baghdad would be the most likely candidate for a divert base; obviously, an emergency landing at Al Asad or any other U.S.-controlled airfield would be facilitated by transmitting the right IFF squawk, and preventing intercept by our fighters. There's also the possibility that Israel has made "other arrangements" within Iraq, and needed the IFF codes to simply allow transit through U.S.-protected airspace.
While the aircraft used on the Syrian raid--the F-15I--is no surprise, the inclusion of a ground team (or, at least their stated purpose) is a bit curious. As we noted last week, Israel's most advanced jet fighters are trained (and equipped) for employment of JDAM, which relies on satellite guidance. In many respects, that weapon would be a better choice for targeting the Syrian storage bunkers, since the guidance kit can be attached to virtually any type of conventional bomb (including penetrators), eliminating the need for ground designation. The presence of that commando team suggests that Israel was concerned about potential GPS jamming, or (more likely) the commando were dispatched to retrieve nuclear material from the site--a claim repeated in the Times' article.
Via Kesher Talk, 4 Mile Creek:
It's King Khalid Military City, most commonly referred to as KKMC. It's not too easy to see (click on picture to enlarge), but there is a nice airfield off to the upper right. Built by Vinnell Corp, and designed to land, re-arm and refuel F-15s. KKMC is in northern Saudi Arabia, and was designed to help protect the northern Saudi border from Iraq incursions. I've been there occasionally on a training missions. It's in the middle of friggin' nowhere, and the airfield is to the southwest of friggin' nowhere (the picture is inverted, north is to the bottom of the picture, add'l picture with a little more detail here).If the Israelis were to disguise their airplanes, and fly in there sometime around 2000 hrs, then capture the airfield personnel, it would be several hours before anyone knew something was going on. Even with the Royal Saudi Land Forces barracks just down the road in the main part of KKMC, it would be several hours after that before the Royal Saudi forces could mount an attack. With only one easily defended road from KKMC to KKMC airfield, it wouldn't be that hard for the Israelis to beat off an attack. It would then be at least six or seven hours (and more likely 24 hours) after that before any sort of Saudi reserve ground force could be mustered from outside of KKMC and brought to bear. As with the airfield, there is only one road into KKMC proper (it's the road visible coming into KKMC from the left), and it wouldn't be too tough for a light battalion to control that high-speed avenue of approach for at least another several hours. All total, the Israelis would have anywhere from 12 to 24 hours to use a well stocked, well built airfield from which their F-15s would be able to be refueled, re-armed and launched to strike nearly anywhere in Iran. Israeli F-16s could fly CAPs over the airfield to deter any Royal Saudi Air Force response coming up from PSAB, and even if the RSAF did attack, their training is mostly in air-to-air combat, not air-to-dirt bombing in support of a ground attack. Add in a few SHORAD sites around the airfield, and the RSAF would likely not affect much of the fighting on the ground.
After using it for maybe a day, the Israelis could load up and quickly cross into Iraqi airspace and hotfoot it home at low level.
In 2006, two young religious Israelis wanted to show their support for the gay rights march in Jerusalem. But the police were having none of it. Jerusalem Post:
When Hebrew University students Isaac and Shlomo wanted to demonstrate their solidarity with the Jerusalem parade in 2006, police prevented them from entering parade grounds. Their crime? Wearing kippot."Because we're religious, the police assumed we were there to attack," Isaac explains. "We were there to support democracy, to show that as religious Jews we support gay rights, and instead we were treated like criminals."
When the two students, both 25 at the time, first attempted to enter the parade grounds, they were taken aside into a tent and strip-searched by the police. "We agreed because they told us that after we were searched, we could go inside," says Isaac.
Their participation in the parade was not a matter of personal grievance, but of idealism, explains Isaac, saying that he was determined to demonstrate his support of a marginalized community.When police prevented the two from joining the parade, Isaac says he felt "hurt. I felt betrayed by the system, that they made assumptions about us [religious people] ... that they didn't allow us to support the same people that they were trying to protect."
"This year, I wore a hat to cover my kippa, and they let me in," he adds. ...
Two important conflicts have played out in the Land of Israel this past week. But first, a word from Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook:
Near the end of their journey in the desert, the Israelites arrived at Kadesh. But there was no water to drink, and the people complained bitterly. God commanded Moses to take his staff before the entire people and speak to the cliff-rock, to provide water for the nation. Moses took the staff and assembled the people. But he shouted,"Listen now, you rebels! Shall we produce water for you from this cliff?" [Num. 20:10]
Moses then struck the cliff twice with the staff, and a huge amount of water gushed out. ...
According to Rav Kook, all religious rage, all intolerance for moral failings, is rooted in this display of anger by Moses. Instead of words of reconciliation, he shouted, "Listen now, you rebels!" Instead of speaking to the heart, he hit the rock. While righteous indignation stems from sincere and pure intentions, the highest goals of holiness will only be achieved through calm spirits and mutual respect.
In our generation, the instruction of Torah and its details involves a pedantic form of debate. Father and son, teacher and student, struggle and battle over Torah study. In the end, their mutual love returns; but the residual feelings of enmity are never completely erased.
The restoration of the peaceful ways of Torah will come through the prophet Elijah, who "shall turn the heart of fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers." [Malachi 3:24]
Rav Kook, who is widely regarded as the founder of religious Zionism (and who's one of my personal heroes), embodied an extraordinary combination of idealism and pragmatism, nationalism and universalism, mysticism and rationalism. One of his greatest strengths was his ability to build bridges between seemingly antagonistic parties. The optimism and magnanimity of spirit that enabled him to do this is evident in the passage I've quoted here.
In Jerusalem this week, the annual controversy over the city's gay pride parade ran its course. Regular readers of Dreams Into Lightning will know that I have sympathies on both sides of the issue, and I posted extensively on the controversy last year. This year, the event seems almost anti-climactic. Here is the Jerusalem Post article:
"Jerusalem of Gold," the ballad that united Israelis following the Six Day War, once again echoed in the streets of the capital as both gay rights activists and religious counterprotesters used the song as their anthem.The point of unity may have been unintentional, but was not entirely surprising, as both the protesters and the marchers acknowledged that the theme of the parade was more about its Jerusalem location than its message of gay pride.
"When we march in Tel Aviv it's like a big party. We have music, we have fun. We are glad to be here but it isn't fun… we're looking over our shoulders all the time, wondering if it will become violent," said David Etkes, a Tel Aviv University student participating in the event. "We came here because we wanted to show Jerusalem that they can't scare the gay community. Jerusalem must learn to accept us, too."
Leading hareidi-religious rabbis say that anti-Gay Pride Parade protests should be put on a low burner. "Prayers are more effective than rallies," they say.Rabbi Shmuel HaLevy Vozner, Rabbi Nissim Karelitz, and other leading rabbinical sages in Bnei Brak have issued a statement against participation in the "protests and similar events" against the upcoming gay-pride parade in Jerusalem.
The homosexual march is scheduled to take place along King David St. in Jerusalem on Thursday at 5 PM, followed by a rally at 8 PM. Some 7,000 policemen will be on hand to try to neutralize violence, though Jerusalem Police Chief Ilan Franco says he has no illusions that the event will be "violence-free."
"We again warn regarding the gathering of youngsters in the streets of Bnei Brak for protests and similar events," the rabbis wrote, "and we hereby present our position, the position of Torah, that the Sages are not pleased with these gatherings, and whoever studies Torah should guard himself and stay away from them."
The rabbis even say that it is known that the organizers are reckless and "do not have fear of G-d opposite them, and joining up with them is a spiritual danger... A significant number of them are not yeshiva students, but youngsters from other towns who are looking for an excuse to go wild, burn trash bins and destroy public property... Our strength is in our mouths, in prayer to G-d that He will bring down a spirit of purity to enable us to serve Him truly." ...
And this is how it works in a civilized society. Protesters may sometimes get carried to extremes in the heat of the moment - for example, the Haredi demonstrations in past years, or the original Stonewall riots - but ultimately they understand that it is in their own best interests to reach out to the community through dialog.
Contrast this with the mayhem that occurred in Gaza with the takeover by the islamist fanatics of Hamas. Ha'Aretz reports that some Palestinians are seeing the irony in being forced to flee to Israel:
"There were five of them. They stood over me and shot my legs from the knee down. One of them put his Kalashnikov to my head. Instinctively I moved the barrel aside and the bullet hit my hand," Shadi told Haaretz yesterday. He arrived at Ichilov with one leg amputated and the other leg crushed."I wanted to shoot myself for voting Hamas," another patient said. He came with his brother, who had been shot in the head while evacuating wounded people in his taxi. "We really believed Hamas would change things," he said. ...
Later yesterday, Zecharia Alrai, 39, an officer in Fatah's elite Force 17 commando unit, arrived. He had been abducted by four Hamas gunmen a week ago. They loaded him into a jeep and drove him to an isolated spot, where they shot three bullets into his leg and dumped him.
"That's not Islam. That's evil and hypocrisy. How ironic that Israel is rescuing us from our Muslim 'brothers,'" he said.
The same profundity and precision which in the past was achieved via zeal and passion ("rit'cha d'oraita"), will be achieved in the future through the spiritual strength of gentleness and equanimity. Then the light of the sukkah of peace will encompass the Jewish people and those nations of the world who gather from afar to the holy city of Jerusalem.
The Jerusalem Post headline reads:
Israel urged to woo Syria away from Iran's influence
A peace agreement with Syria could pull Damascus out of Iran's orbit, a senior Western diplomat based in Israel said Thursday.
The diplomat said this assessment has been relayed to Israeli officials. He said despite the flurry of media reports about a greater openness among some in the government for engaging the Syrians, he had not seen any change in the formal Israeli position that any such talks could not take place until Damascus ended its support for Hizbullah and Hamas.
"We can break Syria away from Iran," the official said, adding that what was needed in Israel was the "political will and courage" to negotiate with Damascus over the return of the Golan Heights.
Dear anonymous senior Western diplomat based in Israel:
Go fuck yourself.
Debka: At least 13 Palestinian gunmen killed in fierce factional battles spreading across the Gaza Strip Tuesday. 'For several hours in the morning, Hamas fired mortars, heavy machine guns, shoulder-borne and anti-tank missiles in bid to seize the Palestinian side of the border crossing from the control of Mahmoud Abbas’ men, more than 200 of whom were pinned down at the facility. Clashes erupted during the day at several flashpoints in Gaza, including a Fatah attack on the Islamic University, a Hamas stronghold. According to some reports, a group of Fatah fighters, some in uniform asked Israel border troops for asylum. Abbas has called for a cessation of hostilities. The mounting chaos in Gaza led Hani al-Kawasmeh to throw up his hands Monday and resign as Palestinian minister of interior. DEBKAfile's Palestinian sources report that the streets are ruled by warring armed gangs over which the rival factions are losing control, leaving the Saudi-brokered Mecca reconciliation and Hamas-Fatah power-sharing accords in tatters.'
YNet: Fatah - Hamas ceasefire atreement reached, Haniyeh says. 'Warring Palestinian factions in Gaza reached a ceasefire agreement Tuesday night, at a meeting between group representatives, Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh announced. According to the agreement, to go into effect at 2 a.m. Wednesday, gunmen will leave the streets and captives will be released. Simultaneously, the two sides will begin a dialogue for "national calm."'
YNet: Blasts heard near Fatah leaders' homes. 'Strong blasts were heard near the homes of senior Fatah members in Gaza. The source of the blasts is not clear. A short while later a ceasefire agreement was reached between different factions in the Palestinian Authority.'
Debka: 'Wave after wave of Qassam missiles strike Sderot Tuesday night, injuring 19 people, two seriously. Hamas expanded blitz of more than 30 missiles from Gaza against Kibbutz Nahal Oz, Alumim, Beeri, Kfar Aza and Netivot. Strategic installation hit in Ashkelon. Sderot took heavy damage from at least 20 missiles which directly hit several homes, in which seven civilians, including a mother and her son, were wounded. Blazes were started in the town and surrounding localities. This was the heaviest Qassam assault the Palestinians have ever staged from the Gaza Strip in more than six years of battering. Hamas has threatened to fire scores in a single night. DEBKAfile’s military sources: Hamas, determined to prove it can fight on two fronts, turned its missiles against Israel amid bloody battles with Mahmoud Abbas’ presidential guard and security forces under Fatah command. More than 20 Palestinians, most Fatah, have been killed in the last 48 hours and the bitter Palestinian factional fighting continued Tuesday night. Israel's response was confined to a helicopter strike against unpopulated areas in N. Gaza. Sunday, the Olmert government decided not to expand operations against the Palestinian missile threat from Gaza despite the daily barrage.'
IRIS: 'On the eve of Jerusalem Day, a barrage of "ineffectual Kassams" struck multiple buildings in Sderot including a school, causing a total of 21 injuries. In response, the IDF fired into empty fields, causing no damage or injuries. Despite essentially no change in the months-long missile siege from Gaza, Amir Peretz found it necessary to suddenly convene an "emergency meeting" to decide how to respond. Actually, there has been a significant development--it is now a news story, so that angle needs to be managed.'
Israellycool has updates.
Ha'Aretz: Main findings of the Winograd report.
1. On September 17th 2006, the Government of Israel decided, under section 8A of The Government Act 2001, to appoint a governmental commission of examination "To look into the preparation and conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12th 2006". Today we have submitted to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense the classified interim report, and we are now presenting the declassified report to the public.2. The Commission was appointed due to a strong sense of a crisis and deep disappointment with the consequences of the campaign and the way it was conducted. We regarded this difficult task both as a duty and a privilege. It is our belief that the larger the event and the deeper the feeling of crisis - the greater the opportunity to change and improve matters which are essential for the security and the flourishing of state and society in Israel. We believe Israeli society has great strength and resilience, with a robust sense of the justice of its being and of its achievements. These, too, were expressed during the war in Lebanon and after it. At the same time, we must not underrate deep failures.
3. This conception of our role affected the way we operated. No-one underestimates the need to study what happened in the past, including the imposition of personal responsibility. The past is the key for learning lessons for the future. Nonetheless, learning these lessons and actually implementing them are the most implications of the conclusions of the Commission.
4. This emphasis on learning lessons not only follows from our conception of the role of a public commission. It also follows from our belief that one of Israeli society's greatest sources of strength is its being free, open and creative. Together with great achievements, the challenges facing it are existential. To cope with them, Israel must be a learning society - a society which examines its achievements and, in particular, its failures, in order to improve its ability to face the future.
5. Initially we hoped that the appointment of the Commission would serve as an incentive to accelerate learning processes in the relevant systems, so that we could devote our time to study all of the materials in depth, and present the public with a comprehensive picture. However, learning processes have been limited. In some ways an opposite, and worrying, process emerged - a process of 'waiting' for the Commission's Report before energetic and determined action was taken to redress the failures that have been revealed.
6. Therefore we decided to publish initially an Interim Report, focusing on the decisions related to the start of the war. We did this in the hope that the relevant bodies would take urgent action to change and correct all the implications. We would like to reiterate and emphasize that we hope that this Partial Report, which concentrates on the functioning of the highest political and military echelons in their decision to move to war will not divert attention from the troubling overall picture revealed by the war as a whole.
7. The interim report includes a number of chapters dealing with the following subjects:
a. The Commission's perception of its role, and its attitude to recommendations in general and to recommendations dealing with specific persons in particular (chapter 2). We see the main task of a public commission of inquiry (or investigation) as determining findings and conclusions, and presenting them - with its recommendations - before the public and decision makers so that they can take action. A public commission should not, in most cases, replace the usual political decision-making processes and determine who should serve as a minister or senior military commander. Accordingly, we include personal conclusions in the interim report, without personal recommendations. However, we will reconsider this matter with regards to our Final Report, in view of the depiction of the war as a whole.
b. The way we balanced our desire to engage in a speedy and efficient investigation with the rights of those who may be negatively affected to 'natural justice' (chapter 3). The special stipulations of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in this regard do not apply to a governmental commission of Examination, but we regard ourselves, naturally, as working under the general principles of natural justice. The commission notified those who may be affected by its investigation, in detailed letters of invitation, of the ways in which they may be negatively affected, and enabled them to respond to allegations against them, without sending "notices of warning" and holding a quasi-judicial hearing before reaching out conclusions. We believe that in this way we provided all who may be negatively affected by our report with a full opportunity to answer all allegations against them.
c. The processes and developments in the period between the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon until July 11, 2006 which contributed to the background of the Lebanon War (chapter 4). These processes created much of the factual background against which the decision-makers had to operate on July 12th, and they are thus essential to both the understanding and the evaluation of the events of the war. Understanding them is also essential for drawing lessons from the events, whose significance is often broader than that of the war itself.
8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.
9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We place the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made. However, there are many others who share responsibility for the mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.
10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making processes can be summed up as follows:
a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not another effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.
b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations without immediate military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.
c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized the commencement of a military campaign without considering how to exit it.
d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action.
e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.
f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting would continue until they were achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.
11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been significantly better.
12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front or of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationship between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and were not materializing.
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.
13. The Minister of Defense is the minister responsible for overseeing the IDF, and he is a senior member of the group of leaders in charge of political-military affairs.
a. The Minister of Defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals.
b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he attended.
c. The Minister of Defense did not act within a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table - and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.
d. The Minister of Defense did not develop an independent assessment of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, of which he was in charge, and the Prime Minister.
e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defense failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.
14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's personal involvement with decision making within the army and in coordination with the political echelon was dominant.
a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.
b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of the arena was that there was a high probability that a military strike against Hezbollah would make such a move necessary.
c. The COS' responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational plans fitting the situation.
d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservations about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals and the authorized modes of actions.
e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and judgment.
15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the outcomes of the war, had many other partners. ...
On Monday, April 30, the Inquiry Commission into the military campaign held in Lebanon in summer 2006, headed by former Justice Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, submitted to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense an interim report relating to the time from the IDF's exit from Lebanon to the soldiers' abduction on July 12, 2006 and to the time between July 12 and July 17, when the decision to move into war was taken. ...
"The prime minister had formulated his opinion without being presented with a detailed plan, and without demanding that such a plan be presented, and therefore he could not have analyzed its details and approved it."Furthermore, he did not demand to be presented with genuine alternatives to his own opinions, or exhibit due skepticism regarding the military's positions. In this he failed.
"The prime minister also failed when he had his government approve such decisions ... and by declaring unattainable objectives to the war, and that the fighting should continue until they were achieved."
Members of the Winograd Commission arrived at Olmert's Jerusalem office at 4 p.m. on Monday -- one hour before the report's release to the public -- and gave the Prime Minister and Defense Minister Amir Peretz copies of the report, for their inspection before its publication.
Upon receiving a copy of the report, Olmert thanked the members for their hard work and assured them, "We will study the report and act immediately ... so that we can implement the lessons, fix the failures, and make sure that in any future scenario of the State of Israel, the failures you have indicted are corrected."
... Then, too, the Olmert government's handling of the Lebanon War last summer came in for scathing criticism in the interim report submitted Monday, April 30 by the team led by Judge Eliahu Winograd. But no demands were made for heads to roll. The final report due out in August 2007 is expected to be less kind to individual decision-makers. So the prime minister and his government can only count their future in months – not years.
... The debacle experienced by Israel last summer was consequent to two fundamental mistakes. The first is that ceding the initiative to the enemy and withdrawing from contact while he is still advancing increases rather than decreases vulnerability. It does not "take troops out of harms' way". It sets them up for the slaughter. The second error is more fundamental. Disengagement is an act in which the enemy gets a vote. The Israeli public's desire for peace, which manifested itself in unilateral withdrawal, the abandonment of its allies and in the reluctance to give the give the slightest offense to its enemies could only have succeeded in ending the fighting if it had been matched by a similar desire on the part of its enemies.... As it was, Israeli passivity only encouraged enemy boldness while it withered the sinews of the IDF. The crisis, when it came, consisted of a rain of unstoppable missiles deep within the territory of Israel itself. Not only was Israel sucked back into Lebanon, from which it had hoped never to return; but it was drawn back under conditions of the enemy's own choosing. Far from removing its soldiers the battlefield, the retreat had brought the battlefield back to its soldier's homes: to Israel itself. Most ironical of all, the appeasement, the concession, the attempts to win "world opinion" to Israel's side brought it no sympathy in the end. All it purchased was contempt for Israel and admiration for its enemies.
What lessons does the Winograd report have for America? None, I suspect. In Israel as in America, there are none so blind as those will not see.
Also, most people seem to be ignoring the rather plentiful evidence pointing to the fact that the ground was laid for the failure of that war long before Olmert took office. For example, Aharon Ze'evi Farkash, who headed military intelligence until January 2006, told Yedioth on Monday that he warned former PM Ariel Sharon of a high risk of kidnappings on the northern border six months before the war, and that Sharon - who certainly had plenty of military experience - brushed his concerns aside. When I tagged along with Michael Totten on his April 2006 trip to the northern border, a young IDF captain told us very soberly that we really shouldn't be there, because "everything could explode at any moment." It's worth going back to read Michael's report to see that there's no way the army could have been unaware that Hezbollah was preparing to attack. And it's simply not credible to contend that the army didn't report what it saw in front of its eyes - a massive buildup of Hezbollah military force on the border - to the prime minister.Don't get me wrong, I'm no Olmert fan. I just don't see any point in his resigning, because he's no more of a liar and a pathological narcissist than pretty much every other prominent Israeli politician (there are few less prominent politicians that I like and respect, but they're too principled and uncharismatic to go far in the shark-infested waters of high-profile politics). And besides, who would replace Olmert? The leader of the opposition, Bibi Netanyahu? Surely not!
A lot of people called Thursday's demonstration a great example of democracy in action. I saw it as a populist event without much purpose beyond the immediate goal of getting rid of the government. Finally, an issue that Left and Right could agree on! Everyone wanted Olmert out, everyone loved their country, let's forget that we usually disagree vehemently on the most fundamental issues affecting the state and go for a big group hug. I would be much more impressed if 200,000 people showed up to protest the fact that one-third of Israeli children live in poverty, or to support the striking university students who are expected to pay higher tuition whilst working for a living, after serving three years in the army, even as academic institutions are starved of funds.
“How dangerous is it here, really?” I asked the lieutenant.“I say this to my guys every morning: Everything could explode at any moment. Just after I said it this morning a bus load of pensioners showed up on a field trip. An old woman brought us some food. It’s crazy. They shouldn’t be here. You shouldn’t be here.”
“What’s happening here is very unusual," Zvika, the Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman, said. But he wouldn't tell me what, exactly, was so unusual. Shortly after I left the country, a story broke in the Daily Telegraph that explained it.
Iran has moved into South Lebanon. Intelligence agents are helping Hezbollah construct watch towers fitted with one-way bullet-proof windows right next to Israeli army positions.
Here's what one officer said:
This is now Iran's front line with Israel.
My feelings of betrayal are not because I think going to war with Hizballah was wrong. If anything, it was far too long coming. The Winograd Commission points to faulty decision making leading up to the war and in its first stage, but that doesn’t prove to me that the war was wrong. But then I haven’t read the full interim report, only what’s been in some of the papers.No, my feelings of betrayal, which are completely subjective, are because I’ve got the feeling it was run all wrong; because the army was ill prepared; because the wrong people were running the show and they seem to have made all the wrong decisions; and all sorts of aggravating little details, for instance, that army intelligence seemed to have become so secretive that the people doing the job didn’t have the correct, updated information to do the job properly, and I have an unsettling fear that the information they did have was known by the enemy, and that the military equipment in emergency storage was antiquated (in a haunting reminder of 1973); and very much because of a feeling that the weaker elements of the northern population, those who couldn’t fend for themselves, were abandoned.
There was this feeling, all the time, that ordinary people were giving it their all - the young soldiers, the reservists, the families in the north, the people in the center of the country and the south that took them in - but that our leaders and our elite just couldn’t give a shit. They were too busy calling their stock brokers.
JERUSALEM, Feb. 5 (JTA) — Gabi Ashkenazi, the blunt general who takes over as the Israel Defense Forces’ chief of staff next week, faces a mammoth task: Within the next few months he’ll be expected to restructure the army, redefine its operational doctrine and restore its self-belief.
Six months after last summer’s war in Lebanon, the IDF is still smarting over its failure to launch a coherent ground operation to stop Hezbollah militiamen from firing hundreds of rockets at Israeli civilians on nearly all 34 days of fighting. That and many other operational shortcomings in the war cost Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz the chief of staff job.To set things right, Ashkenazi, 52, will have to tackle weighty issues of doctrine, organization and training. And he will have to make far-reaching changes with an eye toward meeting the diverse threats Israel faces from Hezbollah, Syria, Iran and the Palestinians.
Ashkenazi is considered one of Israel’s most talented and toughest field officers, but he’ll be hard-pressed to rehabilitate the largely demoralized army and meet the public’s expectations.
In the wake of its poor performance in the war, the IDF under Halutz did something unprecedented: It set up more than 40 internal inquiry committees to investigate every aspect of its functioning. Never before has such a thorough, methodical critique of the IDF been conducted.
The panels’ findings amount to a detailed work plan. Putting the recommendations into practice will be Ashkenazi’s first priority.
Remarks. Susser's analysis goes into some detail about the notions of "effects" and "levers" which proved to be little more than wishful thinking on the part of Israeli commanders in the last war. This will sound familiar to Americans, who know well the temptation to assume that our own country's overwhelming advantage in force projection will spare us the cost of "boots on the ground". But it don't work like that. Best to learn that sooner rather than later.
Related.
Tammuz War index.
Morning Report: February 6, 2007.
DiL can't resist this opportunity to tell you about Israeli artist Paula Gaon, who's having an online exhibition at ArtLand Pro. (Full disclosure: Paula is an old friend from back in the day.) Don't miss her personal blog Beautiful and Fun Things.
The following post on the Eilat, Israel attack will be updated as new information becomes available.
'Israeli military and security chiefs fear first Palestinian suicide bombing in Eilat, which killed 3 Israelis Monday, signals deadly new wave funded from Tehran and Damascus. The bomber, Mohamed Faisal al-Siksik, 21, from Gaza, blew himself up in a bakery in the Red Sea resort of Eilat Monday, Jan. 29, killing the two proprietors and a third Israeli. This was the first such attack the holiday paradise has ever experienced. DEBKAfile’s counter-terror sources report that the next wave of suicide attacks is expected to be mounted from Gaza and Sinai by the Palestinian Jihad Islami in conjunction with local al Qaeda cells with funding from Tehran and Damascus. Although two Palestinian groups – Jihad Islami and Fatah-al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed the attack, DEBKAfile’s counter-terror sources disclosed it was in fact the first joint operation of the third group, the Army of Believers – an al Qaeda cover name – and Jihad Islami of the new anti-Israel terror offensive. A senior Israeli officer familiar with the Israeli-Egyptian Sinai border region told DEBKAfile after the Eilat attack: “Olmert and Peretz have missed the train. Their policy of military restraint in the face of Qassam missile attacks and a terrorist build-up has given the most violent elements free rein to get set for a fresh, well-organized assault.” Some attacks may also come from the sea. He stressed: “It’s no use expecting the Egyptians to secure the Sinai border. Since Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip 15 months ago, the Egyptian-Gazan-Israeli borders are a highway for smugglers of terrorists, missiles, explosives and traffickers of every kind. The IDF is the only force capable of putting a stop to this traffic and suppressing the collaboration between Hamas, Jihad Islami, Fatah-al Aqsa Brigades and al Qaeda. Unfortunately, its hands are tied by the government.”'
For the first time, a suicide terrorist detonated himself in the southern port city of Eilat. After he hitchhiked to the city, the man who innocently drove him called the police - but too late.Three Jews were murdered, and five people were treated for shock.
Initial reports implied that the explosion inside a small bakery in Eilat around 9:45 AM was caused by a gas canister explosion. However, shortly after 10:30, the police abruptly issued an announcement saying that it was the work of an Arab suicide terrorist. The police announced that the murderer had entered the bakery carrying a large bag and detonated himself. Three dead were reported, in addition to the terrorist himself.
The Al Aksa Brigades of Fatah - an arm of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah organization - and Islamic Jihad have claimed joint responsibility for the murderous attack. In general, Fatah's Al Aksa Brigades has shared responsibility with Islamic Jihad for the terror attacks against Israel over the past two years.