Dreams Into Lightning

Imad Mughniyeh

Imad Mughniyeh, the top Hezbollah man in Syria, was sent to meet his virgins by a car bomb in Damascus on February 12, 2008. Dreams Into Lightning is pleased to welcome Mughniyeh to the growing (but with plenty of room for more) list of dead terrorists.

Wikipedia: Imad Mughniyeh.

Imad Fayez Mughniyah (December 7, 1962 - February 12, 2008), also transcribed Mughniyya, Mogniyah, Moughnie, (Arabic: عماد فايز مغنية‎), alias Hajj Radwan, was a senior member of the Hezbollah organization, a militant Shia Islamist group in Lebanon. He was alternatively described as the head of its security section, a senior intelligence official and as a founder of the organization. Sometimes described as a "master terrorist", Mugniyah had been implicated in the 1983 bombings of the U.S. Embassy, and U.S. Marine and French peacekeeping barracks, which killed over 350, as well as the 1992 bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and the kidnapping of dozens of foreigners in Lebanon in the 1980s.

Limited information is known about him. He used the alias of Hajj. Mughniyah is included in the European Union's list of wanted terrorists. and had a US$5 million bounty on the U.S. Most Wanted Terrorist list.

According to his Lebanese passport application, Mughniyah was born in Tayr Dibba, a poor village in southern Lebanon. CIA South Group records state that he lived in Ayn Al-Dilbah; a ghetto in South Beirut. His father was a vegetable seller and during the civil war, his house was on the Green Line.

Little is known about his adolescence, but he is thought to have joined Yasser Arafat's Force 17 in 1976. His role at that time was as a sniper, targeting Christians across the Green Line.[8] At some point, he studied engineering at the American University of Beirut.

Mughniyah has been implicated in many of terrorist attacks in the 1980s and 1990s, primarily American and Israeli targets. These include the April 18, 1983 bombing of the United States embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 63 people including 17 Americans. He was later blamed for the October 23, 1983 simultaneous truck bombings against French paratroopers and the U.S. Marine barracks. The attacks killed 58 French soldiers and 241 Marines. On September 20, 1984, he attacked the US embassy annex building. The United States indicted him (and his collaborator, Hassan Izz al-Din) for the June 14, 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, which resulted in the death of U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem. He was also linked to numerous kidnappings of Westerners in Beirut through the 1980s, most notably that of Terry Anderson. Some of these individuals were later killed, such as U.S. Army Colonel William Francis Buckley. The remainder were released at various times until the last one, Terry Anderson was released in 1991.

He had been described as "tall, slender, well-dressed and handsome ... penetrating eyes," speaking some English but better French.

Meir Javendafar at Pajamas Media: Another setback for Iranian intelligence.

The assassination of Imad Mughniyeh, Iran’s top man in Syria and Lebanon, should set off alarm bells in Tehran. His assassination, according to Iranian media sources, took place in the Kafarsoose neighborhood of Damascus, close to an Iranian school and the headquarters of the Syrian Mukhabarat (intelligence agency). At first glance, the elimination of such a highly valuable Iranian asset, under the very noses of the Syrians, could be taken as a sign that Western intelligence agencies have managed to infiltrate the once seemingly impenetrable walls of Iran’s intelligence operations abroad. ...

The assassination of Mughniyeh is likely to lead to a major restructuring of Iran’s intelligence operations abroad, and even at home. Mughniyeh was a man who traveled frequently between Tehran and Damascus. Therefore it is very possible that his assassins were tracking his movements inside Iran as well. The worst case scenario for Tehran would be if he was compromised by someone inside Iran, a scenario which Iran’s intelligence agency, known by its Farsi acronym as VAVAK, would quite likely be looking into.

Andrew Cochran at Counterterrorism Blog: Mughniyeh, as remembered by CTB.

It was a fitting end for someone who planned and executed numerous deadly terrorist attacks, including the 1983 bombings of the U.S Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut and the 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires, Argentina Jewish center. Mugniyah was indicted in the U.S. for his role in planning and executing the 1985, hijacking of TWA Flight 847, which resulted in the murder of one U.S. citizen.

Mughniyeh was also implicated in Hezbollah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in 2006, which led to Israel's incursion into Lebanon. Contributing Experts posted several analyses at that time about his role in that conflict, including:

"Imad Mugniyah likely behind the capture of Israeli soldiers," by Bill Roggio, July 12: "The sophistication of this attack indicates Imad Fayez Mugniyah, Hezbollah's chief of military operations was directly involved. Mugniyah has a long history of successful military and terrorist operations across the globe. Mugniyah has a history of conducting similar snatch and grab operations against the Israelis."

"Inside Hizballah’s decision-making," by Magnus Ranstorp, July 14: "The file for handling special operations of this kind is usually left to Imad Mughniyeh, the elusive terrorist mastermind for Hizballah, who stands with one foot within Hizballah (reporting to Naserallah directly) and with one foot in Iran inside the architectures of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the al-Qods unit within the Iranian Pasdaran.

See original for links.

The Belmont Club: Mughniyeh killed in Damascus.

[Hezbollah] had recently been resupplied with rockets, shipped under the label of civilian supplies, past the UN Peacekeeping force. Hezbollah was also supposed to have sent reconnaissance teams disguised as journalist to the Lebanese/Israeli border to obtain video footage of certain areas. The strike on Mughniyeh suggests that parallel counterpreparations mirroring those of Hezbollah were simultaneously in progress. Mughaniyeh was regarded as a particularly difficult target. Wikipedia quotes Robert Baer, a former CIA officer as saying, "Mugniyah is probably the most intelligent, most capable operative we’ve ever run across, including the KGB or anybody else. He enters by one door, exits by another, changes his cars daily, never makes appointments on a telephone, never is predictable. He only uses people that are related to him that he can trust. He doesn’t just recruit people."

Across the Bay: Mughniyeh assassinated in Damascus.

To say that Mughniyeh was an Iranian asset is to understate his relationship with the Iranians. He was much more than an asset. He was an organic part of the Iranian regime, answering directly to Khamenei. Just like Hezbollah is itself an organic extension of the Islamic Revolution -- an Iranian ministry as one Iranian analyst told me -- Mughniyeh is like one step above that, answering directly to Khamenei according to some analysts.

As such, this is a big loss for the Iranians. It was perhaps best encapsulated in the statement by Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who declared that "the march of Jihad against the enemy has lost an essential pillar." Operationally, this adds to the losses suffered by Hezbollah in 2006, which, unlike stockpiles of Katyushas, is much more difficult to replace.

But it's also a huge embarrassment for Syria. As Michael Rubin noted at NRO's Corner, "as important as who was killed is where." Not that we needed this, or Mughniyeh's aunt Fayza for that matter, to know that Damascus is terror central.

Coming a few months after the Sept. 6 hit on their nuclear facility in Deir el-Zor, this hit on a most-wanted terrorist, harbored in a joint Iranian-Syrian location in the heart of Damascus is a major embarrassment for Assad. Regardless who did it, it reflects quite badly on Assad, not long after his secret nuke facility was pulverized. Speculation over who did it only adds to the embarrassment no matter how you cut it, and whether Israel did it or not, the suspicion that it did would once again make a mockery of Assad's and Hezbollah's proclamations regarding the "loss of deterrence" after the 2006 war.

Thomas Joscelyn at The Weekly Standard: A master terrorist is killed.

But here is something that none of the press accounts I’ve read today have reported: Imad Mugniyah played an instrumental role in al Qaeda’s rise. I detailed Mugniyah’s role in al Qaeda’s terror in Iran’s Proxy War Against America, a short book published by the Claremont Institute last year. I won’t go into all of the details again in this post, but here is a quick summary of the relationship:

• Mugniyah met with Osama bin Laden in Sudan in the early 1990’s. The two agreed to work together against their common enemies, including America. Al Qaeda operatives were then trained by Mugniyah and other Hezbollah trainers, as well as Iranian personnel, in Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran. Both the Clinton administration, in its first two indictments of al Qaeda and bin Laden, and the 9/11 Commission found significant evidence of this early collaboration.

• According to Bob Baer, a long-time CIA operative who tracked Mugniyah for years, one of Mugniyah’s goons facilitated the travel of an al Qaeda operative en route to the November 19, 1995, bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. The bombing was among al Qaeda’s earliest operations.

• There is no real doubt that Iran and Mugniyah’s Hezbollah were primarily responsible for the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing. But the 9/11 Commission also found evidence that al Qaeda may have played some role. Intelligence indicates that al Qaeda was planning a similar operation in the months prior. And afterwards, in telephone conversations that were evidently intercepted, Osama bin Laden received congratulations from his fellow terrorists, including Ayman al Zawahiri.

• Al Qaeda’s August 7, 1998, embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were modeled after Mugniyah’s bombings in Lebanon in 1983. According to the 9/11 Commission, bin Laden asked Mugniyah for help in executing such attacks and Mugniyah agreed to provide his assistance. Thereafter, al Qaeda adopted Hezbollah’s modus operandi: simultaneous attacks by suicide bombers. Al Qaeda’s August 7, 1998, bombings directly mirrored Hezbollah’s simultaneous strike against the U.S. Marine barracks and a headquarters for French paratroopers on October 23, 1983. In fact, the 9/11 Commission found that some of the terrorists responsible for the embassy bombings were trained by Hezbollah. This is a crucial point: al Qaeda’s most successful attack prior to 9/11--the August 7, 1998, embassy bombings--was modeled after Hezbollah’s operations.

• After the 9/11 attacks, Bob Baer immediately suspected that Mugniyah and his masters had played some role. (I also discussed this in a previous article, "Sy Hersh’s Overactive Imagination".) Amazingly, the 9/11 Commission found that senior Hezbollah operatives were aware of and facilitated the travel of many of the 9/11 hijackers. This evidence was so “disturbing” that the Commission called for a further investigation into the matter. Although he was not named by the Commission directly, Mugniyah was reportedly one of the senior Hezbollah terrorists involved.

Douglas Farah at Counterterrorism Blog: The importance of Imad Mughniyeh.

The assassination of top Shite militant Imad Mughniyeh is important for many reasons, not the least of which was his long-standing ties to Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network and his crucial role as a link between the Iranian special forces and Hezbollah.

It is also interesting to note that Hezbollah, where Mughniyeh was a top strategist for many years, claimed him as their own immediately upon his death, despite denying responsibility in several of the actions for which he is most famous.

Michael Ledeen: Mughniyah.

Hezbollah was a joint Iranian-Syrian operation in which the Iranians ran the organization and Syria provided the base, and logistical support. As I was the first to report, he flew with Iranian President Ahmadi-Nezhad to Damascus for high-level meetings with Bashar Assad and key Syrian military and intelligence officers a while back. So he had very high standing among the terror masters.

Neocon Express: Imad Mughniyeh, the man behind the Beirut Marine barracks bombing killed.

What truly amazes me is that US media are far more fixated today on whether Roger Clemens was injected with steroids years ago, then they seem to be in this huge story involving the mysterious targeted assassination of a man responsible for hundreds of American lives.

Debka: Tehran, Damascus, Hizballah leadership believed coordinating retaliation for Mughniyeh’s death.

Iran, Syria and Hizballah are certain that the bomb planted in the master terrorist’s Mitsubishi Pajero in the heart of the Syrian capital was rigged by the Israeli Mossad. They are therefore most certainly setting up a major reprisal in the form of a terrorist hit or a military assault.

Wednesday night, all Hizballah’s top leaders went to ground. They even gave the mourning tent set up in the Shiite district of Beirut for their dead leader a wide berth.

Our sources report that the long-sought terrorist was finally despatched by a small explosive inserted between the driver’s seat and the back seats, which destroyed only one part of the vehicle. The front and rear remained intact. Mughniyeh was driving alone to a reception marking Islamic Revolution Day at the Iranian embassy in the Romana district.

DEBKAfile’s counter-terror experts note that the way the explosion was set up recalled the method used by the hit team which killed the Jihad Islami senior operative Ghaleb Ghali in Damascus in October 2004. Then, too, Syria held Israel responsible.

In from the Cold: Justice served.

Mughniyeh’s death represents a major blow for Hizballah. Along with his skills in organizing terrorist operations, Mughniyeh was credited with organizing the group’s defenses during the 2006 war with Israel. He also served as a primary liaison between the group and its patrons in Iran. In fact, Mughniyeh also held a position in the Iranian Quods Force, which provides extensive training and support for Hizballah.

Tuesday’s car bombing is also an embarrassment for Damascus, at least officially. A number of terror groups maintain offices in the Syrian capital, and operate there with relative impunity. As the Washington Post observed, the successful effort to eliminate Mughniyeh represents a “major breach” in Syria’s police-state security apparatus.

Remarks. The embarassment to the Syrian regime can hardly be overstated. As I commented on the recent Israeli airstrike on Syria, the message here seems to be "Syria, you are our bitches."

If sources like Stratfor are to be believed, back-channel negotiations between the US and Iran, centering on Iraq, may now be thrown into chaos or scrapped. This doesn't strike me as altogether a bad thing.

Benazir Bhutto 1953-2007

Wikipedia: Benazir Bhutto

Bhutto was the first woman elected to lead a Muslim state, having been twice elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. She was sworn in for the first time in 1988 but removed from office 20 months later under orders of then-president Ghulam Ishaq Khan on grounds of alleged corruption. In 1993 Bhutto was re-elected but was again removed in 1996 on similar charges, this time by President Farooq Leghari.

Bhutto went into self-imposed exile in Dubai in 1998, where she remained until she returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007, after reaching an understanding with President Musharraf by which she was granted amnesty and all corruption charges were withdrawn.

She was the eldest child of former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Pakistani of Sindhi descent, and Begum Nusrat Bhutto, a Pakistani of Iranian-Kurdish descent. Her paternal grandfather was Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who came to Larkana Sindh before partition from his native town of Bhatto Kalan, which was situated in the Indian state of Haryana.

She was assassinated on 27 December 2007, in a combined suicide bomb attack and shooting during a political rally of the Pakistan Peoples Party in the Liaquat National Bagh in Rawalpindi.

Phyllis Chesler: RIP Benazir.

Benazir: Rest in Peace. May your death be a turning point, may it inspire your long-suffering people and their leaders to finally say NO! to death cult suicide killers; NO! to Islamism; NO! to despotism.

Evan Kohlmann, CTB: Al-Qaeda to claim responsibility.

There are now widespread reports suggesting that an imminent official statement is expected from Egyptian Al-Qaida spokesman Mustafa Abu Yazid claiming responsibility for the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Earlier today, Al-Qaida issued a separate statement from Mustafa Abu Yazid denying any role in recent blasts targeting mosques in the Pakistani border city of Peshawar. According to that communique from Abu Yazid (dated December 24), "We do not attack targets in mosques or in public places where there are crowds of Muslims in order to safeguard Muslim blood and to respect the sanctity of mosques. This is our approach generally, and we inform all of our supporters in Pakistan--and everywhere else--about these facts."

In from the Cold: The real Pakistan.

Who killed Benazir Bhutto? The real Pakistan, [Andrew McCarthy] writes, a country where Osama bin Laden has at 46% approval rating. He compares the Pakistan of western fantasy, against the reality on the ground:

There is the Pakistan of our fantasy. The burgeoning democracy in whose vanguard are judges and lawyers and human rights activists using the “rule of law” as a cudgel to bring down a military junta. In the fantasy, Bhutto, an attractive, American-educated socialist whose prominent family made common cause with Soviets and whose tenures were rife with corruption, was somehow the second coming of James Madison.

The real Pakistan is a breeding ground of Islamic holy war ...

Passages in italics are from Andrew McCarthy's article.

Aaron Mannes, CTB: Real investigation needed.

Facts about Benazir Bhutto's assassination are in short supply. Unfortunately that is unlikely to change. There is a long tradition of failure to investigate political murders in Pakistan. This cannot continue if Pakistan is to become a stable democratic state that serves its people and exists at peace with the world. The first step is that Musharraf invite the international community to advise in the investigation into Bhutto’s death. The investigation will be politically expensive - it may not reach Musharraf himself but it will reach deep into the civilian and military elites running Pakistan. Broad, tough international engagement is essential to seeing this forward - the stakes are very high. ...

Bill Roggio, Long War Journal: Benazir Bhutto assassinated.

Bhutto supporters have begun to blame President Pervez Musharraf for her death. The sophistication of the attack, the governments reported refusal to provide adequate security, and the location of the bombing have created distrust among Bhutto supporters.

But this attack was most likely carried out by the Taliban and al Qaeda. Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the newly united Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, threatened to kill Bhutto upon her return in October. The Taliban and al Qaeda manage training camps in Pakistan's tribal areas and have trainers and recruits from the Pakistani military in their ranks.

"My men will welcome Bhutto on her return," Baitullah told a former senator. "We don’t accept President General Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto because they only protect the US interest and see things through its glasses. They’re only acceptable if they wear the Pakistani glasses."

Mustafa Abu al Yazid, al Qaeda's commander in Afghanistan, has taken credit for Bhutto's assassination. "We terminated the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat [the] mujahadeen," Yazid told Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Pakistani reporter. The attack was reportedly ordered by Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, and carried out by a "defunct Lashkar-i-Jhangvi’s Punjabi volunteer."

Muslims Against Sharia: We condemn the murderers.

Muslims Against Sharia condemn the murderers responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her supporters.

Our prayers are with the victims of this atrocity. We send our condolences to their loved ones.

May the homicide bomber rote in hell for eternity. May his accomplices join him soon!

NRO symposium features Jonathan Foreman, Sumit Ganguly, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Victor Davis Hanson, Mansoor Ijaz, Stanley Kurtz, Bill Roggio, and Henry Sokolski.

Ahmad Shah Massoud

Ahmad Shah Massoud - Wikipedia:

Ahmad Shah Massoud(Persian: احمد شاه مسعود Ahmad Shāh Mas'ūd) (c. September 2, 1953 –September 9, 2001) (variant transliterations include Ahmed, Masood, etc.) was an ethnic Tajik and a Kabul University engineering student turned military leader who played a leading role in driving the Soviet army out of Afghanistan, earning him the nickname "Lion of Panjshir". His supporters call him Amer Sahib e Shaheed, translating to our "Martyred Commander".

Ahmad Shah Massoud became Defence Minister of Afghanistan as early as 1992 under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Following the collapse of Rabbani's government and the rise of the Taliban regime, Massoud became the military leader of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. In September 2001 Massoud was assassinated by al-Qaeda agents, allegedly with the complicity of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and the following year he was named "National Hero" by the order of Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai.

In retrospect - as Transterrestrial Musings notes - his assassination was probably the beginning of the Al-Qaeda offensive that would become revealed and manifest to Americans two days later.

Here is the text of Shah Massoud's 1998 Letter to the People of America:

A Message to the People of the United States of America

I send this message to you today on behalf of the freedom and peace-loving people of Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen freedom fighters who resisted and defeated Soviet communism, the men and women who are still resisting oppression and foreign hegemony and, in the name of more than one and a half million Afghan martyrs who sacrificed their lives to uphold some of the same values and ideals shared by most Americans and Afghans alike. This is a crucial and unique moment in the history of Afghanistan and the world, a time when Afghanistan has crossed yet another threshold and is entering a new stage of struggle and resistance for its survival as a free nation and independent state.

I have spent the past 20 years, most of my youth and adult life, alongside my compatriots, at the service of the Afghan nation, fighting an uphill battle to preserve our freedom, independence, right to self-determination and dignity. Afghans fought for God and country, sometime alone, at other times with the support of the international community. Against all odds, we, meaning the free world and Afghans, halted and checkmated Soviet expansionism a decade ago. But the embattled people of my country did not savor the fruits of victory. Instead they were thrust in a whirlwind of foreign intrigue, deception, great-gamesmanship and internal strife. Our country and our noble people were brutalized, the victims of misplaced greed, hegemonic designs and ignorance. We Afghans erred too. Our shortcomings were as a result of political innocence, inexperience, vulnerability, victimization, bickering and inflated egos. But by no means does this justify what some of our so-called Cold War allies did to undermine this just victory and unleash their diabolical plans to destroy and subjugate Afghanistan.

Today, the world clearly sees and feels the results of such misguided and evil deeds. South-Central Asia is in turmoil, some countries on the brink of war. Illegal drug production, terrorist activities and planning are on the rise. Ethnic and religiously-motivated mass murders and forced displacements are taking place, and the most basic human and women’s rights are shamelessly violated. The country has gradually been occupied by fanatics, extremists, terrorists, mercenaries, drug Mafias and professional murderers. One faction, the Taliban, which by no means rightly represents Islam, Afghanistan or our centuries-old cultural heritage, has with direct foreign assistance exacerbated this explosive situation. They are unyielding and unwilling to talk or reach a compromise with any other Afghan side.

Unfortunately, this dark accomplishment could not have materialized without the direct support and involvement of influential governmental and non-governmental circles in Pakistan. Aside from receiving military logistics, fuel and arms from Pakistan, our intelligence reports indicate that more than 28,000 Pakistani citizens, including paramilitary personnel and military advisers are part of the Taliban occupation forces in various parts of Afghanistan. We currently hold more than 500 Pakistani citizens including military personnel in our POW camps. Three major concerns - namely terrorism, drugs and human rights - originate from Taliban-held areas but areinstigated from Pakistan, thus forming the inter-connecting angles of an evil triangle. For many Afghans, regardless of ethnicity or religion, Afghanistan, for the second time in one decade, is once again an occupied country.

Let me correct a few fallacies that are propagated by Taliban backers and their lobbies around the world. This situation over the short and long-run, even in case of total control by the Taliban, will not be to anyone’s interest. It will not result in stability, peace and prosperity in the region. The people of Afghanistan will not accept such a repressive regime. Regional countries will never feel secure and safe. Resistance will not end in Afghanistan, but will take on a new national dimension, encompassing all Afghan ethnic and social strata.

The goal is clear. Afghans want to regain their right to self-determination through a democratic or traditional mechanism acceptable to our people. No one group, faction or individual has the right to dictate or impose its will by force or proxy on others. But first, the obstacles have to be overcome, the war has to end, just peace established and a transitional administration set up to move us toward a representative government.

We are willing to move toward this noble goal. We consider this as part of our duty to defend humanity against the scourge of intolerance, violence and fanaticism. But the international community and the democracies of the world should not waste any valuable time, and instead play their critical role to assist in any way possible the valiant people of Afghanistan overcome the obstacles that exist on the path to freedom, peace, stability and prosperity.

Effective pressure should be exerted on those countries who stand against the aspirations of the people of Afghanistan. I urge you to engage in constructive and substantive discussions with our representatives and all Afghans who can and want to be part of a broad consensus for peace and freedom for Afghanistan.

With all due respect and my best wishes for the government and people of the United States,

Ahmad Shah Massoud.

Abdul Rahman Arif, 1916-2007

Abdul Rahman Arif; President of Iraq, 1966-1968. Iraq's last pre-Ba'athist leader. Died August 24, 2007.

Wikipedia: Abdul Rahman Arif

Abdul Rahman Arif (Arabic عبد الرحمن عارف `Abd al-Raḥmān `Ārif) (1916–August 24, 2007) was president of Iraq from April 16, 1966 to July 16, 1968.

He was a career soldier, and supported the military coup in 1958 that overthrew the monarchy. He also supported the coup that brought his brother, Abdul Salam Arif to power in 1963. His brother appointed him head of the army following the coup, and when the younger Arif died in a helicopter crash, Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz became acting president; three days later the military decided that Abdul Salam should be succeeded by his older brother instead. Arif was appointed president (military dictator) by the Revolutionary Command Council. He continued his brother's politics, but with a more nationalistic profile.

His presidency was a turbulent one, and on July 16, 1968, while Arif was sleeping, his own assistants along with members of the Ba'ath Party and Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr overthrew him in a coup.

It was accomplished when the defense minister, Hardan Al-Tikriti, phoned Arif informing him that he was no longer president. Arif was exiled to Turkey.

He returned to Iraq in 1979, when Saddam Hussein came to power, and largely stayed out of the public and political spotlight afterwards. He was allowed to leave the country once by Hussein's regime to undertake the Hajj. Arif left Iraq permanently after Hussein was removed from power by the US-led occupation, and lived in Amman, Jordan from 2004. He died in Amman on August 24, 2007.

New York Times obituary:

Former President Abdel-Rahman Aref of Iraq, who was overthrown nearly 40 years ago in a coup that brought Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party to power, died in Amman early Friday. He was 91. ...

Mr. Aref rose to power in 1963, five years after the bloody overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, when his older brother, Abdel-Salam Aref, who was the president, appointed him army chief of staff.

Three years later, Abdel-Salam Aref died in a plane crash and Iraqi Army officers chose the younger Aref to become Iraq’s third president. The plane crash was believed to be sabotage.

Abdel-Rahman Aref was president until 1968, when he was toppled in a bloodless coup by the Baath Party, led at the time by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, who became Iraq’s next president. But Mr. Hussein was believed to have held behind-the-scenes power in the coup and later, until he formally took over in 1979.

Arthur Goldschmidt, A Concise History of the Middle East (1983):

In Iraq, Abd al-Rahman Arif, who had replaced his brother Abd al-Salam Arif (who died in a plane crash in 1966), was overthrown by a rightist coup in July 1968. Two weeks later another faction of the Ba'ath Party seized power in Baghdad. Iraqi politics and policies often mystify foreigners. Basically, the new government did not get along well with Syria (while both were ruled by the Ba'ath Party, the dominant factions were different) because of their dispute over the use of Euphrates River waters. Relations with Iran were strained because both countries wanted to control the Shatt al-Arab, where the Tigris and Euphrates meet before they empty into the Gulf. In addition, Iraq criticized Egypt and Jordan for having accepted Resolution 242, tacitly recognizing Israel. In northern Iraq, the Kurds went on fighting for their independence, and the new regime tried to distract popular opinion at home by publicly hanging fourteen convicted Israeli spies (nine of whom happened to be Jewish) in Baghdad.

He was succeeded by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, who was deposed (officially, he "resigned") on July 16, 1979 - the eleventh anniversary of the Ba'ath coup. Saddam Hussein - who had been ruler in all but name for some time - assumed the presidency of Iraq. Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr died of undisclosed causes on October 4, 1982.

JFK Terror Plot

June 3 - Via IRIS, here's a portrait of this lovely Russell Defreitas fellow from WCBS-TV:  'As a cargo handler at John F. Kennedy International Airport, Russell Defreitas watched military parts be shipped to Israel and believed they would be used to kill Muslims. He seethed with rage against the U.S. and Israel for more than a decade after retirement before finally deciding, authorities said, that he wanted to “get those bastards.” Drawing on his inside knowledge of the massive airport, Defreitas conspired with three men to blow up the airport’s underground jet fuel tanks and its pipeline in a spectacular attack designed to kill thousands in the populous neighborhood, authorities said. ...'  More details at the link.

ThreatsWatch (update - June 3):  'While we investigate, research and analyze developments and background regarding the terrorist plot to bomb fuel storage tanks at JFK Airport, ThreatsWatch will publish interesting details via RapidRecon.  Earlier, Kyle Dabruzzi noted the more troubling stated operation of “to smuggle individuals, including mujahideen, from Asia into Guyana and then into the United States.”

One other interesting and noteworthy item is that the development of the JFK plot included interconnection and cooperation between Shi’a and Sunni terrorist groups. Abdul Kadir, the former Minister of Parliament (2001-2006) in Guyana, is Shi’a Imam in Guyana. The named among his network (see the formal complaint) included Abdel Nur, a Shi’a also from Guyana, and Kareem Ibrahim, a Shi’a imam of “one of the two leading Shia mosques in Trinidad,” according to a report in the Trinidad and Tobago Express. Interestingly, Kadir was arrested trying to make his way to Venezuela, presumably enroute to Iran.'

Full details at the link.

ThreatsWactch (update):

The complaint that was filed against the JFK plotters, Russell Defreitas, Kareem Ibrahim, Abdul Kadir, and Abdul Nur, provides some interesting insight into the operational planning of the operation and reveals what might have been a much larger, more dangerous, operation. On page 12 of the complaint, a conspirator referred to as “Individual A” told another conspirator, “Individual E,” that he, Defreitas and an undercover agent, referred to as “the Source” were working on two plans: “one to smuggle individuals, including mujahideen, from Asia into Guyana and then into the United States; and a second to attack the United States where it would inflict the most harm.” As it appears, Individual A’s first priority was to smuggle foreigners into the United States via Guyana, and not to perpetrate the JFK attacks. With the focus of our border protection agencies being fixed on the Mexican border, our homeland’s borders, notably the Florida keys, are significantly more pourous. Additionally, “Amir” Kareem Ibrahim, a citizen of Trinidad, became involved with the JFK plot when Defreitas and the Source traveled to Trinidad to seek assistance. Kareem insisted that he present the plans to his “contacts overseas who may be interested in purchasing or funding it.”

Tammy Bruce:  'One of the more fascinating aspects of this plot is the fact that one of the terrorists was nabbed in Trinidad as he was hopping a plan to Venezuela for a visa to go to Iran. This information from his own wife.'

Debka : 

FBI charges four suspects in Caribbean-tied Muslim terrorist plot to blow up New York’s JFK’s fuel terminal. 

One, a Guyana-born Muslim airport worker, Russell Defreitas, a US citizen, was detained in New York, two in Trinidad to be extradited to the US Wednesday, and one is at large in Guyana. The target covered 40 miles of underground fuel lines running through several residential districts of New York. US district attorney Rosslynn Mauskopf said the devastation would have been unthinkable. The plot was aborted by US and foreign law enforcement authorities at its early stages. The plotters had not acquired the equipment to carry it out. She said US law enforcement agencies proved they were capable of penetrating a secret group. No mention was made of al Qaeda only “radicalized Muslims.” Indictments were filed Saturday.

Defreitas told the FBI the attack would have destroyed the whole of Kennedy international airport and part of Queens and gained the blessing of the whole Muslim world. “Even the Twin Towers can’t touch it,” he said.

The two men arrested in Trinidad, Abdul Kadir of Guyana and Kareem Ibrahim of Trinidad, are both Muslims. Defreitas was arrested after unknowingly recruiting an FBI informant. Kadir, a former Guyanan member of parliament, was picked up trying to obtain funds for terrorist operations.

Fox News:

Three men were arrested and one was being sought in Trinidad on Saturday. In an indictment charging the four men, one of them is quoted as saying the foiled plot would "cause greater destruction than in the Sept. 11 attacks," destroying the airport, killing several thousand people and destroying parts of Queens, where the line runs underground.

 

One of the suspects, Russell Defreitas, a U.S. citizen native to Guyana and former JFK employee, said the airport was a symbol that would put "the whole country in mourning."

The Corner links to the complaint.  The names of the suspects in the John F. Kennedy (JFK) airport terrorist plot are:  Russell Defreitas (aka Mohammed), Kareem Ibrahim (aka Amir Kareem), Abdul Kadir, and Abdel Nur.  Persons who had bets on the theory that at least one of the alleged plotters is named Mohammed will be grateful to Mr. Defreitas.

Arutz Sheva:

The FBI has arrested three Muslims, and a fourth was being sought, for planning a major terrorist attack at JFK International Airport in New York. The terrorists were planning to sabotage a gas line that runs from a plant in Linden, New Jersey, directly to the airport, either blowing it up or otherwise using the gas to explode buildings in the airport. The line is the main jet fuel supply feeding the airport. “The damage that would have been caused would have been unthinkable,” a Justice Department official said.

The suspects were Muslim immigrants to Guyana and the Caribbean nation of Trinidad and Tobago.

Update from In From the Cold:

Press conference in New York is finally underway; video available on tape delay, due to technical issues at the site. Amid the congratulations from law enforcement and prosecutors, we're learning more about the plot. Indications that Defreitas may have been planning to leave the country, prompting the FBI to arrest him, and spring the trap on other suspects in Trinidad. Additionally, "reading between the lines" of various comments, it sounds like Defreitas and the former Guyanan official may have been facilitators. U.S. attorney talked about the "support" the former official could provide. That suggests that this cell may have been paving the way for the attack, perhaps by operatives from the Middle East. They would enter the U.S. with phony papers from Guyana (procured by that former official), while Defreitas provided the intelligence and surveillance required for the plot.

CTB:

Jamaat-al-Muslimeen (JAM) is a Trinidad & Tobago homegrown political/Muslim organization that was involved in a bloody (by Caribbean standards) coup attempt in 1990 that resulted in the death of 19 people. The leader, Abu Bakr, is still in T&T and is somewhat of a hot potato politically. He is known to spew some wild allegations and poses more of a threat to T&T via kidnappings and robberies than terrorist acts. He once claimed to have a nuclear device on the north end of T&T. Bakr (whose real name escapes me now) still appears in T&T news trying to enter the political arena. He has been linked to several deaths and kidnappings of former JAM members, some of whom have split from JAM and formed a spin off movement against Abu Bakr.

Many JAM members fled to Brooklyn in 1990 and started their own narcotics organizations when the coup failed. Obviously their adherence to Islam did not outweigh their greed. I always thought they were more of a gang then a dedicated extremist organization. Despite what maybe stated in today's news, they do not have obvious direct links to al-Qeada. The only link maybe Adnan El-Shukri-Jumah, al-Qaeda's operative who had distinct links to T&T and Guyana and may have been assisted by JAM members.

Guyana and Haiti have a significant extremist element with a particular Haitian Muslim having links to an Iranian backed cleric linked to the Tri-border area in South America.

JAM is not al-Qaeda, but should be watched closely, which the NY-JTTF does.

Mullah Dadullah

Welcome, Mullah Dadullah, to the exclusive but ever-growing ranks of the Dead Terrorists. We hope you enjoy your stay.

Wikipedia - Mullah Dadullah:

Mullah Dadullah or Dadullah Akhund (1966? – May 12, 2007) was an ethnic Pashtun from Uruzgan province in Afghanistan. He was the Taliban's senior military commander until his death in 2007.

StrategyPage:

May 14, 2007: In a major setback, the senior Taliban field commander, Mullah Dadullah, was cornered and killed by NATO forces in Helmand province over the weekend. NATO and Afghan troops have been chasing Dadullah around southern Afghanistan for a month. Dadullah knew he was being tracked, and his pursuers knew he was trying to get to safety in Pakistan. This time, Dadullah didn't make it.

Dadullah was a member of the Council of Ten that runs the Taliban, and the chief military strategist. Getting killed may have been a good career move, because his terror strategy wasn't working. The Taliban were getting battered worse this year than last, and Taliban popularity was declining in the south. Now the Taliban can simultaneously praise Dadullah as a martyr for the cause, and the reason the cause is failing. The Taliban first denied, then admitted Dadullah was dead. Dadullah was a big fan of terrorism, but he was also important because he managed to get normally hostile groups to cooperate with each other. The government will probably be able to get more Taliban groups to negotiate peace deals now, without the threat of Dadullah "punishing traitors."

Stratfor:

Geopolitical Diary: Examining Mullah Dadullah's Death
Stratfor, 5/14/07, 8:00 CDT

Afghan intelligence announced on Sunday that top Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah was killed early Saturday during a battle with an Afghan-NATO force in Helmand province. The 40-year-old Taliban leader had emerged as the most important operational commander on which Mullah Mohammad Omar could rely in pressing ahead with the jihadist insurgency in the country. Under his leadership, the Pashtun jihadist movement adopted the tactic of suicide bombings, and he represented the faction close to al Qaeda.

Dadullah's killing is the first major success for Kabul and NATO against the Pashtun jihadists since the resurgence of the Taliban shortly after the ouster of their regime in
2001.

CTB:

On May 10, 2007, the Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation was able to secure access to an exclusive interview with Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah--only 24 hours before Dadullah was killed by Afghan and NATO military forces. During what would become his final interview, Dadullah stated that American and British Al-Qaida recruits are in the midst of planning and training for new terrorist strikes in their home countries: "We will be executing attacks in Britain and the U.S. to demonstrate our sincerity," he explained in Pashto, "to destroy their cities as they have destroyed our cities." A senior U.S. official told the Blotter on ABCNews.com that recent intelligence reports confirmed Dadullah's claim that U.S. citizens were being trained in Taliban and al Qaeda camps. "The number is small, not large, but even once is dangerous," the official said.

ABC News:

Thirty-six hours before he was killed by U.S. forces, Taliban Commander Mullah Dadullah said he was training American and British citizens to carry out suicide missions in their home countries, according to a videotape interview to be broadcast on ABC News' "World News" Monday.

"We will be executing attacks in Britain and the U.S. to demonstrate our sincerity," he told an Afghan interviewer, "to destroy their cities as they have destroyed our cities."

Linda:

I hope it hurt. I hope it hurt a lot.

Winograd Report

Ha'Aretz: Main findings of the Winograd report.

1. On September 17th 2006, the Government of Israel decided, under section 8A of The Government Act 2001, to appoint a governmental commission of examination "To look into the preparation and conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12th 2006". Today we have submitted to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense the classified interim report, and we are now presenting the declassified report to the public.

2. The Commission was appointed due to a strong sense of a crisis and deep disappointment with the consequences of the campaign and the way it was conducted. We regarded this difficult task both as a duty and a privilege. It is our belief that the larger the event and the deeper the feeling of crisis - the greater the opportunity to change and improve matters which are essential for the security and the flourishing of state and society in Israel. We believe Israeli society has great strength and resilience, with a robust sense of the justice of its being and of its achievements. These, too, were expressed during the war in Lebanon and after it. At the same time, we must not underrate deep failures.

3. This conception of our role affected the way we operated. No-one underestimates the need to study what happened in the past, including the imposition of personal responsibility. The past is the key for learning lessons for the future. Nonetheless, learning these lessons and actually implementing them are the most implications of the conclusions of the Commission.

4. This emphasis on learning lessons not only follows from our conception of the role of a public commission. It also follows from our belief that one of Israeli society's greatest sources of strength is its being free, open and creative. Together with great achievements, the challenges facing it are existential. To cope with them, Israel must be a learning society - a society which examines its achievements and, in particular, its failures, in order to improve its ability to face the future.

5. Initially we hoped that the appointment of the Commission would serve as an incentive to accelerate learning processes in the relevant systems, so that we could devote our time to study all of the materials in depth, and present the public with a comprehensive picture. However, learning processes have been limited. In some ways an opposite, and worrying, process emerged - a process of 'waiting' for the Commission's Report before energetic and determined action was taken to redress the failures that have been revealed.

6. Therefore we decided to publish initially an Interim Report, focusing on the decisions related to the start of the war. We did this in the hope that the relevant bodies would take urgent action to change and correct all the implications. We would like to reiterate and emphasize that we hope that this Partial Report, which concentrates on the functioning of the highest political and military echelons in their decision to move to war will not divert attention from the troubling overall picture revealed by the war as a whole.

7. The interim report includes a number of chapters dealing with the following subjects:

a. The Commission's perception of its role, and its attitude to recommendations in general and to recommendations dealing with specific persons in particular (chapter 2). We see the main task of a public commission of inquiry (or investigation) as determining findings and conclusions, and presenting them - with its recommendations - before the public and decision makers so that they can take action. A public commission should not, in most cases, replace the usual political decision-making processes and determine who should serve as a minister or senior military commander. Accordingly, we include personal conclusions in the interim report, without personal recommendations. However, we will reconsider this matter with regards to our Final Report, in view of the depiction of the war as a whole.

b. The way we balanced our desire to engage in a speedy and efficient investigation with the rights of those who may be negatively affected to 'natural justice' (chapter 3). The special stipulations of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in this regard do not apply to a governmental commission of Examination, but we regard ourselves, naturally, as working under the general principles of natural justice. The commission notified those who may be affected by its investigation, in detailed letters of invitation, of the ways in which they may be negatively affected, and enabled them to respond to allegations against them, without sending "notices of warning" and holding a quasi-judicial hearing before reaching out conclusions. We believe that in this way we provided all who may be negatively affected by our report with a full opportunity to answer all allegations against them.

c. The processes and developments in the period between the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon until July 11, 2006 which contributed to the background of the Lebanon War (chapter 4). These processes created much of the factual background against which the decision-makers had to operate on July 12th, and they are thus essential to both the understanding and the evaluation of the events of the war. Understanding them is also essential for drawing lessons from the events, whose significance is often broader than that of the war itself.

8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.

9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We place the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made. However, there are many others who share responsibility for the mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.

10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making processes can be summed up as follows:

a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not another effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired - which would have a high "cost" and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.

b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment', or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation level', or military preparations without immediate military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.

c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized the commencement of a military campaign without considering how to exit it.

d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action.

e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.

f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting would continue until they were achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.

11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been significantly better.

12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.

a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of 'his' government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.

b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front or of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.

c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationship between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.

d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of Israel's actions were not realistic and were not materializing.

e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.

13. The Minister of Defense is the minister responsible for overseeing the IDF, and he is a senior member of the group of leaders in charge of political-military affairs.

a. The Minister of Defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals.

b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he attended.

c. The Minister of Defense did not act within a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF's operational plans and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table - and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.

d. The Minister of Defense did not develop an independent assessment of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel's proper response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, of which he was in charge, and the Prime Minister.

e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defense failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defense during the war impaired Israel's ability to respond well to its challenges.

14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS's personal involvement with decision making within the army and in coordination with the political echelon was dominant.

a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.

b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of the arena was that there was a high probability that a military strike against Hezbollah would make such a move necessary.

c. The COS' responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational plans fitting the situation.

d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservations about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals and the authorized modes of actions.

e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and judgment.

15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the outcomes of the war, had many other partners. ...

Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

On Monday, April 30, the Inquiry Commission into the military campaign held in Lebanon in summer 2006, headed by former Justice Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, submitted to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense an interim report relating to the time from the IDF's exit from Lebanon to the soldiers' abduction on July 12, 2006 and to the time between July 12 and July 17, when the decision to move into war was taken. ...

Israel Insider:

"The prime minister had formulated his opinion without being presented with a detailed plan, and without demanding that such a plan be presented, and therefore he could not have analyzed its details and approved it.

"Furthermore, he did not demand to be presented with genuine alternatives to his own opinions, or exhibit due skepticism regarding the military's positions. In this he failed.

"The prime minister also failed when he had his government approve such decisions ... and by declaring unattainable objectives to the war, and that the fighting should continue until they were achieved."

Members of the Winograd Commission arrived at Olmert's Jerusalem office at 4 p.m. on Monday -- one hour before the report's release to the public -- and gave the Prime Minister and Defense Minister Amir Peretz copies of the report, for their inspection before its publication.

Upon receiving a copy of the report, Olmert thanked the members for their hard work and assured them, "We will study the report and act immediately ... so that we can implement the lessons, fix the failures, and make sure that in any future scenario of the State of Israel, the failures you have indicted are corrected."

Debka:

... Then, too, the Olmert government's handling of the Lebanon War last summer came in for scathing criticism in the interim report submitted Monday, April 30 by the team led by Judge Eliahu Winograd. But no demands were made for heads to roll. The final report due out in August 2007 is expected to be less kind to individual decision-makers. So the prime minister and his government can only count their future in months – not years.

The Belmont Club:

... The debacle experienced by Israel last summer was consequent to two fundamental mistakes. The first is that ceding the initiative to the enemy and withdrawing from contact while he is still advancing increases rather than decreases vulnerability. It does not "take troops out of harms' way". It sets them up for the slaughter. The second error is more fundamental. Disengagement is an act in which the enemy gets a vote. The Israeli public's desire for peace, which manifested itself in unilateral withdrawal, the abandonment of its allies and in the reluctance to give the give the slightest offense to its enemies could only have succeeded in ending the fighting if it had been matched by a similar desire on the part of its enemies.

... As it was, Israeli passivity only encouraged enemy boldness while it withered the sinews of the IDF. The crisis, when it came, consisted of a rain of unstoppable missiles deep within the territory of Israel itself. Not only was Israel sucked back into Lebanon, from which it had hoped never to return; but it was drawn back under conditions of the enemy's own choosing. Far from removing its soldiers the battlefield, the retreat had brought the battlefield back to its soldier's homes: to Israel itself. Most ironical of all, the appeasement, the concession, the attempts to win "world opinion" to Israel's side brought it no sympathy in the end. All it purchased was contempt for Israel and admiration for its enemies.

What lessons does the Winograd report have for America? None, I suspect. In Israel as in America, there are none so blind as those will not see.

Lisa Goldman - On the Face:

Also, most people seem to be ignoring the rather plentiful evidence pointing to the fact that the ground was laid for the failure of that war long before Olmert took office. For example, Aharon Ze'evi Farkash, who headed military intelligence until January 2006, told Yedioth on Monday that he warned former PM Ariel Sharon of a high risk of kidnappings on the northern border six months before the war, and that Sharon - who certainly had plenty of military experience - brushed his concerns aside. When I tagged along with Michael Totten on his April 2006 trip to the northern border, a young IDF captain told us very soberly that we really shouldn't be there, because "everything could explode at any moment." It's worth going back to read Michael's report to see that there's no way the army could have been unaware that Hezbollah was preparing to attack. And it's simply not credible to contend that the army didn't report what it saw in front of its eyes - a massive buildup of Hezbollah military force on the border - to the prime minister.

Don't get me wrong, I'm no Olmert fan. I just don't see any point in his resigning, because he's no more of a liar and a pathological narcissist than pretty much every other prominent Israeli politician (there are few less prominent politicians that I like and respect, but they're too principled and uncharismatic to go far in the shark-infested waters of high-profile politics). And besides, who would replace Olmert? The leader of the opposition, Bibi Netanyahu? Surely not!

A lot of people called Thursday's demonstration a great example of democracy in action. I saw it as a populist event without much purpose beyond the immediate goal of getting rid of the government. Finally, an issue that Left and Right could agree on! Everyone wanted Olmert out, everyone loved their country, let's forget that we usually disagree vehemently on the most fundamental issues affecting the state and go for a big group hug. I would be much more impressed if 200,000 people showed up to protest the fact that one-third of Israeli children live in poverty, or to support the striking university students who are expected to pay higher tuition whilst working for a living, after serving three years in the army, even as academic institutions are starved of funds.

Michael Totten - April 28, 2006:

“How dangerous is it here, really?” I asked the lieutenant.

“I say this to my guys every morning: Everything could explode at any moment. Just after I said it this morning a bus load of pensioners showed up on a field trip. An old woman brought us some food. It’s crazy. They shouldn’t be here. You shouldn’t be here.”

“What’s happening here is very unusual," Zvika, the Israeli Defense Forces Spokesman, said. But he wouldn't tell me what, exactly, was so unusual. Shortly after I left the country, a story broke in the Daily Telegraph that explained it.

Iran has moved into South Lebanon. Intelligence agents are helping Hezbollah construct watch towers fitted with one-way bullet-proof windows right next to Israeli army positions.

Here's what one officer said:
This is now Iran's front line with Israel.

Imshin - Not a Fish:

My feelings of betrayal are not because I think going to war with Hizballah was wrong. If anything, it was far too long coming. The Winograd Commission points to faulty decision making leading up to the war and in its first stage, but that doesn’t prove to me that the war was wrong. But then I haven’t read the full interim report, only what’s been in some of the papers.

No, my feelings of betrayal, which are completely subjective, are because I’ve got the feeling it was run all wrong; because the army was ill prepared; because the wrong people were running the show and they seem to have made all the wrong decisions; and all sorts of aggravating little details, for instance, that army intelligence seemed to have become so secretive that the people doing the job didn’t have the correct, updated information to do the job properly, and I have an unsettling fear that the information they did have was known by the enemy, and that the military equipment in emergency storage was antiquated (in a haunting reminder of 1973); and very much because of a feeling that the weaker elements of the northern population, those who couldn’t fend for themselves, were abandoned.

There was this feeling, all the time, that ordinary people were giving it their all - the young soldiers, the reservists, the families in the north, the people in the center of the country and the south that took them in - but that our leaders and our elite just couldn’t give a shit. They were too busy calling their stock brokers.

Link to complete text of Winograd interim report (PDF, 171 pages, Hebrew).

Eilat Terror Attack - January 29, 2006

The following post on the Eilat, Israel attack will be updated as new information becomes available.

Debka:

'Israeli military and security chiefs fear first Palestinian suicide bombing in Eilat, which killed 3 Israelis Monday, signals deadly new wave funded from Tehran and Damascus. The bomber, Mohamed Faisal al-Siksik, 21, from Gaza, blew himself up in a bakery in the Red Sea resort of Eilat Monday, Jan. 29, killing the two proprietors and a third Israeli. This was the first such attack the holiday paradise has ever experienced. DEBKAfile’s counter-terror sources report that the next wave of suicide attacks is expected to be mounted from Gaza and Sinai by the Palestinian Jihad Islami in conjunction with local al Qaeda cells with funding from Tehran and Damascus. Although two Palestinian groups – Jihad Islami and Fatah-al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed the attack, DEBKAfile’s counter-terror sources disclosed it was in fact the first joint operation of the third group, the Army of Believers – an al Qaeda cover name – and Jihad Islami of the new anti-Israel terror offensive. A senior Israeli officer familiar with the Israeli-Egyptian Sinai border region told DEBKAfile after the Eilat attack: “Olmert and Peretz have missed the train. Their policy of military restraint in the face of Qassam missile attacks and a terrorist build-up has given the most violent elements free rein to get set for a fresh, well-organized assault.” Some attacks may also come from the sea. He stressed: “It’s no use expecting the Egyptians to secure the Sinai border. Since Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip 15 months ago, the Egyptian-Gazan-Israeli borders are a highway for smugglers of terrorists, missiles, explosives and traffickers of every kind. The IDF is the only force capable of putting a stop to this traffic and suppressing the collaboration between Hamas, Jihad Islami, Fatah-al Aqsa Brigades and al Qaeda. Unfortunately, its hands are tied by the government.”'

Arutz Sheva:

For the first time, a suicide terrorist detonated himself in the southern port city of Eilat. After he hitchhiked to the city, the man who innocently drove him called the police - but too late.

Three Jews were murdered, and five people were treated for shock.

Initial reports implied that the explosion inside a small bakery in Eilat around 9:45 AM was caused by a gas canister explosion. However, shortly after 10:30, the police abruptly issued an announcement saying that it was the work of an Arab suicide terrorist. The police announced that the murderer had entered the bakery carrying a large bag and detonated himself. Three dead were reported, in addition to the terrorist himself.

The Al Aksa Brigades of Fatah - an arm of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah organization - and Islamic Jihad have claimed joint responsibility for the murderous attack. In general, Fatah's Al Aksa Brigades has shared responsibility with Islamic Jihad for the terror attacks against Israel over the past two years.

MK Levy urges response: 'National Union-NRP MK Yitzhak Levy urged Israel to react to the suicide bombing attack in Eilat, saying the government policy of restraint is a failure. "I believe that the government is erring by acting with restraint. We need to set a price tag for attacks like this," he said.' Eilat's mayor responds: 'Meir Yitzhak Halevi, mayor of Eilat, called the fact that suicide bombers had managed to infiltrate the city "very disturbing," and said that he hoped that city officials would soon have all the information necessary to address the threat.' Internal security minister cites infiltration: 'Internal Security Minister Avi Dichter said Monday afternoon that the bomber who killed three Eilat residents in a suicide attack on Monday morning had infiltrated Israel from Egypt, echoing the conclusion of all of the Israeli intelligence agencies.' A reservist who gave the terrorist a ride became suspicious: 'An Israeli reservist who gave a ride to Muhammed Faisal al-Saksak, the suicide bomber who killed three people in Eilat on Monday morning, said Monday evening that he had suspected al-Saksak was up to something, but that he could do nothing until the terrorist got out of the car. Lt.-Col. (res.) Yossi Voltinski said in an interview with Channel 10 that he had told the man to get out before reaching his destination. "Still, unfortunately, he succeeded in his plot," Voltinski lamented. "He succeeded in killing innocent people, and I don't feel good about that."' IRIS: 'The southern resort city of Eilat has had its first suicide bombing, thanks to the decision of Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert to turn over Gaza to Islamists. Precisely as I predicted the terrorist strategy was two-pronged: arm Gaza and then use that base to move terror into Israel. In this case, the suicide bomber apparently travelled from Gaza across the now open border to Egypt, and then through the desert border into Israel.'

Yaakov Katz, Jerusalem Post:

Immediately following the disengagement from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005, security officials began warning of the creation of a "terror triangle" connecting the Gaza Strip, Egypt and Israel.

With Israel out of Gaza and deployed tightly along the security fence, terror groups found it impossible to infiltrate into Israel in the traditional way - infiltrating settlements or IDF outposts inside and just outside the Strip. Now, their only way to launch attacks against Israel was with Kassam rockets - launched periodically at the Western Negev - and by sending terrorists to the Sinai and then across the border and into Israel.

With the attack scenario in hand, the IDF drew up a plan called "Hourglass" which called for the erection of an electronic fence along the 220 kilometer border with Egypt from Rafah until Eilat. In 2005, then-prime minister Ariel Sharon visited the border together with Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz and called for the establishment of a barrier at least in the 50 kilometer area near Eilat. In the end however, only NIS 100 million - out of the NIS 1.5 billion needed - was transferred by the government for the entire project.

On Monday, Israel's hourglass ran out, although senior officers predicted that the lone suicide attack would not be enough to prompt the government to begin dealing with the strategic threat knocking on Eilat's front door. ...

Debka: 'DEBKAfile’s military sources disclose that the Jihad Islami leader returned to the Gaza Strip on Jan 19 after a six-month absence in Damascus, Beirut and Tehran, during which his Syrian and Iranian masters appointed him chief of the organization in place of Abdallah Ramadan Shelah.

He arrived in Gaza carrying a large sum of cash allocated by the two governments for building a new terrorist militia in the Gaza Strip, West Bank and Sinai in conjunction with al Qaeda. The Islami Jihad plans to reinvent itself from an underground terrorist group to a military militia, like the Hamas special force. None of the authorities controlling the border terminal to the Gaza Strip, Israeli, Egyptian or European, interfered with al Hindi’s entry.

In Damascus and Beirut, the Jihad leader consulted with Qaeda elements operating in the Palestinian camps of Lebanon, under the title Fatah-Brigades of the Islamic Sword, the coming terror campaign against Israel. The Lebanon-based al Qaeda network maintains close operational ties with al Qaeda’s Gaza cell, which calls itself the Islamic Army and which participated in the kidnap of the Israeli soldier Gilead Shalit last June. The Islamic Army holds joint custody over the Israeli captive with Hamas. In his exchanges, al Hindi most likely worked on the details of the Eilat suicide bombing.'

UPDATE: 2200Z.

A7: IDF preparing response to bombing. "\'Defense Minister Amir Peretz has ordered the IDF to prepare for a counter-terrorist operation in the aftermath of Monday’s suicide bombing in Eilat. Peretz declared that no ceasefire will keep Israel from responding to terrorist attacks. Peretz met in Jerusalem with senior officers from the IDF and the General Security Services after the attack, which left three civilians dead and five in shock after a 21-year-old unemployed construction worker from Gaza blew himself up in the popular resort city. It is believed that the IDF will focus on destroying tunnels which lead from Gaza to Egypt and which are used by terrorists to smuggle weapons and infiltrate Israel. However, Peretz said he has no intention of giving details at this time, and will state only that the operation will be “against those who carry out terrorist activities.” ...'

YNet: Bombing victim Israel Samoliya identified. 'The name of one of the casualties in Monday's terror attack in Eilat was cleared for publication. The man, Israel Samoliya, an Eilat resident, was working at the bakery were the explosion took place. Samoliya's family, who lives in Miami, Florida, were notified of his death. Two other people were killed in the attack, their names have not yet been cleared for publication.'

UPDATE: 2300Z.

The Belmont Club: Actually aimed at other Palestinian factions." 'The interesting thing about the recent suicide bombing in Eilat, Israel -- which killed three persons at a bakery -- was that it wasn't aimed at Israel at all, except incidentally. The bombing was actually aimed at other Palestinian factions. The attack on Israel was an attempt to redirect days of continuous internal fighting to where it properly belonged. If properly is the word. Back to killing Jews. ... But Palestinian Jihad raised a valid point when it declared that the real problem was to "point the guns toward the occupation". The only part it has gotten wrong is in the identity of the occupiers. It is the army of thugs who have been coddled, funded and appeased by a timid and politically correct West who are the real occupiers of Muslim lands today.'

UPDATE: January 30, 0200Z.

CTB: First suicide attack in Eilat. 'The implications of today's suicide attack are multiple: first the Israeli government will be under pressure to act because it cannot allow one of its largest revenue source to be tarnished, i.e. tourism, second it seems almost sure now that the bomber did not come from Jordan as initially reported but rather from Egypt. Indeed Jordanian and Egyptian sources have confirmed this. According to TV station Al Arabyia, Egyptian authorities have recently arrested two members of that three men commando which was to strike in Eilat. ...'

JPost: Names of all three victims released. 'The names of all three victims of Monday's suicide bombing in an Eilat bakery were released for publication on Monday night. The two owners of the bakery, Amil Elimelech, 32, and Michael Ben Sa'adon, 27 were killed in the attack as well as one of their employees, Israel Samolia, 26. Elimelech was married with two children while Ben Sa'adon was married with one child. Samolia was an immigrant from Peru. His family, currently residing in Miami, was notified of his death by the Israeli consul.'

RELATED: Morning Report, January 29, 2007.

US, Iraqi forces kill terrorists in Najaf.

Reuters: 'U.S. and Iraqi forces killed 250 gunmen in a fierce battle involving U.S. tanks and helicopters on the outskirts of the Shi'ite holy city of Najaf on Sunday, a senior Iraqi police officer said. The day-long battle was continuing after nightfall, Colonel Ali Nomas told Reuters, as tens of thousands of pilgrims converged on the nearby city of Kerbala for the climax of the Ashura commemorations. A U.S. helicopter was shot down in the fighting, Iraq security sources said. The U.S. military declined comment. A Reuters reporter saw a helicopter come down trailing smoke.'

Wizbang: 'The US military isn't commenting on the helicopter that crashed because the mission is still ongoing, but I expect we'll have more successful missions where we send terrorists to their waiting virgins. The question is will the media actually report on our and the Iraqi troops' successes or will they completely ignore them?'

Debka: 'The US military confirmed the downing of the helicopter and the death of the two-man crew in fighting near Najef as hundreds of thousands of Shiite pilgrims converged on the Shiite shrine city of Karbala for the Ashura festival marking the 7th-century Battle of Karbala. The governor of Najef said Iraqi troops fought all day with hundreds of Sunni gunmen, including foreign fighters, who had plotted to murder Shiite clergy on the 10th day of the festival which falls on Monday. About twenty were captured, including a Sudanese national. They said they belonged to the Army of Imam Ahmed al-Yemeni.'

LGF thread here.

UPDATE: 2300Z.

Global Security: Iraqi officials report cult leader killed. ''Iraqi officials say the leader of an Islamic cult that was plotting to assassinate senior Shi'ite clerics was killed during a daylong battle near the holy city of Najaf on Sunday. Officials say the man led the Soldiers of Heaven group, and that it planned to assassinate the clerics Monday during the Shi'ite observance of Ashura. Cult members are both Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims. The leader claimed to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, and the group hoped to bring back the Mahdi, a messianic figure in Islam. Iraqi forces, backed by U.S. tanks and airstrikes, attacked the group on Sunday. An Iraqi spokesman Mohammed al-Askari said today that at least 200 militants were killed in the battle. More than 100 were detained. Earlier, officials said 300 militants had been killed.'

The Belmont Club: Heaven's Army. 'Whatever organization these individuals belong to, they had serious firepower, as evidenced by the cell phone video and their ability to down a US helicopter. Their religious identity remains mysterious, what with the Afghan robes and reports that it was headed by the "Madhi". But bizarre events do happen in the Third World. ...' Go to the link to read the post in full.

UPDATE: January 30, 1400Z.

Chicago Tribune: Cult leader reported killed. 'An apocalyptic Shiite cult leader claiming to be the messenger of a revered 9th Century figure was among more than 200 people killed in the fierce battles that erupted Sunday near the southern Shiite city of Najaf, Iraqi officials said Monday. Ahmed Bin al-Hassani, who headed a previously unknown group called the Soldiers of Heaven, was plotting to sow chaos in Iraq by assassinating top Shiite clerics in order to facilitate the return Tuesday of a messianic Shiite leader who went missing in 874, the officials said. That an obscure sect of Shiite fanatics was able to engage U.S. and Iraqi forces for almost 24 hours underscored the unpredictability of Iraq's political landscape as the U.S. military is focused on the sectarian violence raging in Baghdad and on hunting down Al Qaeda members.'

Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail: Background on the Army of Heaven cult. 'According to the intelligence source, the history of the organization behind the fighting in Najaf is sketchy, however what is clear is this was "an anti-Shi'ite establishment cult," which opposed both the Qom and Najaf schools of Shi'ite Islam as both schools did not recognize Ahmed Hassani al-Yemeni (or Diyah Abdul Zahraa Khadom), the cult's leader, as the Mahdi. Hassani's group received Saddam Hussein's support as it opposed both the leaders of the Iraqi Najaf school, as well as the Iranian Qom school. The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) infiltrated the group during Saddam's rule to maintain tabs on the organization's activities. After the fall of Saddam's regime, the remnants of the IIS maintained its connections with the organization. Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, the chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, two of the few Baathists leaders on the original 'Deck of Cards' remained free, and exercised control of the intelligence network. ... With the rise of Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the operational possibilities were expanded. Al-Masri is by far a more shrewed operational and political leader. The intelligence network picked up on the cult's desire to initiate its "end-times" beliefs by rising up and assassinating the Shia clerics during the festival of Ashura. Seeing an opening to foment chaos, al-Masri moved in elements of the Omar Brigade, the al-Qaeda unit tasked with attacking Shi'ites.' Go to the link for the full post.

YNet: Iraq reports 263 terrorists killed. 'Iraq's defense ministry said on Tuesday 263 militants from an obscure Shi'ite cult were killed and more than 500 arrested on Sunday in one of the largest battles since the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Ministry spokesman Mohammed al-Askari said Iraqi security forces arrested 502 people including 210 who had been wounded in the battle near the holy Shi'ite city of Najaf.'

Gateway Pundit: Well done, soldiers of Najaf! Gateway Pundit has a roundup and some great photos.

Saddam Hussein

A roundup of information on the deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. This post is under construction; it will be updated continuously and will stay at the top of the page.

Saddam Hussein, 1937-2006: Iraqi dictator. Full name: Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti. (Alternate spelling: Sadam Hosein.) Born April 28, 1937; died December 30, 2006. Official title: President of Iraq. Unofficial title: The Butcher of Baghdad. Ruled 1979 - 2003. Saddam Hussein was responsible for atrocities against the Iraqi people. He was executed at dawn on December 30, 2006 (Iraqi time; the night of December 29 in North America).

Chronology. Compiled from various sources.
April 28, 1937 (official date): Born in Tikrit.
1957: Joins the Ba'ath Party.
July 16, 1979: Assumes power as president of Iraq.
September 22, 1980: Iraq invades Iran; beginning of the long and bloody Iran-Iraq war, formerly referred to as the "Gulf War" and known in Iraq as the Qadissiyyah (or Qadissiyyat Saddam).
1986-1989: Anfal campaign of genocide against Iraqi Kurds, headed by Saddam's cousin from Tikrit, Ali Hasan al-Majid, known as "Chemical Ali".
March 1988: Attack on Halabja.
August 20, 1988: End of the Iran-Iraq war.
August 2, 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait. Beginning of the (Second) Gulf War. United States and allies respond with Operation Desert Shield / Desert Storm.
January 29, 1991: Iraqi forces attack Khafji, Saudi Arabia.
February 28, 1991: Cessation of hostilities declared; Gulf War effectively ends. Iraq accepts terms of cease-fire on April 6.
March 20, 2003: US-led forces invade Iraq in Operaton Iraqi Freedom.
April 9, 2003: Baghdad falls to US and Coalition forces.
December 13, 2003: Saddam Hussein is captured in a "spider-hole" at a farmhouse in ad-Dawr, near Tikrit.
November 5, 2006: Convicted in absentia of crimes against humanity for the mass killings at Dujail by the Special Tribunal; sentenced to death by hanging.
December 30, 2006: Executed.

Early career and rise to power. Wikipedia:

Saddam Hussein Kazmi (link to Arabic name information) was born in the town of Al-Awja, 13 kilometres (8 mi) from the Iraqi town of Tikrit in the Sunni Triangle, to a family of shepherds. His mother, Subha Tulfah al-Mussallat, named her newborn son "Saddam", which in Arabic means "One who confronts". He never knew his father, Hussein 'Abd al-Majid, who disappeared six months before Saddam was born. He was the son of Musa Al-Kazim, one of the Sunni Imams of the Ahlul Bait. Shortly afterward, Saddam's 13-year-old brother died of cancer, leaving his mother severely depressed in the final months of the pregnancy. The infant Saddam was sent to the family of his maternal uncle, Khairallah Talfah, until he was three.[From Elisabeth Bumiller's interview of Jerrold M. Grumpkin, the founder of the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior at the CIA in the New York Times (15 May 2004) on the importance of events during Saddam Hussein's youth. It can be read online at History News Network. The interviewee's surname appears as Post in the HNN article. - aa]

The Ba'ath Party. Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Hussein joined the Ba'th Socialist Party in 1957. He participated in an unsuccessful attempt by Ba'thists to assassinate the Iraqi prime minister, Abdul Karim Kassem, and, wounded, escaped to Syria and then Egypt. There he attended Cairo Law School (1962-63) and continued his studies at Baghdad Law College after the Ba'thists took power in 1963. After the Ba'thists were overthrown that same year, Hussein spent several years in prison in Iraq. He again escaped, becoming a leader of the Ba'th party, and was instrumental to the coup that brought the party to power in 1968. Hussein then effectively held power in that country along with the head of state, President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. [1]

Presidency. Britannica:

Hussein began to assert open control over the government in 1979, becoming president upon Bakr's resignation in that year. Hussein then became chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and prime minister, among other positions. He used an extensive secret-police establishment to suppress any internal opposition to his rule, and made himself the object of an extensive personality cult among the Iraqi public. [1]

Controversy over Iraq War.
Open letter from Rania Kashi, 2003:

I am writing this email after a lot of deliberation about whether I have the right to argue the case for an invasion in Iraq. But in the end I have decided that if I keep quiet I have more to lose.

My parents, my family, are from Iraq. My parents fled from Iraq some twenty-three years ago leaving everything and everyone behind. At that point, seventeen of our relatives had been “disappeared” or imprisoned for no reason whatsoever.

They sought refuge in Kuwait for four years, but once again were forced to flee with us (my brother and I) when Saddam had the Kuwaitis deport the Iraqi men back to Iraq. On the border he had these returnees shot dead.

We were lucky; we made it safely to Britain. My father was lucky – his brother was caught trying to escape, and tortured. So here I am, nineteen years later, never having set foot in the country of my parents.

The anti-“war” feeling prevalent among most people I speak to seems to me totally misjudged and misplaced. (Incidentally, the quotation marks here are deliberate: in truth it will be no war, but an invasion. A war presumes relatively equal forces battling against each other, with resistance on both sides. A US-led force will encounter no resistance from the Iraqi people nor the army).

I have to be honest here and say that, to me, this feeling is based partly on a great misunderstanding of the situation in Iraq, and partly on people’s desire to seem “politically rebellious” against the big, bad Americans. ...

Full text at the link.

Zainab al-Suwaij, February 2003:

As war with Iraq draws closer, commentators, journalists, and policymakers frequently question whether the Iraqi people would really support the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. But that question has already been answered. Although Americans remember the Gulf war, many do not realize that, for a few momentous days immediately after it, much of Iraq rose up in open rebellion against Saddam's regime. In fact, 15 out of 18 Iraqi provinces rebelled. I was one of the rebels.

For over a decade, I have stayed silent about what I saw. But now, as the world considers freeing Iraq from Saddam's rule, I feel compelled to bear witness to the last time Iraqis tried to liberate their country.

In February 1991, I was living with my grandparents in Karbala, a city of roughly 350,000 an hour southwest of Baghdad. The Gulf war was raging, and my family and I often listened to Voice of America for news free of Iraqi-government control. We heard President George H.W. Bush repeatedly assure us that if the Iraqi people rose up against Saddam, the United States stood ready to help them. "There's another way for the bloodshed to stop," Bush had said, "and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside." I was excited by Bush's words, but, after two decades of living under the brutal rule of Saddam's Baath Party, it was impossible for me to imagine we would ever be liberated. Even though millions of Iraqis dreamed of overthrowing Saddam, we were afraid to speak about it and doubted anyone would ever come to help us. I felt the world had abandoned us. ...

Full text at the link.

Fall from power, capture, and execution.
This section under construction.
Wikipedia has a photo of Samir, a 34-year-old Iraqi-American, pinning Saddam at the time of his capture in Operation Red Dawn.
Wikipedia: Operation Red Dawn.

Operation Red Dawn was a military operation conducted by the United States armed forces on December 13, 2003 in the small town of ad-Dawr in Iraq, near Tikrit. The operation resulted in the capture of the country's former president Saddam Hussein, and put to rest rumours of his death. The operation, and its two main objectives, were named for the 1984 film Red Dawn.

The operation was assigned to the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division, the Raider Brigade. 600 soldiers participated, including cavalry, engineers, artillery, air support, and special forces, under the overall command of Colonel James Hickey of the 4th Infantry Division. ...

Debka:

His trial for the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Kurds was interrupted by his death. Palestinians esteem him for aiding Yasser Arafat and their war against Israel with generous grants to suicide killers and their families. In the first Gulf War in 1991, he fired 39 Scud missiles against Tel Aviv, although Israel did not take part in the war.

Iraq the Model, December 29, 2006: 'Meanwhile lots of updates are coming through news TV here; al-Arabiya reporter said the noose is already set in a yard in the IZ. Al-Hurra reported that preparations for the execution are underway and no delay is expected. ... -Bahaa' al-Aaraji, a Sadrist and member of the parliament's legal commission told al-Iraqiya TV that two execution sites have been prepared; one in the IZ and one in another location he wouldn't disclose. -Al-Aaraji told al-Iraqiya TV that the government is asking clerics whether it's allowed to carry out executions during religious holidays. He added that he expects Saddam to be executed no later than noon tomorrow.'

The Mesopotamian: 'But it must be admitted, that there is haste to execute Saddam for reasons other than simply justice and revenge; there are political considerations. The Government wants to get this over and done with as quickly as possible to forestall any unforeseen impediments, and in order not give his followers and supporters time to plan something. Besides, Saddam is still a symbol for some, and you may remember the demonstrations in Diala, Salahuldin and elsewhere brandishing his photos and shouting the famous slogan “with Souls, with Blood, we sacrifice our lives for you”. And then there is the so-called “Return Party”, which is a group of Baathist terrorists calling for the return of the Saddam regime under his leadership. Therefore, it is of political urgency to eliminate this symbol and put an end to any hopes and illusions of a return to the previous state of affairs. Due to the extreme personality cult that Saddam had cultivated, it would be difficult for "the enemy" to find a new convincing father figure. Also it is an act of defiance in the face of all the terrorists, the Bin Ladins & Co., the international chorus and etc. etc.; here we are stringing up your Saddam and you “can ride your highest horses” as the Iraqi proverb goes. We are not afraid of your car bombs, suicide bombers, I.E.D’s etc. etc.'

Hyscience links to video of the Saddam Hussein execution.

Wizbang clears up a point of grammar. 'I was delighted to know that Saddam Hussein was hanged. I have no interest whatsoever in knowing whether or not he was hung. They are NOT the same thing, people.'

The Wikipedia team debates the execution of Saddam Hussein.

In beginning of article, there is profanity that I can [not] edit out, because the page is closed to editing. Would someone with the ability to edit this page please remove the part in the beginning about him being a "PIECE OF S***" even though he really is. Unfortunately, it presents a bias point of view, even though it's just saying it like it is...
15:42, 31 December 2006 (UTC)

Noting that Saddam was "pwned" is not necessarily vandalism...

CBC News: 'Saddam, who ruled Iraq with an iron grip for almost 25 years, was hanged in Baghdad around 6 a.m. local time Saturday (10 p.m. ET Friday) in Baghdad's Green Zone, according to state-run Iraqiya television. "Criminal Saddam was hanged to death," the report said. The station played patriotic music and showed images of national monuments and other landmarks. The station also quoted Iraqi security adviser Mouwafak al-Rubaie as saying Saddam "totally surrendered" and did not resist before being led to the gallows.'

Crimes against humanity.
Anfal campaign - Wikipedia:

The Anfal campaign began in 1986 and lasted until 1989, and was headed by Ali Hasan al-Majid, a cousin of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The Anfal campaign included the use of ground offensives, aerial bombing, systematic destruction of settlements, mass deportation, concentration camps, firing squads, and the chemical warfare, which earned al-Majid the nickname of "Chemical Ali".
Thousands -- and most likely tens of thousands -- of civilians were killed during chemical and conventional bombardments stretching from the spring of 1987 through the fall of 1988. The attacks were part of a long-standing campaign that destroyed almost every Kurdish village in Iraq -- along with a centuries-old way of life -- and displaced at least a million of the country's estimated 3.5 million Kurdish population. [Human Rights Watch]
Independent sources estimate 50,000 to more than 100,000 deaths; the Kurds claim about 182,000 people were killed. Amnesty International collected the names of more than 17,000 people who had "disappeared" during 1988. [Amnesty International] The campaign has been characterized as genocidal in nature, notably before a court in The Hague. It is also characterized as gendercidal, because "battle-age" men were the primary targets, according to Human Rights Watch/Middle East (hereafter, HRW/ME).

Gateway Pundit reviews the highlights of Saddam's career.

Over 3,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed by Saddam Hussein duing his genocide campaign against the northern minority. (Academic.regis.edu)
... 148 Iraqis were murdered by the Saddam Regime including children in the village of Dujail, north of Baghdad, in 1982.
... Official Iraqi documents recovered after the fall of Saddam regime suggest a staggering 5 million executions were made during Baath era alone. Over 10 million were also imprisoned. They were all Shias save a small percentage of Kurds.