April 23, 2008

Hillary Clinton and Iran

Hillary Clinton vowed that if she were president and if Iran were to launch a nuclear attack on Israel, the US could "totally obliterate" Iran.

Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, facing a crucial primary in Pennsylvania Tuesday, said that if she were in the White House and Tehran attacked Israel with nuclear weapons, the United States would be able to 'totally obliterate' Iran.

Interviewed on ABC's Good Morning America program, Clinton was asked what she would do if Iran attacked Israel with nuclear weapons.
"I want the Iranians to know that if I'm the president, we will attack Iran," Clinton replied. "In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them."


Now, from a pro-Israel, anti-Iranian-regime standpoint, what's wrong with that statement? Just about everything.

First and most directly to the point, the object is to prevent Israel from being nuked in the first place. The question posed to HRC presupposed the hypothetical case of Israel having been nuked; but Senator Clinton failed to stress that such a scenario, if (G-d forbid) it were to occur, would itself represent an enormous tragedy and a massive failure of diplomacy and strategy. The cavalier "nuke 'em till they glow" attitude would be of scarce comfort to the Israeli victims of such a strike.

But what about deterrence? Cannot Senator Clinton say that by publicly articulating a hard line, she is making it less likely that the attack will occur in the first place? No. Again, by tacitly granting the initial premise - an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel - she makes it clear that she is not serious about preventing such an attack from occurring. And this in turn makes the obscene threat sound like a bluff.

Whether the threat is in earnest or not, it will do little to deter Iran. During the Cold War, deterrence was our only recourse against the Soviet Union, because we did not have the means to prevent the Soviets from acquiring nuclear weapons or building an arsenal; and it was effective because the Soviet dictators, cruel and evil men though they were, were not so suicidally irrational as to actively seek that Mutually Assured Destruction that would have been the result of a nuclear exchange.

None of these things apply to Iran. The mad mullahs in Tehran may very well be willing to sacrifice thousands or even millions of their people if it means furthering their destructive designs against the Jews. But there is no reason for the West to meekly accept those plans, because they can be stopped. The Iranian nuclear program can be stopped and, I believe, the regime in Tehran overthrown without recourse to massive nuclear weapons.

In short: An ounce of prevention is worth a kiloton of cure.

Finally, the most deeply offensive thing about Clinton's remark is its utter disregard for innocent human life, in Iran and elsewhere. What sane person would want to "totally obliterate" an entire nation? Destroy its war machine, if necessary, or topple its dictators - but "totally obliterate" Iran? What kind of madness is that?

It's the madness of someone who is afraid of being seen as weak; who, instead of imagining how she might win a meaningful victory, fantasizes about the scores she will settle when she loses.

March 18, 2008

Chaharshanbe Souri - Videos

These just in, via e-mail:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9jRmL316u4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3ZtQHOPUus
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nfA0potyiY
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtpTLem2bC4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2o0APSpNSFc
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=896BFJgjJfI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRoJmcB4I9A
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iy7rS6mGVz8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9oASQjr1tA
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9lB8mu7FDw
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CgLC-CHOsNc
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fqvWgJWEDKk
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uUCkOBhYjWU
http://persiancards.com/images/ecard/132.swf

For those not familiar, this traditional Persian holiday (چهارشنبه سوری in Farsi) is forbidden by the islamist dictatorship in Tehran, and has become a rallying point for Iranian freedom activists. Here's The Spirit of Man:

Riot Time
It's Chahar-Shanbe Soori time for the Iranians and for those living inside of the country this is "Riot Time". Because it might be among the few days of the year where people of different backgrounds come out to the streets to celebrate and these "celebrations" always end up being the main place for anti-government riots.

Right now, I'm hearing about the sporadic clashes between the youth and anti-riot police in eastern area of Tehran called "Tehran Pars". The people chanted "Death to Khamenei" and other anti-regime stuff.

46 have suffered minor injuries and a few have been detained by police, regime Fars News reporting.

Photo slideshow from Reza (captions in Esperanto).

Previous post: Dreams Into Lightning - Chaharshanbe Souri dar Iran.

March 11, 2008

Netherlands Rejects Gay Iranian's Asylum Appeal

CNN:

The Netherlands has rejected an asylum plea by a gay Iranian teenager trying to escape possible persecution in his homeland.

Mehdi Kazemi believes he will face persecution if he is made to return to Iran.

Mehdi Kazemi, 19, had originally sought asylum in Britain, where he was taking classes on a student visa, because, he said, his boyfriend had been executed in Iran after saying he and Kazemi had been in a gay relationship. Britain's Home Office rejected his request, prompting Kazemi to flee to Netherlands.

Tuesday's decision by the Council of State -- the highest administrative court in the Netherlands --means Kazemi could face deportation to Britain, which he fears will send him back to Iran.

Council spokeswoman Daniela Tempelman said the council decided it must comply with the Dublin Regulation and return Kazemi to Britain. ...

Kazemi now has exhausted his chances for appeal in the Netherlands and, according to Tempelman, could be returned to Britain on a short notice. The British government about six months ago accepted the Dutch request to take him back.

Kazemi's lawyer will have the option of taking his case to the European Court of Human Rights to request an "interim measure" that could allow Kazemi to stay in Europe until further notice.

"If anybody signs his deportation papers and says, look, he's got to be deported to Iran, that means they have signed his death sentence," said Kazemi's uncle Saeed, who asked CNN to withhold his last name over safety concerns.

Gay rights activists in Europe and Iran are also researching Kazemi's case.
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"When Britain is prepared to send a young man back to possible execution, that is inhumanity on a monumental scale," said Peter Tatchell, an activist for gay campaign group OutRage. "And I hang my head in shame, as a British citizen."


Words fail me.

February 13, 2008

Imad Mughniyeh

Imad Mughniyeh, the top Hezbollah man in Syria, was sent to meet his virgins by a car bomb in Damascus on February 12, 2008. Dreams Into Lightning is pleased to welcome Mughniyeh to the growing (but with plenty of room for more) list of dead terrorists.

Wikipedia: Imad Mughniyeh.

Imad Fayez Mughniyah (December 7, 1962 - February 12, 2008), also transcribed Mughniyya, Mogniyah, Moughnie, (Arabic: عماد فايز مغنية‎), alias Hajj Radwan, was a senior member of the Hezbollah organization, a militant Shia Islamist group in Lebanon. He was alternatively described as the head of its security section, a senior intelligence official and as a founder of the organization. Sometimes described as a "master terrorist", Mugniyah had been implicated in the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy, and U.S. Marine and French peacekeeping barracks, which killed over 350, as well as the 1992 bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the kidnapping of dozens of foreigners in Lebanon in the 1980s.

Limited information is known about him. He used the alias of Hajj. Mughniyah is included in the European Union's list of wanted terrorists. and had a US$5 million bounty on the U.S. Most Wanted Terrorist list.

According to his Lebanese passport application, Mughniyah was born in Tayr Dibba, a poor village in southern Lebanon. CIA South Group records state that he lived in Ayn Al-Dilbah; a ghetto in South Beirut. His father was a vegetable seller and during the civil war, his house was on the Green Line.

Little is known about his adolescence, but he is thought to have joined Yasser Arafat's Force 17 in 1976. His role at that time was as a sniper, targeting Christians across the Green Line.[8] At some point, he studied engineering at the American University of Beirut.

Mughniyah has been implicated in many of terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s, primarily American and Israeli targets. These include the April 18, 1983 bombing of the United States embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 63 people including 17 Americans. He was later blamed for the October 23, 1983 simultaneous truck bombings against French paratroopers and the U.S. Marine barracks. The attacks killed 58 French soldiers and 241 Marines. On September 20, 1984, he attacked the US embassy annex building. The United States indicted him (and his collaborator, Hassan Izz al-Din) for the June 14, 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, which resulted in the death of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem. He was also linked to numerous kidnappings of Westerners in Beirut through the 1980s, most notably that of Terry Anderson. Some of these individuals were later killed, such as U.S. Army Colonel William Francis Buckley. The remainder were released at various times until the last one, Terry Anderson was released in 1991.

He had been described as "tall, slender, well-dressed and handsome ... penetrating eyes," speaking some English but better French.

Meir Javendafar at Pajamas Media: Another setback for Iranian intelligence.

The assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, Iran’s top man in Syria and Lebanon, should set off alarm bells in Tehran. His assassination, according to Iranian media sources, took place in the Kafarsoose neighborhood of Damascus, close to an Iranian school and the headquarters of the Syrian Mukhabarat (intelligence agency). At first glance, the elimination of such a highly valuable Iranian asset, under the very noses of the Syrians, could be taken as a sign that Western intelligence agencies have managed to infiltrate the once seemingly impenetrable walls of Iran’s intelligence operations abroad. ...

The assassination of Mughniyeh is likely to lead to a major restructuring of Iran’s intelligence operations abroad, and even at home. Mughniyeh was a man who traveled frequently between Tehran and Damascus. Therefore it is very possible that his assassins were tracking his movements inside Iran as well. The worst case scenario for Tehran would be if he was compromised by someone inside Iran, a scenario which Iran’s intelligence agency, known by its Farsi acronym as VAVAK, would quite likely be looking into.

Andrew Cochran at Counterterrorism Blog: Mughniyeh, as remembered by CTB.

It was a fitting end for someone who planned and executed numerous deadly terrorist attacks, including the 1983 bombings of the U.S Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut and the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires, Argentina Jewish center. Mugniyah was indicted in the U.S. for his role in planning and executing the 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight 847, which resulted in the murder of one U.S. citizen.

Mughniyeh was also implicated in Hezbollah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in 2006, which led to Israel's incursion into Lebanon. Contributing Experts posted several analyses at that time about his role in that conflict, including:

"Imad Mugniyah likely behind the capture of Israeli soldiers," by Bill Roggio, July 12: "The sophistication of this attack indicates Imad Fayez Mugniyah, Hezbollah's chief of military operations was directly involved. Mugniyah has a long history of successful military and terrorist operations across the globe. Mugniyah has a history of conducting similar snatch and grab operations against the Israelis."

"Inside Hizballah’s decision-making," by Magnus Ranstorp, July 14: "The file for handling special operations of this kind is usually left to Imad Mughniyeh, the elusive terrorist mastermind for Hizballah, who stands with one foot within Hizballah (reporting to Naserallah directly) and with one foot in Iran inside the architectures of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the al-Qods unit within the Iranian Pasdaran.


See original for links.

The Belmont Club: Mughniyeh killed in Damascus.

[Hezbollah] had recently been resupplied with rockets, shipped under the label of civilian supplies, past the UN Peacekeeping force. Hezbollah was also supposed to have sent reconnaissance teams disguised as journalist to the Lebanese/Israeli border to obtain video footage of certain areas. The strike on Mughniyeh suggests that parallel counterpreparations mirroring those of Hezbollah were simultaneously in progress. Mughaniyeh was regarded as a particularly difficult target. Wikipedia quotes Robert Baer, a former CIA officer as saying, "Mugniyah is probably the most intelligent, most capable operative we’ve ever run across, including the KGB or anybody else. He enters by one door, exits by another, changes his cars daily, never makes appointments on a telephone, never is predictable. He only uses people that are related to him that he can trust. He doesn’t just recruit people."

Across the Bay: Mughniyeh assassinated in Damascus.

To say that Mughniyeh was an Iranian asset is to understate his relationship with the Iranians. He was much more than an asset. He was an organic part of the Iranian regime, answering directly to Khamenei. Just like Hezbollah is itself an organic extension of the Islamic Revolution -- an Iranian ministry as one Iranian analyst told me -- Mughniyeh is like one step above that, answering directly to Khamenei according to some analysts.

As such, this is a big loss for the Iranians. It was perhaps best encapsulated in the statement by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who declared that "the march of Jihad against the enemy has lost an essential pillar." Operationally, this adds to the losses suffered by Hezbollah in 2006, which, unlike stockpiles of Katyushas, is much more difficult to replace.

But it's also a huge embarrassment for Syria. As Michael Rubin noted at NRO's Corner, "as important as who was killed is where." Not that we needed this, or Mughniyeh's aunt Fayza for that matter, to know that Damascus is terror central.

Coming a few months after the Sept. 6 hit on their nuclear facility in Deir el-Zor, this hit on a most-wanted terrorist, harbored in a joint Iranian-Syrian location in the heart of Damascus is a major embarrassment for Assad. Regardless who did it, it reflects quite badly on Assad, not long after his secret nuke facility was pulverized. Speculation over who did it only adds to the embarrassment no matter how you cut it, and whether Israel did it or not, the suspicion that it did would once again make a mockery of Assad's and Hezbollah's proclamations regarding the "loss of deterrence" after the 2006 war.

Thomas Joscelyn at The Weekly Standard: A master terrorist is killed.

But here is something that none of the press accounts I’ve read today have reported: Imad Mugniyah played an instrumental role in al Qaeda’s rise. I detailed Mugniyah’s role in al Qaeda’s terror in Iran’s Proxy War Against America, a short book published by the Claremont Institute last year. I won’t go into all of the details again in this post, but here is a quick summary of the relationship:

• Mugniyah met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan in the early 1990’s. The two agreed to work together against their common enemies, including America. Al Qaeda operatives were then trained by Mugniyah and other Hezbollah trainers, as well as Iranian personnel, in Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran. Both the Clinton administration, in its first two indictments of al Qaeda and bin Laden, and the 9/11 Commission found significant evidence of this early collaboration.

• According to Bob Baer, a long-time CIA operative who tracked Mugniyah for years, one of Mugniyah’s goons facilitated the travel of an al Qaeda operative en route to the November 19, 1995, bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. The bombing was among al Qaeda’s earliest operations.

• There is no real doubt that Iran and Mugniyah’s Hezbollah were primarily responsible for the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. But the 9/11 Commission also found evidence that al Qaeda may have played some role. Intelligence indicates that al Qaeda was planning a similar operation in the months prior. And afterwards, in telephone conversations that were evidently intercepted, Osama bin Laden received congratulations from his fellow terrorists, including Ayman al Zawahiri.

• Al Qaeda’s August 7, 1998, embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were modeled after Mugniyah’s bombings in Lebanon in 1983. According to the 9/11 Commission, bin Laden asked Mugniyah for help in executing such attacks and Mugniyah agreed to provide his assistance. Thereafter, al Qaeda adopted Hezbollah’s modus operandi: simultaneous attacks by suicide bombers. Al Qaeda’s August 7, 1998, bombings directly mirrored Hezbollah’s simultaneous strike against the U.S. Marine barracks and a headquarters for French paratroopers on October 23, 1983. In fact, the 9/11 Commission found that some of the terrorists responsible for the embassy bombings were trained by Hezbollah. This is a crucial point: al Qaeda’s most successful attack prior to 9/11--the August 7, 1998, embassy bombings--was modeled after Hezbollah’s operations.

• After the 9/11 attacks, Bob Baer immediately suspected that Mugniyah and his masters had played some role. (I also discussed this in a previous article, "Sy Hersh’s Overactive Imagination".) Amazingly, the 9/11 Commission found that senior Hezbollah operatives were aware of and facilitated the travel of many of the 9/11 hijackers. This evidence was so “disturbing” that the Commission called for a further investigation into the matter. Although he was not named by the Commission directly, Mugniyah was reportedly one of the senior Hezbollah terrorists involved.

Douglas Farah at Counterterrorism Blog: The importance of Imad Mughniyeh.

The assassination of top Shite militant Imad Mughniyeh is important for many reasons, not the least of which was his long-standing ties to Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network and his crucial role as a link between the Iranian special forces and Hezbollah.

It is also interesting to note that Hezbollah, where Mughniyeh was a top strategist for many years, claimed him as their own immediately upon his death, despite denying responsibility in several of the actions for which he is most famous.

Michael Ledeen: Mughniyah.

Hezbollah was a joint Iranian-Syrian operation in which the Iranians ran the organization and Syria provided the base, and logistical support. As I was the first to report, he flew with Iranian President Ahmadi-Nezhad to Damascus for high-level meetings with Bashar Assad and key Syrian military and intelligence officers a while back. So he had very high standing among the terror masters.

Neocon Express: Imad Mughniyeh, the man behind the Beirut Marine barracks bombing killed.

What truly amazes me is that US media are far more fixated today on whether Roger Clemens was injected with steroids years ago, then they seem to be in this huge story involving the mysterious targeted assassination of a man responsible for hundreds of American lives.

Debka: Tehran, Damascus, Hizballah leadership believed coordinating retaliation for Mughniyeh’s death.

Iran, Syria and Hizballah are certain that the bomb planted in the master terrorist’s Mitsubishi Pajero in the heart of the Syrian capital was rigged by the Israeli Mossad. They are therefore most certainly setting up a major reprisal in the form of a terrorist hit or a military assault.

Wednesday night, all Hizballah’s top leaders went to ground. They even gave the mourning tent set up in the Shiite district of Beirut for their dead leader a wide berth.

Our sources report that the long-sought terrorist was finally despatched by a small explosive inserted between the driver’s seat and the back seats, which destroyed only one part of the vehicle. The front and rear remained intact. Mughniyeh was driving alone to a reception marking Islamic Revolution Day at the Iranian embassy in the Romana district.

DEBKAfile’s counter-terror experts note that the way the explosion was set up recalled the method used by the hit team which killed the Jihad Islami senior operative Ghaleb Ghali in Damascus in October 2004. Then, too, Syria held Israel responsible.

In from the Cold: Justice served.

Mughniyeh’s death represents a major blow for Hizballah. Along with his skills in organizing terrorist operations, Mughniyeh was credited with organizing the group’s defenses during the 2006 war with Israel. He also served as a primary liaison between the group and its patrons in Iran. In fact, Mughniyeh also held a position in the Iranian Quods Force, which provides extensive training and support for Hizballah.

Tuesday’s car bombing is also an embarrassment for Damascus, at least officially. A number of terror groups maintain offices in the Syrian capital, and operate there with relative impunity. As the Washington Post observed, the successful effort to eliminate Mughniyeh represents a “major breach” in Syria’s police-state security apparatus.

Remarks. The embarassment to the Syrian regime can hardly be overstated. As I commented on the recent Israeli airstrike on Syria, the message here seems to be "Syria, you are our bitches."

If sources like Stratfor are to be believed, back-channel negotiations between the US and Iran, centering on Iraq, may now be thrown into chaos or scrapped. This doesn't strike me as altogether a bad thing.

February 12, 2008

Azarmehr on Iran and Regime Change

Azarmehr writes at Harry's Place in response to an Israeli claim that the islamist regime in Iran is "here to stay":

I have rarely read something so defeatist in the last 29 years, during which I have followed Iranian related news on a daily basis. In fact the article does not give any valid reasons why the Islamic regime cannot be toppled, it just says it's difficult! So should we only engage in easy tasks? Next time I am handed a project at work should I say, oh that's difficult, I only want to do easy ones?

I have to say I agree with a few points in the article. Fomenting ethnic dissent is counter-productive to toppling the regime. Those familiar with Iranian history and Iranian psychology will realise that the overwhelming majority of Iranians are so anti-separatism that they will put up with the most repressive regime to keep the historic entity of Iran intact, and this includes myself. The Islamic Republic does not discriminate against the ethnicity of Iranians, it discriminates against those who do not conform to the state's interpretation of religion. The Islamic Republic is not a "Persian chauvinist" state, the Supreme Leader is an Azeri like myself. Persian is not a ruling ethnic group, it's the common language of the Iranian people and much loved because of its richness by all Iranian people. The majority of Persian literature lecturers and scholars are non-Persians.

Back to my objections to the article. Is it difficult to topple the regime? Yes it is. Is it impossible? Not at all. Why is it not impossible? Just look at the trend of its popularity in the last 29 years. In the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic revolution, 98 percent of the people voted for the referendum to establish an Islamic republic. Although it was a flawed election, we have to accept that the majority were in favour, not knowing what was ahead for them. Would a similar number vote in favour now? Absolutely not. Just look at the filtering of the candidates by the Guardian Council. The regime is so scared of giving the Iranian people a real choice that even the most loyal people to the revolution are now barred from standing as candidates. If the likes of Yossi Alpher bothered to promote engagement with Iranian dissidents as well as with Iranian state officials, perhaps it would surprise him to find out from the ex-political prisoners that even their prison guards and governors would at times manifest their hatred of the religious dictatorship in Iran. That's how deeply unpopular the regime has become.

The difficulty in mobilising the Iranian masses to reach the critical mass required to topple the regime is that the regime to them seems invincible. They lack confidence, and certainly such articles by Yossi Alpher do not help. ...

January 24, 2008

Azarmehr: Hope for VOA Persian

Azarmehr

One must not always criticise without giving credit when it is due. There has been some worthwhile improvements in VOA Persian programs recently. Most noteworthy was a very professionally managed program presented by Shahla Arasteh who had invited Gene Sharp as her guest. The program started with some good background footage in civil disobedience, appropriate questions were asked in a coherent manner by the presenter, and professionally interpreted from Persian to English and vice versa.

Also what I liked was how an IRI plant intent on causing embarrassment during the first call was quickly recognised and dealt with quickly. ...


Read the rest at the link.

January 23, 2008

Iran, Russia, China

FrontPage Magazine: The Iran-Russia-China axis.

Frontpage Interview's guest today is Steve Schippert, co-founder of the Center for Threat Awareness and managing editor for ThreatsWatch.org.

FP: We've gathered here today to discuss the Iran-Russia-China alignment. I think a good place to start is with Russia sending nuclear fuel to Iran. What do you make of this development?

Schippert: The 11-shipment Russian supply underway of 80 tons of enriched uranium nuclear fuel for the Russian-built 1,000 megawatt light water reactor is a sweeping Iranian victory and troubling in several respects. From a strategic view flying by at 20,000 feet, it is indicative of Iran and Russia's deepening common alignment against the United States. It's an alignment – an allied partnership beyond nuclear cooperation - that also includes China.

Iran has notched yet another major victory over the West, which remains quick and eager to talk while slow and reluctant to act. Iran smartly feeds the Western obsession with talks and negotiations, while acting without pause or regret. The West, in this regard, is persistently, willingly and knowingly being played. ...

FP: What is the state of the Iranian support axis: Russia and China? What threats does it represent?

Schippert: The state of the axis is good, strong – and strengthening – and mutually beneficial, particularly for the Iranian regime in the short term. I have and will continue to refer to Russia and China as the Iranian Protectorate. No nation at the UN Security Council has been more steadfast or consistent in resistance to US and Western sanctions efforts there than either the bear or the dragon.

The reasons for this are quite simple: Synergistic strategic advancement against a common enemy, oil and money. ...

FP: What do you make of Iran's invitation to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?

Schippert: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was originally the manifestation of the Russian and Chinese rapprochement, a new strategic pact between historic enemies. It was publicly introduced as an anti-terrorism regional cooperative, looking to combine regional efforts to combat the thereat that terrorism posed to each participating state. But, while each may indeed have its own challenges posed by regional terrorism, The SCO has always been largely leveraged by Russia and China as an anti-US strategic cooperative, including security and economic aspects. ...

FP: What policy do you recommend for the U.S. in facing this new axis?

Schippert: It truly is a three dimensional chessboard in both complexity and scope. Compounding this is the sometimes schizophrenic nature of American Foreign Policy brought about by the regular peaceful transition of power brought about with every American election, particularly presidential elections. When an election results in a majority transition from one general world view to a different world view, the foreign policy changes can be dramatic.

With regard to the 'new axis' among Iran, Russia and China, we must avoid bi-polar sea changes in direction and effort and adopt a policy that recognizes these strategic competitors with consistency. Some may be enamored with phrases claiming to end the days of “cowboy diplomacy” and the like, but if ending this perception means fundamentally altering the approach to one or all in a 'kinder, gentler' manner, this will only serve to empower the alliance to further exploit an America (and the West) already nearing a refusal to act. They clearly have few such equivalent inhibitions.

For instance, China and Russia had some reluctance to ink a new oil and gas deal with Iran or supply enriched uranium for its reactors while its won enrichment program proceed unabated. But the words of one NIE reversed that in an instant. So too can the words outlining an outwardly weak foreign policy shift, and the words employed during its execution.

To the contrary, our foreign policy must be bolder, particularly with Iran. As it is, our Iran policy is impossible to define and left largely to interpretation.

I will make one crucial policy recommendation, though there are many to consider. The United States must openly adopt a regime change policy with regard to Iran. ...


December 14, 2007

Belmont Club on NIE

The Belmont Club:

I guess the Europeans were content to play the "good cop" as long as Washington played the "bad cop". Now that the current NIE has made that role harder to play, that essential role must be fulfilled by someone else. Which just goes to show that a lot of the criticism directed at Washington simply goes with the turf of being the leading power in the world.
Read the rest at the link.

Remarks. Once again, Richard "Wretchard the cat" Fernandez says it more clearly and succinctly than I can. I'll just remind readers that I suspect the Bush Administration is very adept at playing the game of "be careful what you wish for, you might get it" with its adversaries. I linked The American Thinker's article arguing that

[the NIE] will cause a fuss in the media in Israel (which is under the gun most directly), but also in Saudi, the Gulf States, Europe, the United States, and even Russia, where everybody has been happily demagoguing W for ages, secure in the knowledge that Uncle Sam would help them if they encountered real danger from the martyrdom brigade.

It's very clever. Some countries are suddenly getting serious about Tehran's nukes. The UK Guardian (!) has been writing about the danger, the same folks who've been blowing superheated steam like Old Faithful ever since the overthrow of Saddam. The Brits, Germans and French have told the press that the Americans are just wrong again, just like with Saddam, but now in the opposite way. With Saddam, the myth goes, there were no WMDs, but now Iran has them coming for sure.

In Israel, people are going bananas, realizing that the danger is very real, and that the US can't pull their chestnuts out of the fire without some painful compromises with the Arabs.

In Saudi, according to Max Boot's recent article in the WSJ, they're sounding like neocons about Iran. Everybody is shaking in their boots, and rightly so.


In my own post on the NIE, I compared the new document to last year's Baker-Hamilton report on Iraq. The New York Sun had similar ideas:
It's the return of Baker-Hamilton. A year ago, this newspaper was the first to alert Americans to the dangers of this panel's recommendations regarding Iraq. We ran the first report that these congressionally-appointed "wise" men were fashioning a call to retreat from the Battle of Iraq and to appease those states sabotaging the nation-building there. Our Eli Lake also broke the story of the commission's scheme to press for Israel's relinquishment of the Golan Heights in hopes of stabilizing Iraq.

A month after the release of the commission's report, President Bush brushed aside the council of defeatists. Instead of offering a "diplomatic surge," whereby Secretary Rice would visit — hat in hand — Tehran and Damascus asking what we might be able to do to get them to stop terrorizing our soldiers and Iraq's civilians, the president led with a military surge. He announced that we were going to disrupt the supply lines of the enemy, and he ordered General Petraeus to protect Baghdad from confessional cleansers block by block. ...


It'll be interesting to see what happens next. As the Belmont Club observes, nothing scares the Left more than the prospect of having to face real threats on their own.

Related.
The National Intelligence Estimate.

December 12, 2007

"So here's what W decides: Why not let the libs write that NIE?"

Call me crazy, but I think James Lewis at American Thinker might be on to something here.

December 07, 2007

National Intelligence Estimate: Intentions, Capabilities, and Choices

In reading the controversy over the new National Intelligence Estimate, I've had odd feelings of deja vu. I am persistently reminded of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group report of a year ago. But I'll come back to this later. First, I want to look at the wording of two passages in the "Key Judgments" section of the report.

Here's a link to the unclassified summary of the NIE:
National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (DNI release) - PDF document

In reading the text of the NIE summary itself, I was struck by the peculiar wording of the following passages:

Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.

and
Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

Emphasis added. Now an "assessment" is an evaluation of the available data; it is not, in and of itself, an objective fact. An assessment cannot directly "suggest" or "indicate" anything except the beliefs of the person making the assessment. A more natural way to word the foregoing paragraphs might have been:
Our assessment that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure, if correct, implies Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.

and:
Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure is consistent with the theory that Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.

But that's not what the report says. And the strange locution it uses instead suggests - to me - something close to a reversal of cause and effect in the writer's mind. It's as though the NIE's "assessments" on these points have been magically transmuted into empirical, incontrovertible "facts on the ground" from which other things - specifically, foreign policy prescriptions - may be deduced.

You may think I'm quibbling here over a minor point of semantics. I invite you to read the "Key Judgments" section of the report aloud to yourself, all the way through, and see if the awkwardness of those two passages doesn't just jump out at you.

Now go to the second passage in question and read the whole paragraph:

Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

Now, notice how quick the authors are to translate their "assessment", which becomes an objective fact, into foreign policy prescriptions. Just in case you didn't get the point when they claimed that "Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon", they spell out for you the implication that

threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.

At this point, the sages of the NIE modestly refrain from offering any advice on "what such a combination might be", but I think it's awfully nice of them to be so concerned for Iran's "security, prestige, and goals for regional influence", don't you?

John Bolton sees 'a more fundamental problem: Too much of the intelligence community is engaging in policy formulation'; Michael Ledeen thinks 'those “intelligence professionals” were very happy to take off their analytical caps and gowns and put on their policy wigs.' I agree.

Now about the other thing I was saying. Remember the Baker-Hamilton report? I wrote a couple of posts on it about a year ago. I concluded that with Baker-Hamilton spelling out in such stark terms the choices in Iraq, the public and the Administration would "consider, and reject, the empty and failed policies of the past". I quoted Michael Ledeen saying:

The Surrender Commission Report underlines the basic truth about the war, which is that we cannot possibly win it by fighting defensively in Iraq alone. So long as Iran and Syria have a free shot at us and our Iraqi allies, they can trump most any military tactics we adopt, at most any imaginable level of troops. Until the publication of the report this was the dirty secret buried under years of misleading rhetoric from our leaders; now it is front and center.

As I said earlier, I've been trying to put my finger on why the NIE debate reminded me so strongly of the ISG debate; that's it right there. Now you might argue that Ledeen was wrong - that we did, in fact, win in Iraq by fighting defensively in Iraq. But his point was simply that the report had the unintended value of exposing the utter moral and strategic bankruptcy of the appeasement position.

Which brings us to the new post at The Belmont Club: "Not that far."

What the new NIE has done -- and why I think even the liberals are so worried -- is that the intelligence assessment has made it very difficult to sustain even the bluff of working towards regime change; a threat they would have no truck with but at the same time probably found useful for so long as they could get a President George W. Bush to articulate it. Now that the doves have got what they ostensibly wanted, whether by design or misadventure, it has become apparent that it's not everything they wanted after all. It's ironic that an NIE which was supposed to have "proved" the usefulness of sanctions and diplomacy may wind up underlining its ultimate inadequacy without the threat of more dire action to give it teeth.

And you remember what happened after Baker-Hamilton was released? President Bush smiled politely, thanked the authors of the report, and went ahead and did as he damn well pleased. What Baker-Hamilton wanted was withdrawal from Iraq.

What they got was the surge.


Related.
Morning Report: December 7.
Morning Report: December 6.

November 19, 2007

Iran regime's "cooperation" - and its nuclear aims.

Joshua Goodman at ThreatsWatch:

In recent meetings with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iran made “guarantees” to stop supplying explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). While these guarantees and those before them were met with skepticism, Major General James Simmons, the deputy commanding general of Multinational Corps-Iraq, sees reason to be optimistic: “I’m hopeful… What I see is a diplomatic effort being undertaken by the United States government – and I see a positive response from the Iranian government and that’s good.” A few weeks later, Simmons once again noted additional signs of Iranian cooperation: “We have not seen any recent evidence that weapons continue to come across the border into Iraq.” Simmons’ comments echo an early November statement by Defense Secretary Robert Gates that Iran was playing some role in the reduction of bombings by Shi’a militias. Gates did acknowledge, though, that it was difficult to quantify exactly how much of a positive influence Iran was playing in this matter. Nevertheless, there was a clear recognition that positive steps were being taken.

Similarly, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari noted Iran’s effort to “rein in” Shi’a militias. In a November 6 interview with Ross Colvin of Reuters, Zebari clearly stated that “Iran has been instrumental in reining in the militias and the Mehdi Army by using its influence.” As such, “Part of the security improvement was their [Iran’s] control of the militias. We see this as a positive development.”

For its part, the United States is making a few overtures to Iran as a gesture of goodwill. On November 6, Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith announced that the U.S. military would release 9 of the 20 Iranians they have captured in Iraq. And while the 9 released Iranians do not include the highest ranking or “most troubling” of the detainees, the U.S. is clearly offering Iran a carrot in the hopes of continuing the cooperation.


Some of these developments were noted in this site's November 18 Morning Report, which cited a Reuters story indicating a perception by the Iraqi government of a "thaw" in US/Iranian relations. That post also cited the NYT article stating that
The Iraqi government on Saturday credited Iran with helping to rein in Shiite militias and stemming the flow of weapons into Iraq, helping to improve the security situation noticeably. The Iraqi government’s spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, speaking at a lunch for reporters, also said that the Shiite-dominated government was making renewed efforts to bring back Sunni Arab ministers who have been boycotting the government for more than four months.

American Future speculated on the possibility of a behind-the-scenes deal between the US and the IRI. Here, Goodman raises another possibility:
The motives for Iran’s temporary shift in strategy with regards to Iraq are unclear, although a number of dynamics are likely to have factored into the equation. For one, with al-Qaeda in Iraq becoming weaker everyday, the focus of the U.S. military was shifting to Iran’s Shi’a network. In fact, the coalition forces have already taken a number of steps in combating the Shi’a threat with notable success – particularly in Baghdad. More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that Iran’s involvement in Iraq seemed on the verge of spiraling to direct conflict with the U.S. By following through on its promise to stop the flow of weapons and fighters, Iran seems to have temporarily brought calm to an almost certain clash.

If I'm understanding Goodman correctly, he believes that it is the Iranian regime, and not the US government, that has been pressured to cut its losses in Iraq - specifically, in order to avoid a disastrous confrontation with the US and save its own resources for its number one priority, the nuclear program. Goodman's concluding paragraph words it this way:
While Iran has grand ambitions for regional hegemony, it views its nuclear program as a basic necessity to achieve all ends. Iran’s support of Shi’a militias in Iraq was, for the time being, endangering its nuclear endeavors. Although Iran is currently quite secure on the nuclear issue, it is unlikely to take any action in the near future to jeopardize its current position. Thus, in the interim, Iran’s behavior in Iraq will likely continue to foil its actions on the nuclear front.

Now I'm going to zoom back to the beginning of Goodman's article to take a look at the other entity he mentions: the IRGC.

The United States government’s October 25, 2007 “Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,” was a clear indication of where the administration’s Iran policy will focus on in the near future: namely curbing the threat Iran poses to American forces in Iraq and ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. At the center of both of these issues is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Crops (IRGC), the elite Iranian military organization that was singled out as a terrorist entity under Executive Order 13382. As my colleague Steve Schippert rightly noted back in August before the formal State Department designation, “the intent in the President’s Executive Order to specifically designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist entity may be to increase international pressure to divest from the Iranian regime and injure the elite IRGC.”

The IRGC plays a central role in Iran’s activities in Iraq, where the Quds force and the Iranian-proxy Hizballah have been actively training and arming Shi’a militias, and in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, as past United Nations Security Council resolutions have suggested. By targeting the IRGC, a military body whose business operations make it susceptible to economic pressure, the administration may well be trying to pressure those elements close to the source of the problem in the hopes of forcing Iran to cooperate.


He's talking about the recently enacted sanctions, which I previously noted in this October 25 post on new Iran sanctions. I quoted the Treasury Department's press release at some length, and cited Walid Phares at the Counterterrorism Blog, who called it "a master strategic strike into the financial web of the major power centers of the Iranian regime". Phares' CTB colleague Andy Cochran expressed similar enthusiasm:
In my opinion, the broad scope of this sweeping announcement signals a decisive foreign policy decision, in concert with other countries, to significantly ratchet up sanctions against Iran to avoid a more dangerous confrontation (the Associated Press characterizes them as "the harshest since the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 1979").

And this view would appear to be supported by Goodman's analysis of today's post. Here, though, Cochran's reference to a "more dangerous confrontation" invites the question: Dangerous for whom? In general, a confrontation is more "dangerous" for the side that expects to lose. The way I'm reading this is that both the US and the IRI have decided against coming to blows over Iraq, each party for its own reasons: Iran because it cannot win such a battle and because it needs to conserve its resources for its nuclear program; and the US because the battle, even if won, would prove costly and a Pyrrhic victory.

So it looks as if what's happening is that the arena of confrontation is being narrowed. Neither the US nor the Iranian regime seems to think a conflict over (or in) Iraq is worth the cost. Where we go from here is anybody's guess, but while I'm on the subject of the IRGC, I want to return to The Spirit of Man's post citing Amir Taheri:

A very well written piece on WSJ by Amir Taheri about the nature and goals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards:

"A few IRGC commanders, including some at the top, do not relish a conflict with the U.S. that could destroy their business empires without offering Iran victory on the battlefield. Indeed, there is no guarantee that, in case of a major war, all parts of the IRGC would show the same degree of commitment to the system. IRGC commanders may be prepared to kill unarmed Iranians or hire Lebanese, Palestinian and Iraqi radicals to kill others. However, it is not certain they would be prepared to die for President Ahmadinejad's glory."

And this is what I have always thought to happen in case of a foreign military intervention. No body will die for this corrupt and monstrous regime and many will not sacrifice their lives for the mullahs. Many many Iranians are willing to take the risk of being bombed if their evil rulers get what they deserve which is what happened to Saddam and Milosevic.

Now read this:

"While many Iranians see it as a monster protecting an evil regime, others believe that, when the crunch comes, it will side with the people against an increasingly repressive and unpopular regime."

And this is exactly what concerns me. A limited bombing strike against the command and control sectors of the Iranian regime will eventually help accelerate the fall of the clerical establishment.


In Taheri's and Winston's view, then, the IRGC is not a monolithic mass but a structure which, with the application of the right kind and degree of pressure, may at least in part be turned to ends other than those which it was originally created to serve.

And if this view is correct, then the application of targeted economic pressure may serve as a means of testing the organization's response to that pressure - and a possible prelude to further action in the future.

But this leads to the other important question, and the one that Winston asks: Who, in the event of the Mullahs' fall, would take over in Iran?

October 25, 2007

Iran Sanctions: "Master Strategic Strike" at IRI's Financial Machine

Walid Phares at Counterterrorism Blog:

After Andy Cochran's posting, here is a quick comment on the Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism Today's documents revealing the US financial measures taken against Iran's military power hits the heart of the regime. The US official document can only be described as a master strategic strike into the financial web of the major power centers of the Iranian regime. See the full document. Following are three points:

The first organization, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to the document is "considered the military vanguard of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is composed of five branches (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations) in addition to a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the Supreme Leader. It runs prisons, and has numerous economic interests involving defense production, construction, and the oil industry. Several of the IRGC's leaders have been sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1747."

Point One: The Pasdaran is indeed the backbone of the regime. Compare it to a combined Communist Party, Militia and KGB during the peak of the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union.

The second organization, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL): According to the report, "the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) controls the Defense Industries Organization, an Iranian entity identified in the Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and designated by the United States under E.O. 13382 on March 30, 2007. MODAFL also was sanctioned, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act, in November 2000 for its involvement in missile technology proliferation activities."

Point Two: This is Iran's Defense apparatus. ...

HP-644 - October 25, 2007:

October 25, 2007
HP-644

Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism

The U.S. Government is taking several major actions today to counter Iran's bid for nuclear capabilities and support for terrorism by exposing Iranian banks, companies and individuals that have been involved in these dangerous activities and by cutting them off from the U.S. financial system.

Today, the Department of State designated under Executive Order 13382 two key Iranian entities of proliferation concern: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Additionally, the Department of the Treasury designated for proliferation activities under E.O. 13382 nine IRGC-affiliated entities and five IRGC-affiliated individuals as derivatives of the IRGC, Iran's state-owned Banks Melli and Mellat, and three individuals affiliated with Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).

The Treasury Department also designated the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) under E.O. 13224 for providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations, and Iran's state-owned Bank Saderat as a terrorist financier.

Elements of the IRGC and MODAFL were listed in the Annexes to UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. All UN Member States are required to freeze the assets of entities and individuals listed in the Annexes of those resolutions, as well as assets of entities owned or controlled by them, and to prevent funds or economic resources from being made available to them.

...

Effect of Today's Actions

As a result of our actions today, all transactions involving any of the designees and any U.S. person will be prohibited and any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction will be frozen. Noting the UN Security Council's grave concern over Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program activities, the United States also encourages all jurisdictions to take similar actions to ensure full and effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747.

Today's designations also notify the international private sector of the dangers of doing business with three of Iran's largest banks, as well as the many IRGC- affiliated companies that pervade several basic Iranian industries.

Proliferation Finance – Executive Order 13382 Designations

E.O. 13382, signed by the President on June 29, 2005, is an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters, and at isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems. Designations under the Order prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Considered the military vanguard of Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is composed of five branches (Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, Basij militia, and Qods Force special operations) in addition to a counterintelligence directorate and representatives of the Supreme Leader. It runs prisons, and has numerous economic interests involving defense production, construction, and the oil industry. Several of the IRGC's leaders have been sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1747.

The IRGC has been outspoken about its willingness to proliferate ballistic missiles ...

September 20, 2007

Israel's Peres to Syria: Let's Talk Peace

Two weeks after an Israeli airstrike against something or other in Syria, Israeli President Shimon Peres suddenly feels all warm and fuzzy toward the Syrians. Here's Ha'Aretz

"I do believe the nervousness in the relationship between Syria and ourselves is over," Peres told foreign journalists. "Why go back to rumors and speculation when we say clearly we are ready to negotiate directly with the Syrians for peace."

... Meanwhile, another indication that tensions with Syria have quieted somewhat is the fact that the Israel Defense Forces have announced that a round of officer appointments, suspended due to the rise in tensions, would resume. The appointments were halted about a month before the September 6 incident, due to fears of a possible war with Syria during the summer.


Commentary. As you know, I'm not any kind of Middle East expert, so what follows here is my strictly amateur analysis. Now we all know that there's been a lot of talk in the last couple of years about a Syrian/Iranian strategic alliance, which would make sense, because neither of those countries has very many friends left in the Middle East. Consequently, there's been speculation on the US/Israeli side about the desirability of trying to weaken the alliance by making peace overtures to Syria in order to woo it away from the Iranian orbit.

The debate within Israel has been between the camp that says "Iran or no Iran, Syria is our enemy - we'd be nuts to negotiate with them"; and the side that says "One thing at a time - Iran is Public Enemy Number One, and we need to keep them from establishing a beachhead on our borders."

So what has just happened is that Israel has taken Syria to the woodshed and whipped it like a naughty schoolboy. Then, to add insult to injury, they've publicly humiliated the Assad regime by saying, "... Oh, you were saying something about peace talks? Let's talk peace."

I think there's a message for everybody here:

For Syria: You are our bitches.

For Iran: Your so-called allies in Syria are useless to you. We can strike any point in Syria at any time. You are alone.

For the Israelis: This is what we mean when we talk about negotiating from a position of strength. We know you think your government are a bunch of wimps, but we do know what we're doing. When we say "let's negotiate with the Syrians", we're not talking about giving away the farm - so don't take us for fools. Our focus must be on prying Syria away from Iran, and that's what we're doing.

And it might be working. Here's Stratfor:

Most intriguing are the reports we have received from Lebanon claiming that a serious division has opened up in the leadership of Hezbollah over the prospect of Syria working out a peace agreement with Israel. To even hear of a division within Hezbollah over the subject is startling, let alone the fact that the group is taking the possibility of a peace treaty seriously.

Israel periodically raises the possibility of a peace settlement with Syria, usually not all that sincerely, so Peres' comment is not completely strange. The report on Hezbollah taking this seriously is more interesting, but remember that rumors always flow in Lebanon, and this one may not be true -- or Hezbollah is simply getting itself bent out of shape.

The report goes on to speculate on the possible role of Turkey, raising the possibility that something was entering Syria from Turkey "that the Israelis didn't want arriving" and noting that the Turkish government is interested in seeing Syria and Israel negotiate.

Related.
Israel-Syria overflight roundup.

August 26, 2007

More on Majid Kavousifar; and Canada/US/Iran

Apparently Majid Kavousifar has the US Department of State to thank for that noose. Azarmehr:

Majid Kavousifar, seen in these pictures before being hanged, left Iran for Abu Dhabi two days after the assassination of one of the corruptest and most repressive judges in the Islamic Republic. Judge Moghaddas who was assassinated by Kavousifar and his nephew, was responsible for handing out long sentences to many political activists. Moghaddas sometimes even boasted that he sentenced the accused without even reading their files!

Kavoussifar had introduced himself as the killer of Moghaddas to the American Embassy in Abu Dhabi, where he had applied for asylum. The embassy guards handed him over to the Interpol, which informed Islamic Republic's authorities of the incident.


I regret that my previous post missed this important detail.

Azarmehr is back in Canada now after four weeks in Washington, DC, and he's none too impressed with the Homeland Security people at Dulles:

The worst things I will remember however about the four weeks in Washington, will be the repressive unbearable heat and humidity and once again the encounter with the stupidest officials I have ever come across in my life, the US Homeland Security at Dulles airport. These so called Homeland Security people represent the embodiment of the worst combination. Stupid, ignorant and illiterate people who have been given a lot of power.

Also from Iranada, Winston at The Spirit of Man writes in response to this piece at the Western Standard:

First of all, it is really disappointing to see that a US ally such as Canada let the US go down its "destructive path" instead of helping it all the way.

Heh. Winston goes on to say,
A regime, as Jordan Michael Smith put it, is "weak, fearful and defensive" will not give up because if it does so, it will lose its iron-fist gained legitimacy among its own unhappy people more than ever.

Go to the link for a point-by-point rebuttal to the Western Standard.

August 23, 2007

The Smile of Majid Kavousifar

Shiro-Khorshid Forever:

When I first saw the video of Hossein and Majid Kavousifar I did not undrestand why he was smiling while being taken to his execution. ...

Read the rest.

July 27, 2007

Iranians: Invade Us, Please

Strategy Page:

July 21, 2007: A recent opinion survey showed that 58 percent of Iranians would support a foreign invasion to overthrow the current religious dictatorship. However, nearly 70 percent would prefer a popular, but non-violent, revolution, like the one that tossed out European communist dictatorships in 1989-90. Worse, 92 percent do not approve of how their government operates. Only eleven percent oppose democracy, and 72 percent did not support the "Islamic Revolution" that has dominated the country for 28 years. Still, most Iranians are not willing to fight, knowing that the minority of Iranians who do support the government are armed and willing to kill Iranians that oppose them. The survey also showed that 78 percent of Iranians believe the country should have nuclear power, but only 46 percent believed they should have nuclear weapons. Interestingly, 52 percent believed that Western Europe would accept Iran having nuclear power. People are not happy with the government foreign policy, with 60 percent opposing support of Hizbollah, 56 percent oppose support for Hamas, and 70 percent oppose the destruction of Israel. However, a third of the population agreed with president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's contention that the World War II German death camp program, that killed six million Jews, never happened. ...

July 25, 2007

CalPERS: Reconsider Iran Investments

San Francisco Business Times:

The California Public Employees' Retirement System urged four companies in its public equity portfolio to take steps to "minimize the risk of investment in Iran," as part of a broader effort by large U.S. pension funds to reconsider financial investments in the increasingly isolated Middle East powerhouse. ...

Clark McKinley, a CalPERS spokesman, told the San Francisco Business Times that "the threat is what could happen if there were some kind of sanction or some kind of action in Iran," calling the situation similar to earlier international efforts to bar investments in Sudan, which has been shattered by civil war and by what many consider government-sponsored genocide. In addition, California, other states and Congress are pursuing legislation "to force pension funds to divest their investments in Iran," McKinley said. ...


Read the full article at the link.

May 30, 2007

Let's Talk

Via LGF, here's Pat Dollard:

Watching the pundits discuss our historic meeting with Iran, you would have mostly heard despair at the notion that we have no leverage in these talks, and so therefor why would Iran give on anything? Why would they stop waging war against us in iraq if they have nothing to fear? To all the experts in the media, the whole thing seemed like some grand puzzlement. Was it just an attempt to appease the administration’s domestic critics who have been chiding it for not engaging in diplomacy ( a vaguery if there ever was one ) with the world’s top terrorist? No one you heard from could really quite grasp what was going on.

For some reason, no one told you that just 5 days before Monday’s talks, an entire floating army, with nearly 20,000 men, comprising the world’s largest naval strike force, led by the USS Nimitz and the USS Stennis, and also comprising the largest U.S. Naval armada in the Persian Gulf since 2003, came floating up unnanounced through the Straight of Hormuz, and rested right on Iran’s back doorstep, guns pointed at them. The demonstration of leverage was clear. And it also came on the exact date of the expiration of the 60 day grace period the U.N. had granted Iran.

And it came just a few weeks after Vice President Dick Cheney had swept through the region and delivered a very clear and pointed message to the Saudi King Abdullah and others: George Bush has unequivocally decided to attack Iran’s nuclear, military and economic infrastructure if they do not abandon their drive for military nuclear capability. Plain and simple. Iran heard the message as well, and although a lack of leverage may seem clear to America’s retired military tv talking heads, it is not so clear to the government in Tehran.

The message to both Iran and Syria is that if the talks in Baghdad fail, the military option is ready to go.

The administration is almost freakishly confident, in marked contrast to media reports like the one featuring Newt Gingrich’s attack on the President below. The U.S. is in the midst of another dipolomatic surge through the region to bolster allies for the final showdown with Iran. ...

May 01, 2007

Gay Iranian Activist Mani Zaniar - "Out in Iran"

CBC spotlights Iranian gay activist:

He is followed by secret police. His friends are routinely whipped. Some are executed. His name is Mani Zaniar and he is the leader of Iran’s secret gay rights movement.

It is the most dangerous civil rights movement in the world. And for the first time ever, Mani, and many others, have risked their lives to come on camera and tell their story.

In this startling and unique documentary, Out in Iran, we go to Iran and get the world’s first look at life inside Iran’s persecuted gay community. We meet an astonishing group of courageous people with heartbreaking stories.

HT: Or Does It Explode

April 29, 2007

Iran: Hunger Strike for Political Prisoners

From Ghazal Omid, via e-mail:

Hunger Strike in Iran Started April 7, 2007 Means Life or Death
For One of 39 Political Prisoners, Possibly All

On April 22, 2007, political prisoner Mr. Khalid Hardani was carried to the medical center of Rajai Shahar prison by two of his fellow inmates, Mr. Nasser Khirolahi and Mr. Shahin Aryanejad, due to Mr. Khaled Hardani's worsening heart condition. Mr. Hardani, who was transferred from Evin Prison to Rajai Shahar approximately two months ago, has had his heart medication intentionally withheld, and his physical well-being is worsening each day.

This hunger strike is a last resort for these political prisoners, who have no way whatsoever to alert people worldwide to their conditions in the prison, and illuminates the disinterest of UN Representatives, Red Cross/Red Crescent, and Amnesty International. Mr. Khaled Hardani and another 38 political prisoners from a number of prisons in Iran could possibly die as a result of this official apathy.

In the clinic, Mr. Khaled Hardani was not allowed to see a physician, and when the prisoners resisted pressure to end the strike, they were savagely beaten inside the clinic, in full view of medical staff, by professional torture master Aslan Beghi. Neither prisoner received any medical care, not for the hunger strike's physical effects, nor for the injuries from physical torture. Instead, they were dragged back to their filthy cells to recover on their own from the savage beatings.

Mr. Hardani, whose cardiac condition requires medication, has received no medication for his heart condition from prison medical officials since his transfer from Evin nearly 2 months ago.

Repeated letters and calls to officials of Amnesty International by Ghazal Omid (www.ghazalomid.com), Iranian dissident and the official spokesperson for 19 of the 39 political prisoners, have not been returned. UN Human Rights Commission member states have also not responded to repeated calls for intervention.

Ghazal Omid
www.ghazalomid.com/videos

April 10, 2007

Political Prisoners in Iran

From Ghazal Omid, via e-mail:

Thirty-one political prisoners in the ten most horrific prisons in nine major Iranian cities are on a hunger strike to shed light on the brutal conditions in which they are being held in small cells.

Prisoners in Evin and Raji Shahr prisons in greater Tehran, Bandar Abbass, Isfahan, Birjan, Semnan, Oromieh ( Tabriz) and Khorasan ( Mashahad) started their strike on April 7th and have vowed to continue until they receive international attention to what they describe as intolerable conditions inside the Iranian prisons.

These prisoners are standing up to the regime because the UN and Amnesty International seem to have forgotten they should be paying frequent visits to prisons to ensure prisoners are receiving, among other basic needs, their medications and visitation rights.

For the past month and a half, there has been no visitation rights for political prisoners.

The government does not supply their basic medical needs. Prison guards have denied families access and refused to deliver to political prisoners medication on which their life depends.

Hygiene in the prisons is deplorable. The smell of urine is overwhelming. Prisoners have offered to buy cleaning products to clean up their prison but only in Evin Prison have they been allowed to do so.

The prisons are infested with cockroaches and other insects and prisoners who don't have beds must sleep on the floors.

Evin Prison, historically one of the worst, seems to be a luxury prison in comparison to Raji Shahr or Bandar Abbass.

The heating system has been turned off during all the winter months. Prisoners have to ask their families to bring them jackets to keep warm.

Prisons such as Bandar Abbas and Ahvaz are death traps for prisoners who are held in small barred cells with no air conditioning in 60 C, (140F) temperatures. Families have to buy ice from prison guard so their loved ones can have ice water.

The food is disgusting and virtually inedible, reportedly contaminated with cockroaches and rat droppings.

I am the spokesperson for nineteen political prisoners, all of whom are on hunger strike. The remainder are asking for my help or, more accurately, your help. Please don't let this barbaric treatment go quietly unnoticed and ignored or they will die. The government of Iran is torturing and punishing them because they stood up to the regime.

Please help their cause.

Let me know what else you might need to bring this to the attention of your viewers.

Kindest Regards,

Ghazal Omid

March 22, 2007

Nowruz Greetings from President Bush

The White House:

I send greetings to those celebrating Nowruz.

Nowruz is a special time of thanksgiving and celebration when millions of people around the world who trace their heritage to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, India, and Central Asia welcome the New Year. For thousands of years, it has been an occasion when family, friends, and loved ones come together to reflect on the blessings of the past year and look forward with a spirit of renewal and hope.

America is strengthened by the rich cultural diversity of our people, and we are blessed to be a Nation that welcomes individuals of all races, religions, and cultural backgrounds. Celebrating Nowruz honors the values of family and tradition and helps preserve the unique fabric that makes up our country.

Laura and I send our best wishes for health and happiness in the coming year.

GEORGE W. BUSH

Related. Chaharshenbe Souri dar Iran.

March 13, 2007

چهارشنبه سوری در تهران

Red Wednesday. Iranians celebrate Chaharshenbe Souri, or Red Wednesday, an ancient cultural tradition and now a symbol of resistance against regime oppression. The Spirit of Man: 'Chahar-shanbe Soori is the biggest nightmare of the Islamic regime of Iran and that's why they do any thing to prevent people from celebrating it.' Go to the post for links (in Persian and English) and photos.

UPDATE: Chaharshanbe Souri 2008 - videos and photos.

February 28, 2007

Tammy: A Perverse Threesome

Tammy Bruce:

So when is the president going to rename the Axis of Evil to the evil Axis of Ménage à Trois? Was if Ahmadinejad's Members Only jacket from 1973 that was so appealing, or Kim Jong Il looking like a lost little pot bellied pig? One thing I do know is this--under Condi Rice and President Bush's apparent acquiescence to her approach, we are now legitimizing and negotiating with countries that how vowed to, or have been, murdering millions of people. ...

Today it is announced that on March 5-6, we will be meeting in New York with a representative from North Korea to "normalize" relations with them. In other words, the policy of the State department under Condi Rice is to reward genocidal regimes who lie and cheat their way to a nuclear bomb. Not only are they not punished, they are rewarded with normalized relations and international legitimacy. ...


Read it all here.

Related, from Debka:

Syria to send an aide to Baghdad conference of Iraq’s neighbors while Iran is reviewing the invitation.

In a sharp policy reversal, the US joined Iraq in a new initiative to invite Iran and Syria to a “neighbors meeting” in Baghdad next month.

Iran’s supreme national security council head Ali Larijani said Wednesday: “We support solving problems by Iraq by all means and will attend the conference if it is expedient.” He added: Iraq’s security is related to all its neighbors.

US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice said Tuesday, Feb. 27: “We hope that all governments seize this opportunity to improve their relations with Iraq and to work for peace and stability in the region.”

Until now, the Bush administration had resisted calls to include Iran and Syria in diplomatic efforts to stabilize Iraq.

In Baghdad, the Iraqi government announced the meeting would take place in mid-March with the participation of members of the Arab League and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Rice said it would be held at sub-ministerial level, to be followed perhaps in April by a full ministerial-level meeting of the same countries, plus G-8 Group members.


Meanwhile, Michael Ledeen reports a possible defection by an Iranian spy. The Turkish Press: 'Ankara’s diplomatic and political circles are currently filled with gossip over a missing Iranian, thought by some to be a spy. Iranian citizen Ali Rızari Asqhari, 63, who recently retired from the Iranian Defense Ministry, disappeared in Istanbul on Feb. 7, daily Hürriyet reported on Monday. Iran has made a diplomatic move, yesterday sending a delegation to Turkey to obtain more information on the missing man.' Ledeen adds: 'So a guy from the Iranian Defense Ministry goes missing in Istanbul, and the mullahs are concerned enough to send a team to investigate. Let’s hope the guy’s in Langley, and that he knows something useful.' Amen.

Update. For another view of the proposed talks, here's Neo-Neocon:

So, if the present proposed talks contain two elements: (1) a strategically viable "big stick" threat from the US; and (2) Iran's awareness that the talks are not a cover for a planned precipitous US retreat from Iraq--then I think talking to Iran and Syria would not be a particularly dangerous thing to do. Although I still doubt the productivity of any such talks, they would no longer be especially risky, as long as we remain realistic about their chances of success, and continue to pressure Iran in other ways.

Whether these two needed elements are fully in place right now, I'm not sure. ...


Read the rest here.

January 12, 2007

Iran Protests Consulate Seizure

Debka reports:

Kurdish sources report five helicopters carried US forces to pre-dawn raid of Iranian consulate in N. Iraqi town of Irbil. They were dropped on the roof while armored vehicles encircled the building. The troops used loudspeakers to call out in Farsi and Arabic to the consulate staff not to resist “or else they would be killed.” Five Iranian diplomatic staff members were detained and documents and computers impounded. Tehran has strongly protested this breach of its sovereign territory [Kinda sucks when that happens, doesn't it? - aa] and summoned the Swiss ambassador who represents US interests in Iran and the Iraqi ambassador to demand the immediate release of the Iranian diplomats. Later Thursday, Jan. 11, Tehran reported three large explosions shaking the southern town of Khorramshahr north of the oil port of Abadan on the Shatt al-Arb waterway. DEBKAfile: Khorramshahr, which faces the Iraqi town of Basra, is one of the key towns from which Iran delivers smuggled fighters, weapons and explosives to its Shiite supporters in Iraq. Our sources also report that some hours before President George W. Bush’s policy speech, a series of explosions were heard in Iranian Balochistan. Tehran imposed a blackout on the incident. These statements and events tie in closely with the new Iraq strategy announced by the US president of confronting Iran and Syria for “allowing networks to use their territory to attack US forces.”

Regime Change Iran reports that Iran's strategic guru Hassan Abbassi may have been among those arrested:
Iran Press News reported that based on unconfirmed received reports from reliable sources in Iraq, Hassan Abbasi was among those who was arrested in the Thursday, January 11th early-morning raid in the Iraqi town of Erbil. An excerpt:
Abbasi has been among the highest ranking members of the Islamic regime’s terror operations for many years, acting as Khamenei’s foreign policy and defense advisor. Abbasi has had an active voice under not only Khamenei but also Rafsanjani and Khatami as well. The Martyrdom Brigades of the Global Islamic Awakening is controlled by Abbasi.
The full text:
Based on unconfirmed received reports from reliable sources in Iraq, Hassan Abbasi was among those who was arrested in the Thursday, January 11th early-morning raid in the Iraqi town of Erbil.
Hassan Abbasi known by his friends as "The Dr. Kissinger of Islam," is the guru of the Islamic Republic's revolutionary guard corps which puts volunteers and recruits through rigorous training in four camps funded and run by the Revolutionary Guard. The boot camp includes physical training, ideological indoctrination, building explosives, code-cracking classes, and finally foreign languages classes, specifically Arabic and English as well as many other 'useful' languages.

Iran Press News (Farsi).

Stratfor (subscription) believes the recently announced "troop surge" in Iraq caught the IRI by surprise; the regime had been expecting a drawdown after the Democratic victory in November. Today's analysis also notes that regime officials are acutely aware of the "resourceful and treacherous" nature of their American adversary.

December 27, 2006

Three Jewish Souls Seeking a Way Home

Ha'Aretz:

Three Iranians interested in converting to Judaism recently left their native country, but have been unable to find any entity to assist them.

The three Shi'ite Muslims left Iran and approached the Israeli embassy and Jewish communities in Azerbaijan, but were rejected. It is impossible to convert to Judaism in Iran, as they would be considered heretics, a crime punishable by death. They are now waiting in a makeshift city in Turkey for a United Nations hearing on their application for refugee status.

The three left Iran two months ago and immediately approached the Israeli embassy in Baku. According to N., they were given a chilly reception. N. points out that embassy officials did not invite them into the building, but talked to them on the street.

"We told them we want visas to Israel in order to convert," N. recounts. "They told us that if we are not Jewish, our parents aren't Jewish and we have no family members in Israel, we cannot get visas."

The three also did not receive warm welcomes in Baku synagogues. At one place of worship, they were laughed at, at another, locked out. ...

December 25, 2006

Remembering Iranian Christian Converts

This Christmas day, Azarmehr remembers the Iranian converts to Christianity who were arrested during worship services:

- Shirin Sadeq Khanjani
- Behrooz Sadeq Khanjani
- Hamid Reza Toloii-nia
- Behnam Irani
- Bahman Irani
- Shahin Taqi-zadeh
- Yussef Nourkhani
- Parviz Khalaj-Zamani
- Mohammad Beliad
- Payman Salarvand
- Sohrab Sayyadi

Link (in Persian) to Human Rights Activists in Iran (H.R.A.I.).

Study: Iran's Oil Export Revenues to Plummet

JPost:

Iran is suffering a staggering decline in revenue from its oil exports, and if the trend continues income could virtually disappear by 2015, according to an analysis released Monday by the National Academy of Sciences.

Iran's economic woes could make the country unstable and vulnerable, with its oil industry crippled, Roger Stern, an economic geographer at Johns Hopkins University, said in the report and in an interview.

Iran earns about $50 billion a year in oil exports. The decline is estimated at 10 to 12 percent annually. In less than five years exports could be halved and then disappear by 2015, Stern predicted.